18 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1982–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
La Frankie v. Miklichgreen2 sentences2022See Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s intentional tort claim against prison employees, reasoning that where “an employee of a Commonwealth agency [is] acting within the scope of his or her duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims”); La Frankie v. Miklich, . . . 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992) (same). 2021See Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s intentional tort claim against prison employees, reasoning that where “an employee of a Commonwealth agency [is] acting within the scope of his or her duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims”); La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth.1992) (same). | 3 | 4 |
Williams v. Stickmangreen2 sentences2022See Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s intentional tort claim against prison employees, reasoning that where “an employee of a Commonwealth agency [is] acting within the scope of his or her duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims”); La Frankie v. Miklich, . . . 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992) (same). 2021See Williams v. Stickman, 917 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an inmate’s intentional tort claim against prison employees, reasoning that where “an employee of a Commonwealth agency [is] acting within the scope of his or her duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims”); La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth.1992) (same). | 2 | 2 |
Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co.green2 sentences1989See e.g., Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 595 , 252 A.2d 646 (1969), (a decedent who was killed as a result of his employer’s alleged willful and unlawful conduct was bound to the provisions of the WCA and was precluded from bringing an action at common law). 1989See e.g., Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 595 , 252 A.2d 646 (1969), (a decedent who was killed as a result of his employer’s alleged willful and unlawful conduct was bound to the provisions of the WCA and was precluded from bringing an action at common law). | 1 | 2 |
Higgins v. Clearing MacHine Corp.green2 sentences1989Higgins v. Clearing Machine Corporation, 344 Pa. Super. 325, 330 , 496 A.2d 818, 821 (1985). 1989Higgins v. Clearing Machine Corporation, 344 Pa. Super. 325, 330 , 496 A.2d 818, 821 (1985). | 1 | 2 |
American & Foreign Insurance v. Jerry's Sport Center, Inc.green1 sentence2023However, if any one claim in the complaint is potentially covered by the policy, the insurer is obligated to provide a defense to the insured in the action, as “it is the potential, rather than the certainty, of a claim falling within the insurance policy that triggers the insurer’s duty to defend.” See id. at 541 (holding that an insurer is obligated to defend its insured if the factual allegations of the complaint on its face encompass an injury that is actually or potentially within the scope of the policy). | 1 | 1 |
Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.green2 sentences1995Id. 521 Pa. 36 , 555 A.2d at 770 (citations omitted). 1995Id. 521 Pa. 36 , 555 A.2d at 770 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Millison v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green2 sentences1987See Millison v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 , 501 A.2d 505 (1985). 1987See Millison v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161 , 501 A.2d 505 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Koslop v. Cabot Corp.green2 sentences1987See also Koslop v. Cabot Corp., 622 F.Supp. 222, 224 (M.D.Pa.1985) (“the weight of authority supports the continued recognition of the intentional tort exception [to the “exclusivity” provision of the Act].”). 1987See also Koslop v. Cabot Corp., 622 F.Supp. 222, 224 (M.D.Pa.1985) ("the weight of authority supports the continued recognition of the intentional tort exception [to the "exclusivity" provision of the Act]."). | 1 | 1 |
Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences1987Even more recently, this court explicitly stated: "[A]n action can lie against the employer itself if it harmed its employee through an intentional wrongful act.” Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 356 Pa.Super. 532, 539 , 515 A.2d 21, 24-25 (1985). 1987Even more recently, this court explicitly stated: "[A]n action can lie against the employer itself if it harmed its employee through an intentional wrongful act.” Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 356 Pa.Super. 532, 539 , 515 A.2d 21, 24-25 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Readinger v. Gottschall
green
2 sentences1989Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa.Super. 134 , 191 A.2d 694 (1963). 1989Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa.Super. 134 , 191 A.2d 694 (1963). | 3 | 1982–1989 |
Brooks v. Marriott Corp.
