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65 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences2021The requirements to fall within the exception were described as follows in Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich 149, 180 ; 551 NW2d 132 (1996) (opinion by BOYLE, J.): If we read both sentences of the intentional tort exception together, it becomes evident that an employer must have made a conscious choice to injure an employee and have deliberately acted or failed to act in furtherance of that intent. 2021The requirements to fall within the exception were described as follows in Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich 149, 180 ; 551 NW2d 132 (1996) (opinion by BOYLE, J.): If we read both sentences of the intentional tort exception together, it becomes evident that an employer must have made a conscious choice to injure an employee and have deliberately acted or failed to act in furtherance of that intent. | 6 | 15 |
Pim, Inc. v. Steinbichler Optical Tech. USA, Inc.green2 sentences2019On the other hand, “ [a] continuously operative dangerous condition may form the basis of a claim under the intentional tort exception only if the employer knows the condition will cause an injury and refrains from informing the employee about it.” Alexander v Demmer Corp, 468 Mich 896 , 896–897; 660 NW2d 67 (2003). 2016But even if we held that plaintiff’s decedent was required to confront a “continuously operative dangerous condition,” such condition “may form the basis of a claim under the intentional tort exception only if the employer knows the condition will cause an injury and refrains from informing the employee about it.” Alexander v Demmer Corp, 468 Mich 896 ; 660 NW2d 67 (2003). | 3 | 5 |
Benson v. Callahan Mining Corp.green2 sentences1996See Benson v Callahan Mining Corp, 191 Mich App 443, 446-447 ; 479 NW2d 12 (1991). 1995Compare Mirror Lite Co, supra, Benson, supra, and Phillips v Ludvanwall, Inc, 190 Mich App 136 ; 475 NW2d 423 (1991), with Adams, supra, and McNees, supra. While we firmly agree that the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the wdca is narrow, the exception must have meaning and can exist without a formal declaration by the employer that it desires a particular employee to be injured. | 3 | 3 |
Elliott v. Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences1985Elliott v Dep’t of Social Services, supra, p 130, citing Randall v Delta Charter Twp, supra, p 34.” 132 Mich App 636 . 1985Elliott v Dep't of Social Services, supra, p 130, citing Randall v Delta Charter Twp, supra, p 34." See also my dissenting opinion in Landry v Detroit, 143 Mich App 16 ; 371 NW2d 466 (1985), and Judge SHEPHERD'S dissenting opinion in Sanford v Detroit, 143 Mich App 194 ; 377 NW2d 904 (1985). | 3 | 3 |
Randall v. Delta Charter Townshipgreen2 sentences1985Generally, the intentional tort exception to the governmental immunity doctrine has been limited to traditional intentional torts, Randall v Delta Charter Twp, 121 Mich App 26, 34 ; 328 NW2d 562 (1982), and acts of omission rather than commission are not generally characterized as intentional torts. 1985Generally, the intentional tort exception to the governmental immunity doctrine has been limited to traditional intentional torts, Randall v Delta Charter Twp, 121 Mich App 26, 34 ; 328 NW2d 562 (1982), and acts of omission rather than commission are not generally characterized as intentional torts. | 3 | 3 |
Ford v. City of Detroitgreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333 ; 283 NW2d 739 (1979). 1989See, e.g., Ford v Detroit, 91 Mich App 333 ; 283 NW2d 739 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co.green2 sentences1997In 1986, although the statutory language contained no exception to this exclusive remedy, the Supreme Court in Beauchamp v Dow Chemical Co, 427 Mich 1 ; 398 NW2d 882 (1986), recognized an intentional tort exception, reasoning that while accidental injuries were a matter of course in industry, intentional injuries were not. 1997In 1986, although the statutory language contained no exception to this exclusive remedy, the Supreme Court in Beauchamp v Dow Chemical Co, 427 Mich 1 ; 398 NW2d 882 (1986), recognized an intentional tort exception, reasoning that while accidental injuries were a matter of course in industry, intentional injuries were not. | 1 | 6 |
