admitted exception in California

2015Thus, the admitted error the Board made in initially rejecting the reconsideration petition as untimely, even assuming the error resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, does not excuse petitioners from raising the issue of the adequacy of the Board’s CEQA findings in their reconsideration petition.9 9 We also reject petitioners’ argument, raised for the first time in their reply brief, that they fall within an exception to the exhaustion requirement found in section 21177, subdivision (e). “ ‘[P]oints raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown

2015Thus, the admitted error the Board made in initially rejecting the reconsideration petition as untimely, even assuming the error resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, does not excuse petitioners from raising the issue of the adequacy of the Board’s CEQA findings in their reconsideration petition.9 9 We also reject petitioners’ argument, raised for the first time in their reply brief, that they fall within an exception to the exhaustion requirement found in section 21177, subdivision (e). “ ‘[P]oints raised in the reply brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown

1967This case falls into the latter category, and error cannot be predicated on counsel's admitted mistake in judgment. [17] Even if the attorney's admitted error in judgment be considered as evidencing lack of preparation and general competence — which for the reasons set forth above is not apparent — the defendant must also show that the omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a crucial defense from the case. ( People v. Ibarra, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 464; People v. Kirchner, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d at p. 86 .) The ultimate issue is not the validity of the search warrant, but the use of the testim

1967(People v. Ibarra, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 464; People v. Kirchner, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d at p. 86 .) The ultimate issue is not the validity of the search warrant, but the use of the testimony of what was observed and the use of the physical evidence which was seized after the entry of defendant’s brother’s house.

1954(Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 366 [ 188 P.2d 755 ]; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 [ 270 P.2d 613 ].) Duffy v. Duffy, 82 Cal.App.2d 203 [ 186 P.2d 61 ], Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ], Ringwalt v. Bank of America Assn., 3 Cal.2d 680 [ 45 P.2d 967 ], and other cases cite with approval the illustrations in this quotation from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ] : “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule, in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision

1954(Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 366 [ 188 P.2d 755 ]; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 [ 270 P.2d 613 ].) Duffy v. Duffy, 82 Cal.App.2d 203 [ 186 P.2d 61 ], Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ], Ringwalt v. Bank of America Assn., 3 Cal.2d 680 [ 45 P.2d 967 ], and other cases cite with approval the illustrations in this quotation from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ] : “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule, in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision

1932Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to- represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real co

1915Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced upon him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court; a false promise of a compromise or where the defendant had never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; . . . and similar cases which show that there never has been a real contest at the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained, to set aside the former judgment or decree and open the case for a new and fair hearing." Further discussing the prop

2024First, as previously noted, the McCoy court reaffirmed that counsel may decide “ ‘what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence.’ ” (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 422 .) Second, the McCoy court explained that its recognition of a limited right in a defendant to “decide whether to maintain his innocence” (id. at p. 423) would not displace counsel’s “trial management role[]” (ibid.), and it supported this point by noting that a client need not consent to counsel’s determination of “the witnesses to call” (ibid.)

2016The trial court (Lucena, J.) reinstated defendant’s probation, subject to a waiver of prior custody credits pursuant to People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183 , and ordered him to complete an intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment program.

2013Lamar was awarded a total of 420 days of credit, consisting of 366 days of custody credits and 54 days of conduct credits.8 6 Just prior to the jury rendering its verdict, the codefendants waived their right to a jury trial on the remaining sentencing enhancement allegations. 7 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 . 8 In the probation violation case, Lamar was awarded 647 days of credit--563 custody plus 84 conduct. 11 As to Deshawn, after denying his motion to strike his prior juvenile adjudication for sentencing purposes, the court sentenced him to a total term of 11 years

2013(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-188 .) The minute order entered after the hearing indicates that the minor admitted a violation of section “25400(c)(2)”—a subdivision not referenced in the amended petition.

1969There was no issue concerning the admitted violation of Penal Code section 12021, and the court properly concluded that the homicide, if not a felony-murder, was ‘ ‘ as a matter of law, at least murder in the second degree.” (See People v. Ford, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 58 .) The issues of diminished capacity and intoxication (see infra) were raised as a defense to the robbery charge, and the jury was fully instructed on those issues.

1966However, defendant makes no complaint on that score. 9 Both Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 577 [ 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ], decided June 20, 1966 and People v. Graves, 64 Cal.2d 208 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 411 P.2d 114 ] contain strong dicta to that effect; see also People v. Harper, 115 Cal.App.2d 776, 779 [ 252 P.2d 950 ]; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) §2.05; Annotation 171 A.L.R. 1144 , 1177-1178, 1192-1196; 8 Wigmore, McNaughton Revision, § 2265.

1966However, defendant makes no complaint on that score. 9 Both Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 577 [ 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ], decided June 20, 1966 and People v. Graves, 64 Cal.2d 208 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 411 P.2d 114 ] contain strong dicta to that effect; see also People v. Harper, 115 Cal.App.2d 776, 779 [ 252 P.2d 950 ]; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) §2.05; Annotation 171 A.L.R. 1144 , 1177-1178, 1192-1196; 8 Wigmore, McNaughton Revision, § 2265.

1966However, defendant makes no complaint on that score. 9 Both Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 577 [ 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ], decided June 20, 1966 and People v. Graves, 64 Cal.2d 208 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 411 P.2d 114 ] contain strong dicta to that effect; see also People v. Harper, 115 Cal.App.2d 776, 779 [ 252 P.2d 950 ]; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) §2.05; Annotation 171 A.L.R. 1144 , 1177-1178, 1192-1196; 8 Wigmore, McNaughton Revision, § 2265.