green
2 sentences1991The Defendants also argue, in support of their preliminary objections, that Brown might have attacked a different person, regardless of who it was, in Sabot’s position, and therefore the attack falls outside the intentional tort exception to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 411(1); Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114 , 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Plum, 20 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 35, 340 A.2d 637 (1975); Brooks v. Marriott Corporation, 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 , 522 A.2d 618 (1987); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa. 1991The Defendants also argue, in support of their preliminary objections, that Brown might have attacked a different person, regardless of who it was, in Sabot’s position, and therefore the attack falls outside the intentional tort exception to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 411(1); Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114 , 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Plum, 20 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 35, 340 A.2d 637 (1975); Brooks v. Marriott Corporation, 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 , 522 A.2d 618 (1987); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa. | 2 | 1988–1991 |
Jones v. P.M.A. Insurance
green
2 sentences1987Union Carbide in its answer to automation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings cites Jones v. PMA Insurance Company, 343 Pa. Super. 411 , 495 A.2d 203 (1985), as standing for an acknowledgment by the Superior Court of the continued validity of the holding in Readinger, supra. However, in a subsequent opinion, Higgins v. Cleaning Machine Corporation, 344 Pa. Super. 325 , 331 n.5, 496 A.2d 818 , 821 n.5 (1985), the court held that the issue was still unsettled. 1987Union Carbide in its answer to automation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings cites Jones v. PMA Insurance Company, 343 Pa. Super. 411 , 495 A.2d 203 (1985), as standing for an acknowledgment by the Superior Court of the continued validity of the holding in Readinger, supra. However, in a subsequent opinion, Higgins v. Cleaning Machine Corporation, 344 Pa. Super. 325 , 331 n.5, 496 A.2d 818 , 821 n.5 (1985), the court held that the issue was still unsettled. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Neitzke v. Williams
red
1 sentence2021(Id.) Thus, the trial court found that White’s Complaint “‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact’ and is therefore [] frivolous.” (Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)).) On August 19, 2019, White appealed the July 2019 Order to this Court.1 1 “Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, or whether the trial court committed an error of law.” Lichtman v. Glazer, 111 A.3d 1225 , 1227 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 3 By order dated September 4, 2019 (September 2019 Order), the t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lichtman v. Glazer
green
1 sentence2021(Id.) Thus, the trial court found that White’s Complaint “‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact’ and is therefore [] frivolous.” (Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)).) On August 19, 2019, White appealed the July 2019 Order to this Court.1 1 “Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, or whether the trial court committed an error of law.” Lichtman v. Glazer, 111 A.3d 1225 , 1227 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 3 By order dated September 4, 2019 (September 2019 Order), the t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Flowers v. Philadelphia Parking Authority
green
1 sentence2017We held that “when an employee of a Commonwealth agency was acting within the scope of his or her duties, the Commonwealth employee is protected by sovereign immunity from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims.” Id. at 917 (quoting La Frankie, 618 A.2d at 1149 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kuney v. PMA Insurance
green
2 sentences1992As our supreme court has recently held, “When the allegations of a claim have as their ultimate basis an injury compensable *637 under the Workman’s Compensation Act, the claim must be considered within the framework of the statute.” Kuney, supra 525 Pa. at 176 , 578 A.2d at 1287 . 1992As our supreme court has recently held, “When the allegations of a claim have as their ultimate basis an injury compensable *637 under the Workman’s Compensation Act, the claim must be considered within the framework of the statute.” Kuney, supra 525 Pa. at 176 , 578 A.2d at 1287 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Vosburg v. Connolly
green
1 sentence1992However, as the court in Vosburg, supra, aptly points out, a blanket statement denying the existence of an intentional tort exception the Act is not finally dispositive, since in claims such as appellant’s the pertinent inquiry is whether the assault or attack which is the intentional injury arose out of “personal or business related animosity.” Id. 405 Pa.Super. at 127 n. 3, 591 A.2d at 1131 n. 3. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Borough of Plum & Bituminous Casualty Corp.
green
2 sentences1991The Defendants also argue, in support of their preliminary objections, that Brown might have attacked a different person, regardless of who it was, in Sabot’s position, and therefore the attack falls outside the intentional tort exception to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 411(1); Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114 , 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Plum, 20 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 35, 340 A.2d 637 (1975); Brooks v. Marriott Corporation, 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 , 522 A.2d 618 (1987); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa. 1991The Defendants also argue, in support of their preliminary objections, that Brown might have attacked a different person, regardless of who it was, in Sabot's position, and therefore the attack falls outside the intentional tort exception to the Workmen's Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 411(1); Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa. 114 , 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Plum, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 35 , 340 A.2d 637 (1975); Brooks v. Marriott Corporation, 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 , 522 A.2d 618 (1987); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa . *507 In Holland , we followed the Superior | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Dolan v. Linton's Lunch
green
2 sentences1991The Defendants also argue, in support of their preliminary objections, that Brown might have attacked a different person, regardless of who it was, in Sabot’s position, and therefore the attack falls outside the intentional tort exception to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 411(1); Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114 , 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Plum, 20 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 35, 340 A.2d 637 (1975); Brooks v. Marriott Corporation, 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 , 522 A.2d 618 (1987); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa. 1991The Defendants also argue, in support of their preliminary objections, that Brown might have attacked a different person, regardless of who it was, in Sabot’s position, and therefore the attack falls outside the intentional tort exception to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 411(1); Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114 , 152 A.2d 887 (1959); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Plum, 20 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 35, 340 A.2d 637 (1975); Brooks v. Marriott Corporation, 361 Pa. Superior Ct. 350 , 522 A.2d 618 (1987); Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Callender v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
2 sentences1990Defendant Pfister cites Callender, Administratix of the Estate of Gary Callender v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 387 Pa. Super. 283 , 564 A.2d 180 (1989), rearg’t denied September 25, 1989. 1990Defendant Pfister cites Callender, Administratix of the Estate of Gary Callender v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 387 Pa. Super. 283 , 564 A.2d 180 (1989), rearg’t denied September 25, 1989. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1988The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Poyser v. Newman, 514 Pa. 32 , 522 A. 2d 548 (1987) refused to allow the intentional tort exception to section 481(a) when an employer allegedly disregarded governmental safety regulations and forbade workers using a machine safety device. 1988The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Poyser v. Newman, 514 Pa. 32 , 522 A. 2d 548 (1987) refused to allow the intentional tort exception to section 481(a) when an employer allegedly disregarded governmental safety regulations and forbade workers using a machine safety device. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McGinn v. Valloti
green
2 sentences1988Readinger v. Gottshall, 201 Pa. Super. 134 , 191 A.2d 694 (1963); McGinn v. Valloti, 363 Pa. Super. 88 , 525 A.2d 732 (1987); Jones v. PMA Ins. 1988Readinger v. Gottshall, 201 Pa. Super. 134 , 191 A.2d 694 (1963); McGinn v. Valloti, 363 Pa. Super. 88 , 525 A.2d 732 (1987); Jones v. PMA Ins. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.