Genesee County Drain Commissioner v. Genesee Countygreen2 sentences2024Plaintiffs additionally do not dispute that defendants were engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function,2 or argue that “[t]he GTLA does not contain an intentional tort exception to governmental immunity from tort liability.” Genesee Co Drain Comm’r v Genesee Co, 309 Mich App 317, 328 ; 869 NW2d 635 (2015) (quotations and citation omitted). 2015“Accordingly, any plaintiff who seeks to assert an intentional tort claim against a governmental defendant must demonstrate that the defendant committed the alleged tort outside the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” Genesee Co Drain Comm’r v Genesee Co, 309 Mich App 317, 328 ; 869 NW2d 635 (2015). | 1 | 2 |
Palazzola v. Karmazin Products Corp.green2 sentences2023See Palazzola, 223 Mich App at 150 . 2004Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich 149, 169 (Boyle, J.), 191 (Riley, J.); 551 NW2d 132 (1996); Palazzola v Karmazin Products Corp, 223 Mich App 141, 149 ; 565 NW2d 868 (1997). | 1 | 2 |
| Ward v. Michigan State Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pineda v. City of Houstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walsh v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Muskegon Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phillips v. Ludvanwall, Incgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tolbert v. U S Truck Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. Auto. Club of Mich.green2 sentences2026But see Roberts v Auto Club of Mich, 138 Mich App 488, 497 ; 360 NW2d 224 (1984) (holding that Garmon preemption did not apply to a contractual dispute because the state has a substantial interest in adjudicating contract claims), and Trudeau v Fisher Body Div, Gen Motors Corp, 168 Mich App 14, 19 ; 423 NW2d 592 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claim against her employer was not preempted under Garmon because the plaintiff did not allege a violation of the NLRA, the tortious activity did not require analyzing the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, and “the state h 2026But see Roberts v Auto Club of Mich, 138 Mich App 488, 497 ; 360 NW2d 224 (1984) (holding that Garmon preemption did not apply to a contractual dispute because the state has a substantial interest in adjudicating contract claims), and Trudeau v Fisher Body Div, Gen Motors Corp, 168 Mich App 14, 19 ; 423 NW2d 592 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claim against her employer was not preempted under Garmon because the plaintiff did not allege a violation of the NLRA, the tortious activity did not require analyzing the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, and “the state h | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McNees v. Cedar Springs Stamping Co.
green
2 sentences2016If the latter issue were for the court, all jury trials in this type of case would have been eliminated, and we find that this was not the intention of the Legislature. [Quoting McNees v Cedar Springs Stamping Co, 184 Mich App 101, 104 ; 457 NW2d 68 (1990).] The intentional tort exception, MCL 418.131(1), provides: An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. 2016If the latter issue were for the court, all jury trials in this type of case would have been eliminated, and we find that this was not the intention of the Legislature. [Quoting McNees v Cedar Springs Stamping Co, 184 Mich App 101, 104 ; 457 NW2d 68 (1990).] The intentional tort exception, MCL 418.131(1), provides: An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. | 6 | 1991–2016 |
Gray v. Morley
green
2 sentences2021BUCKEYE Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by finding that she failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her claim against Buckeye under the intentional-tort exception to the WDCA.5 5 “[T]he issue whether the facts alleged by plaintiff are sufficient to constitute an intentional tort is a question of law for the trial court, while the issue whether the facts are as plaintiff alleges is a jury question.” Gray v Morley, 460 Mich 738, 742-743 ; 596 NW2d 922 (1999). -4- “[O]rdinarily, an employee’s sole remedy against an employer for a workplace-related injury is provided by t 2021BUCKEYE Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by finding that she failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her claim against Buckeye under the intentional-tort exception to the WDCA.5 5 “[T]he issue whether the facts alleged by plaintiff are sufficient to constitute an intentional tort is a question of law for the trial court, while the issue whether the facts are as plaintiff alleges is a jury question.” Gray v Morley, 460 Mich 738, 742-743 ; 596 NW2d 922 (1999). -4- “[O]rdinarily, an employee’s sole remedy against an employer for a workplace-related injury is provided by t | 5 | 2009–2025 |
Johnson v. Detroit Edison Co.