1966However, defendant makes no complaint on that score. 9 Both Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 577 [ 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 ], decided June 20, 1966 and People v. Graves, 64 Cal.2d 208 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 411 P.2d 114 ] contain strong dicta to that effect; see also People v. Harper, 115 Cal.App.2d 776, 779 [ 252 P.2d 950 ]; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) §2.05; Annotation 171 A.L.R. 1144 , 1177-1178, 1192-1196; 8 Wigmore, McNaughton Revision, § 2265.

1965Code, § 11532), the only question is whether the tape recording of a telephone conversation between defendant and the minor was admitted in violation of the rule announced in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ], Since no contentions are raised concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, a brief review of the pertinent facts will suffice.

1965Code, § 11532), the only question is whether the tape recording of a telephone conversation between defendant and the minor was admitted in violation of the rule announced in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ], Since no contentions are raised concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, a brief review of the pertinent facts will suffice.

1957Such was pronounced by the supreme court to be the admitted principle in the cases of Little v. Moore, 4 N.J.L. 74, 75 [7 Am.Dee. 574]; Taylor v. Doremus, 16 N.J.L. 473, 476 ; Mangold v. Thorpe, 33 N.J.L. 134, 137 ; and by this court in Loftus v. Fraz, 43 N.J.L. 667 .

1957Such was pronounced by the supreme court to be the admitted principle in the cases of Little v. Moore, 4 N.J.L. 74, 75 [7 Am.Dee. 574]; Taylor v. Doremus, 16 N.J.L. 473, 476 ; Mangold v. Thorpe, 33 N.J.L. 134, 137 ; and by this court in Loftus v. Fraz, 43 N.J.L. 667 .

1957Such was pronounced by the supreme court to be the admitted principle in the cases of Little v. Moore, 4 N.J.L. 74, 75 [7 Am.Dee. 574]; Taylor v. Doremus, 16 N.J.L. 473, 476 ; Mangold v. Thorpe, 33 N.J.L. 134, 137 ; and by this court in Loftus v. Fraz, 43 N.J.L. 667 .

1955Fuentes v. Panella, 120 Cal.App.2d 175 , holds (p. 183 [ 260 P.2d 853 ]): “But these cases do not stand for the proposition that excuse instructions can be given only where there is an admitted violation and the violator offers evidence of justification for such violation.

1955Fuentes v. Panella, 120 Cal.App.2d 175 , holds (p. 183 [ 260 P.2d 853 ]): “But these cases do not stand for the proposition that excuse instructions can be given only where there is an admitted violation and the violator offers evidence of justification for such violation.

1955(Giavoc chini v. Bank of America, 39 Cal.App.2d 444, 447 [ 103 P.2d 603 ] ; Baker v. Baker, 217 Cal. 216 [ 18 P.2d 61 ].) In Metzger v. Vestal, 2 Cal.2d 517, 524 [ 42 P.2d 67 ], the court said: “As types of extrinsic fraud, the courts of appellate jurisdiction of this state have adopted the classic definition, found in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ], in which the Supreme Court of the United States said: ‘ But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversar

1955(Giavoc chini v. Bank of America, 39 Cal.App.2d 444, 447 [ 103 P.2d 603 ] ; Baker v. Baker, 217 Cal. 216 [ 18 P.2d 61 ].) In Metzger v. Vestal, 2 Cal.2d 517, 524 [ 42 P.2d 67 ], the court said: “As types of extrinsic fraud, the courts of appellate jurisdiction of this state have adopted the classic definition, found in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ], in which the Supreme Court of the United States said: ‘ But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversar

1954(Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 366 [ 188 P.2d 755 ]; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 [ 270 P.2d 613 ].) Duffy v. Duffy, 82 Cal.App.2d 203 [ 186 P.2d 61 ], Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ], Ringwalt v. Bank of America Assn., 3 Cal.2d 680 [ 45 P.2d 967 ], and other cases cite with approval the illustrations in this quotation from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ] : “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule, in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision

1954(Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 366 [ 188 P.2d 755 ]; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 [ 270 P.2d 613 ].) Duffy v. Duffy, 82 Cal.App.2d 203 [ 186 P.2d 61 ], Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ], Ringwalt v. Bank of America Assn., 3 Cal.2d 680 [ 45 P.2d 967 ], and other cases cite with approval the illustrations in this quotation from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ] : “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule, in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision

1954(Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 366 [ 188 P.2d 755 ]; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 [ 270 P.2d 613 ].) Duffy v. Duffy, 82 Cal.App.2d 203 [ 186 P.2d 61 ], Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ], Ringwalt v. Bank of America Assn., 3 Cal.2d 680 [ 45 P.2d 967 ], and other cases cite with approval the illustrations in this quotation from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ] : “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule, in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision

1954(Gale v. Witt, 31 Cal.2d 362, 366 [ 188 P.2d 755 ]; Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 161 [ 270 P.2d 613 ].) Duffy v. Duffy, 82 Cal.App.2d 203 [ 186 P.2d 61 ], Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477 [ 89 P. 317 ], Ringwalt v. Bank of America Assn., 3 Cal.2d 680 [ 45 P.2d 967 ], and other cases cite with approval the illustrations in this quotation from United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 [ 25 L.Ed. 93 ] : “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule, in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to the suit, there was, in fact, no adversary trial or decision