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18 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1842–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Perrygreen1 sentence2022While this Court’s decision in Perry did not establish a blanket rule requiring a PCRA petitioner to call counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged, we did find that without Appellate Counsel’s testimony, the PCRA court was unable to determine whether counsel had a reasonable basis for her actions, which was fatal to Perry’s ineffectiveness claim.11 See Perry, 128 A.3d at 1290 (“Instantly, Perry failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to assert on appeal that Perry was entitled to a ____________________________________________ 11 Because this Co | 1 | 1 |
In Re LDFgreen1 sentence2020In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 2003) (noting that abuse of discretion is “not merely an error of judgment, but also a conclusion that the law has been overridden or misapplied, or judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of prejudice, bias, or ill-will as shown by the record”). | 1 | 1 |
Harasym v. Harasymgreen2 sentences2016Generally, when addressing issues concerning equitable distribution, we are guided by the following: “Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a marital property distribution is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure.” Harasym v. Harasym, 418 Pa. Super. 486 , 614 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. Super. 1992). 2016Generally, when addressing issues concerning equitable distribution, we are guided by the following: “Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a marital property distribution is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure.” Harasym v. Harasym, 418 Pa. Super. 486 , 614 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. Super. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cherrygreen2 sentences1990“While we view evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth in testing sufficiency, and thus resolve ambiguities and disputes in the Commonwealth’s favor, ... in testing whether the evidence is overwhelming, those same ambiguities and disputes are crucial to the determination of whether the evidence compelled the result reached.” Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 307, n. 12 , 378 A.2d 800, 806, n. 12 (1977). 1990“While we view evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth in testing sufficiency, and thus resolve ambiguities and disputes in the Commonwealth’s favor, ... in testing whether the evidence is overwhelming, those same ambiguities and disputes are crucial to the determination of whether the evidence compelled the result reached.” Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 307, n. 12 , 378 A.2d 800, 806, n. 12 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
McCULLOUGH ET VIR v. WCAB (XEROX C.)green1 sentence1990Karzenoski , 96 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 612-13, 508 A.2d 621 . | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Wardgreen1 sentence1942Order affirmed. 1 $870, less an admitted error of $30.' 2 Payments of rent made on a lease of real estate without any special appropriation will be “applied to the extinguishment of the rents which first accrued.” Reed v. Ward, supra, p. 151. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Dent
green
1 sentence2024Appellant insists that the testimony from law enforcement constituted evidence presented in the form of oblique narratives relating to the course of police investigation, which would allow the jury to “accept third- party declarations as substantive evidence of guilt without giving the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (Appellant’s Brief at 47) (citing Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 671 , 863 A.2d 1143 (2004)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Com. v. Dulin
green
1 sentence2024Appellant insists that the testimony from law enforcement constituted evidence presented in the form of oblique narratives relating to the course of police investigation, which would allow the jury to “accept third- party declarations as substantive evidence of guilt without giving the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (Appellant’s Brief at 47) (citing Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 671 , 863 A.2d 1143 (2004)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Western Center, Department of Public Welfare v. Hoon
green
1 sentence2019Hoon, 598 A.2d at 1045 . 9 Moreover, the Department’s post hoc attempt to distinguish Barnes from the male COTs based on the admitted violation of the Code of Ethics is unavailing because her pre-termination evaluations did not mention the incident and Rowe admitted that this isolated incident was not the motivating reason for Barnes’ removal. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2015The court explained, “This error was noted by this [c]ourt at trial and did not change the determination that the stop was lawful in light of the affiant’s other observations regarding Appellant’s driving behavior.” Id. -6- J-A03027-15 Based on our review of the suppression hearing transcript, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, with the exception of its erroneous recollection that the officer observed Appellant cross over the centerline of the roadway. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Krushauskas v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2012Although the majority concludes that the WCJ was empowered to treat the penalty petition as a suspension petition as well because “[ujnder the specific facts of this case, Claimant clearly had notice that a suspension was possible, and Claimant was given an opportunity to defend against it” 56 A.3d at 72 , the question raised here is whether a defense raised in opposition to a penalty petition for an admitted violation of the Act falls outside the general rule that if an employer wants to change the character of the disability, it must file a petition specifically requesting the relief sought. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