green
2 sentences2024An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. “[I]t is for the court to determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to sustain the intentional tort claim.” Johnson, 288 Mich App at 696 . 2024Courts must “determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to sustain the intentional tort claim.” Johnson, 288 Mich App at 696 . * * * According to plaintiff, after the bin shattered his foot, Talbot repeatedly tried to force plaintiff to stand and walk using his shattered foot. | 4 | 2018–2024 |
Bagby v. Detroit Edison Company
green
2 sentences2024An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. [MCL 418.131(1).] Therefore, “to recover under the intentional tort exception of the WDCA, a plaintiff must prove that his or her injury was the result of the employer’s deliberate act or omission and that the employer specifically intended an injury.” Bagby v Detroit Edison Co, 308 Mich App 488, 491 ; 865 NW2d 59 (2014). 2024An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. [MCL 418.131(1).] Therefore, “to recover under the intentional tort exception of the WDCA, a plaintiff must prove that his or her injury was the result of the employer’s deliberate act or omission and that the employer specifically intended an injury.” Bagby v Detroit Edison Co, 308 Mich App 488, 491 ; 865 NW2d 59 (2014). | 4 | 2016–2024 |
Marrocco v. Randlett
green
2 sentences1997As noted earlier, the same formulation also appears in the statute. 7 Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 611 ; 410 NW2d 749 (1987) (opinion of Brickrey, J.), affd on other grounds sub nom Will v Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58 ; 109 S Ct 2304 ; 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989). 8 In Marrocco , this Court indicated that the inquiry into whether actions are within a public official’s “executive authority” is analogous to the inquiry whether lower level officials are engaged in a “governmental function.” 431 Mich 708 . 9 I agree with the holding of the majority but write separately to e 1996We concur with the Gracey majority’s reluctance in applying the intentional tort exception to governmental immunity found in Marrocco, supra. | 3 | 1995–1997 |
Adams v. Shepherd Products, US, Inc
neutral
2 sentences1995To date, the published decisions of this Court *338 finding a basis for tort liability within the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision, § 131 of the wdca, involve the legislatively created alternative to "true intentional torts.” See Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 207 Mich App 1 ; 523 NW2d 818 (1994); Zuke v Fritz Enterprises, Inc, 202 Mich App 572 ; 509 NW2d 787 (1993); Adams v Shepherd Products, US, Inc, 187 Mich App 695 ; 468 NW2d 332 (1991); McNees v Cedar Springs Stamping Co, 184 Mich App 101 ; 457 NW2d 68 (1990). 1995To date, the published decisions of this Court *338 finding a basis for tort liability within the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision, § 131 of the wdca, involve the legislatively created alternative to "true intentional torts.” See Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 207 Mich App 1 ; 523 NW2d 818 (1994); Zuke v Fritz Enterprises, Inc, 202 Mich App 572 ; 509 NW2d 787 (1993); Adams v Shepherd Products, US, Inc, 187 Mich App 695 ; 468 NW2d 332 (1991); McNees v Cedar Springs Stamping Co, 184 Mich App 101 ; 457 NW2d 68 (1990). | 3 | 1991–1995 |
Madison v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences2024In Madison v City of Detroit, 208 Mich App 356 ; 527 NW2d 71 (1995), overruled 450 Mich 976 (1996),3 this Court squarely addressed whether the WDCA’s intentional-tort exception permits a plaintiff to bring an action against a governmental agency that would otherwise be entitled to immunity under the GTLA. 2024In Madison v City of Detroit, 208 Mich App 356 ; 527 NW2d 71 (1995), overruled 450 Mich 976 (1996),3 this Court squarely addressed whether the WDCA’s intentional-tort exception permits a plaintiff to bring an action against a governmental agency that would otherwise be entitled to immunity under the GTLA. | 2 | 1996–2024 |
Luce v. Kent Foundry Co.
green
2 sentences2022To establish an intentional tort under that doctrine, plaintiff had to establish that these defendants had “knowledge of the condition and refrain[ed] from informing [plaintiff] about it.” Luce v Kent Foundry Co, 316 Mich App 27, 35 ; 890 NW2d 908 (2016) (emphasis omitted). 2022To establish an intentional tort under that doctrine, plaintiff had to establish that these defendants had “knowledge of the condition and refrain[ed] from informing [plaintiff] about it.” Luce v Kent Foundry Co, 316 Mich App 27, 35 ; 890 NW2d 908 (2016) (emphasis omitted). | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Odom v. Wayne County
green
2 sentences2022Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 479 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). 2022Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 479 ; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). | 2 | 2014–2022 |
People v. Davis
green
2 sentences2019On the other hand, “ [a] continuously operative dangerous condition may form the basis of a claim under the intentional tort exception only if the employer knows the condition will cause an injury and refrains from informing the employee about it.” Alexander v Demmer Corp, 468 Mich 896 , 896–897; 660 NW2d 67 (2003). 2016But even if we held that plaintiff’s decedent was required to confront a “continuously operative dangerous condition,” such condition “may form the basis of a claim under the intentional tort exception only if the employer knows the condition will cause an injury and refrains from informing the employee about it.” Alexander v Demmer Corp, 468 Mich 896 ; 660 NW2d 67 (2003). | 2 | 2016–2019 |
Smith v. Stolberg
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Freiburger v. Department of Mental Health
green
2 sentences2018See MCR 2.111(A)(2) (a party may plead alternate theories of liability); Frieburger v Dep’t of Mental Health, 161 Mich App 316, 319-320 ; 409 NW2d 821 (1987) (a given set of facts may give rise to more than one cause of action, such that it would be improper to summarily dismiss one claim merely because it relies upon the same set of facts as another claim). 2018See MCR 2.111(A)(2) (a party may plead alternate theories of liability); Frieburger v Dep’t of Mental Health, 161 Mich App 316, 319-320 ; 409 NW2d 821 (1987) (a given set of facts may give rise to more than one cause of action, such that it would be improper to summarily dismiss one claim merely because it relies upon the same set of facts as another claim). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Smith v. Department of Public Health
green
2 sentences1997As noted earlier, the same formulation also appears in the statute. 7 Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 611 ; 410 NW2d 749 (1987) (opinion of Brickrey, J.), affd on other grounds sub nom Will v Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58 ; 109 S Ct 2304 ; 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989). 8 In Marrocco , this Court indicated that the inquiry into whether actions are within a public official’s “executive authority” is analogous to the inquiry whether lower level officials are engaged in a “governmental function.” 431 Mich 708 . 9 I agree with the holding of the majority but write separately to e 1997As noted earlier, the same formulation also appears in the statute. 7 Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 611 ; 410 NW2d 749 (1987) (opinion of Brickrey, J.), affd on other grounds sub nom Will v Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 US 58 ; 109 S Ct 2304 ; 105 L Ed 2d 45 (1989). 8 In Marrocco , this Court indicated that the inquiry into whether actions are within a public official’s “executive authority” is analogous to the inquiry whether lower level officials are engaged in a “governmental function.” 431 Mich 708 . 9 I agree with the holding of the majority but write separately to e | 2 | 1990–1997 |
Gerzeski v. Department of State Highways
green
2 sentences1989Those pre-Hadfield cases which recognized an intentional tort exception appear to have done so after having analyzed Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149 ; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), two Supreme Court cases in which no clear majority view emerged. 1989Those pre-Hadfield cases which recognized an intentional tort exception appear to have done so after having analyzed Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149 ; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), two Supreme Court cases in which no clear majority view emerged. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Rosario v. City of Lansing
green