West Torresdale Civic Ass'n v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
green
2 sentences1995West Torres-dale Civic Assoc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 525 Pa. 106 , 576 A.2d 352 (1988). .Since through an admitted error on the part of the Board, each of the parties received a different written notification, we must turn then to equity principles, i.e. the concept of “vested rights.” We can see no reason, however, why the writing received by the Brunos should be considered more “valid” than the contrary notice from the Board received by Ms. Talio. . 1995West Torres-dale Civic Assoc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 525 Pa. 106 , 576 A.2d 352 (1988). .Since through an admitted error on the part of the Board, each of the parties received a different written notification, we must turn then to equity principles, i.e. the concept of “vested rights.” We can see no reason, however, why the writing received by the Brunos should be considered more “valid” than the contrary notice from the Board received by Ms. Talio. . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick
green
2 sentences1991Finally, I would overrule Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 521 Pa. 264 , 555 A.2d 883 (1989), which is an aberration designed to insulate a miscreant from peer review for acts which were an admitted violation of an attorney’s oath of office. 1991Finally, I would overrule Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 521 Pa. 264 , 555 A.2d 883 (1989), which is an aberration designed to insulate a miscreant from peer review for acts which were an admitted violation of an attorney’s oath of office. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Meitner v. State Real Estate Commission
green
2 sentences1986In Meitner v. State Real Estate Commission, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 426 , 275 A.2d 417 (1971), this court found that a penalty imposed on a licensed real estate broker by the State Real Estate Commission for an admitted violation of the law was harsh under the circumstances, and remanded the cáse to the State Real Estate Commission for a reconsideration of the penalty imposed. 1986In Meitner v. State Real Estate Commission, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 426 , 275 A.2d 417 (1971), this court found that a penalty imposed on a licensed real estate broker by the State Real Estate Commission for an admitted violation of the law was harsh under the circumstances, and remanded the cáse to the State Real Estate Commission for a reconsideration of the penalty imposed. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1983It merely calls for the court to make a finding of fact. [That is, i]nferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances[.]" Id. at 675 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 . 1983It merely calls for the court to make a finding of fact. [That is, i]nferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances[.]" Id. at 675 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Valley Forge Golf Club, Inc. Tax Appeal
green
2 sentences1980Id. at 650 , 285 A.2d at 216 . 1980Id. at 650 , 285 A.2d at 216 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973
green
2 sentences1979That section declares it unlawful: “(1) For any licensee or the board, or any employe, servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages, or to permit any liquor or *367 malt or brewed beverages to be sold, furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits.” In Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626 , 198 A.2d 550 (1964), the Court held that a licensee who violated 4 the above section wa 1979That section declares it unlawful: “(1) For any licensee or the board, or any employe, servant or agent of such licensee or of the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages, or to permit any liquor or *367 malt or brewed beverages to be sold, furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits.” In Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626 , 198 A.2d 550 (1964), the Court held that a licensee who violated 4 the above section wa | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Burt v. Burt
neutral
2 sentences1959Appellant also relies strongly on Burt v. Burt, 218 Pa. 198 , 67 A. 210 . 1959Appellant also relies strongly on Burt v. Burt, 218 Pa. 198 , 67 A. 210 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Hunt v. Rousmanier's Administrators
green
1 sentence1842And the reason given by Chief Justice Marshall in Hunt v. Rousmanier, ( 8 Wheat. 174 ), is, thatHhe agent, having the legal title in the property, is capable of transferringJt in his own name, notwithstanding the death of the principal; ana the death of the principal has no operation upon his act. | 1 | 1842–1842 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.