2 sentences1989Those pre-Hadfield cases which recognized an intentional tort exception appear to have done so after having analyzed Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149 ; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), two Supreme Court cases in which no clear majority view emerged. 1989Those pre-Hadfield cases which recognized an intentional tort exception appear to have done so after having analyzed Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149 ; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), two Supreme Court cases in which no clear majority view emerged. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Trudeau v. Fisher Body Division
green
2 sentences2026But see Roberts v Auto Club of Mich, 138 Mich App 488, 497 ; 360 NW2d 224 (1984) (holding that Garmon preemption did not apply to a contractual dispute because the state has a substantial interest in adjudicating contract claims), and Trudeau v Fisher Body Div, Gen Motors Corp, 168 Mich App 14, 19 ; 423 NW2d 592 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claim against her employer was not preempted under Garmon because the plaintiff did not allege a violation of the NLRA, the tortious activity did not require analyzing the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, and “the state h 2026But see Roberts v Auto Club of Mich, 138 Mich App 488, 497 ; 360 NW2d 224 (1984) (holding that Garmon preemption did not apply to a contractual dispute because the state has a substantial interest in adjudicating contract claims), and Trudeau v Fisher Body Div, Gen Motors Corp, 168 Mich App 14, 19 ; 423 NW2d 592 (1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claim against her employer was not preempted under Garmon because the plaintiff did not allege a violation of the NLRA, the tortious activity did not require analyzing the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, and “the state h | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Madison v. City of Detroit
neutral
1 sentence2024In Madison v City of Detroit, 208 Mich App 356 ; 527 NW2d 71 (1995), overruled 450 Mich 976 (1996),3 this Court squarely addressed whether the WDCA’s intentional-tort exception permits a plaintiff to bring an action against a governmental agency that would otherwise be entitled to immunity under the GTLA. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lane v. Kindercare Learning Centers, Inc
green
2 sentences2022Additionally, we have not held that plaintiff must show that defendant knew Waller would shoot the decedent; instead, we held that no allegations supported that defendant knew or should have known that Waller would have physically harmed the decedent. -5- Mich App at 19, citing Lane v KinderCare Learning Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697 ; 588 NW2d 715 (1998). 2022Additionally, we have not held that plaintiff must show that defendant knew Waller would shoot the decedent; instead, we held that no allegations supported that defendant knew or should have known that Waller would have physically harmed the decedent. -5- Mich App at 19, citing Lane v KinderCare Learning Ctrs, Inc, 231 Mich App 689, 697 ; 588 NW2d 715 (1998). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mikedis v. Perfection Heat Treating Co.
green
2 sentences2021In Mikedis, 180 Mich App 189 , the predecessor judge retired and was succeeded by Judge Murphy, who concluded that a summary disposition order entered by the predecessor judge should be set aside in view of recent caselaw concerning the intentional-tort exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers compensation act. 2021Id. at 195-196 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Huron Tool and Engineering Co. v. Precision Consulting Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Huron, 209 Mich App at 370-371 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Hall green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Smitter v. Thornapple Township green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Harris v. Vernier green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Herman v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| KNUE v. Smith green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Watts v. Nevils green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gracey v. Wayne County Clerk green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Spiek v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Haverbush v. Powelson green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Atkinson v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Will v. Michigan Department of State Police green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Detroit Edison Co. v. Department of Revenue green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| City of Detroit v. Walker green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Travis v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Smith v. Mirror Lite Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Agee v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Zuke v. Fritz Enterprises, Inc green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Boyer v. Louisville Ladder Co., Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Bowden v. McAndrew green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.