intentional tort exception in Connecticut

1995The problem with the intentional tort test, i.e., whether the employer intended the specific injury, "appears to be that it allows employers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only workers' compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically intend to hurt the worker." Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. , 427 Mich. 1 , 25 , 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986).

1995The problem with the intentional tort test, i.e., whether the employer intended the specific injury, "appears to be that it allows employers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only workers' compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically intend to hurt the worker." Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. , 427 Mich. 1 , 25 , 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986).

2018Subsequently, in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 , 639 A.2d 507 (1994) (Suarez I), and Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 , 698 A.2d 838 (1997) (Suarez II), the court expanded the intentional tort exception to the exclusiv- ity provision to include circumstances in which either . . . the employer actually intended to injure the plain- tiff (actual intent standard) or . . . the employer inten- tionally created a dangerous condition that made the plaintiff’s injuries substantially certain to occur (sub- stantial certainty standard).’’ (Citation omitted; empha- sis o

2018Subsequently, in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99 , 639 A.2d 507 (1994) (Suarez I), and Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 , 698 A.2d 838 (1997) (Suarez II), the court expanded the intentional tort exception to the exclusiv- ity provision to include circumstances in which either . . . the employer actually intended to injure the plain- tiff (actual intent standard) or . . . the employer inten- tionally created a dangerous condition that made the plaintiff’s injuries substantially certain to occur (sub- stantial certainty standard).’’ (Citation omitted; empha- sis o

2017In Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 889 A.2d 810 (2006), our Supreme Court concluded that, "[a]lthough it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonetheless, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent ....

2017In Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 889 A.2d 810 (2006), our Supreme Court concluded that, "[a]lthough it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonetheless, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent ....

2007Whereas the intentional tort test requires that both the act producing the injury and the specific injury to the employee must be intentional . . . the substantial certainty standard requires a showing that the act producing the injury was intentional or deliberate and the resulting injury, from the standpoint of the employer, was substantially certain to result from the employer’s acts or conduct.” (Citations omitted.) Ramos v. Branford, 63 Conn. App. 671, 679-80 , 778 A.2d 972 (2001).

2007Whereas the intentional tort test requires that both the act producing the injury and the specific injury to the employee must be intentional . . . the substantial certainty standard requires a showing that the act producing the injury was intentional or deliberate and the resulting injury, from the standpoint of the employer, was substantially certain to result from the employer’s acts or conduct.” (Citations omitted.) Ramos v. Branford, 63 Conn. App. 671, 679-80 , 778 A.2d 972 (2001).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2022All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agree- ment with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.’’ (Emphasis added.) 8 ‘‘[I]n Suarez v. Dickmon

2022All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agree- ment with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.’’ (Emphasis added.) 8 ‘‘[I]n Suarez v. Dickmon

2022All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agree- ment with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.’’ (Emphasis added.) 8 ‘‘[I]n Suarez v. Dickmon

2022All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agree- ment with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.’’ (Emphasis added.) 8 ‘‘[I]n Suarez v. Dickmon

2022For this court to . . . consider [a] claim on the basis of a spe- cific legal ground not raised during trial would amount to trial by ambuscade, unfair both to the [court] and to the opposing party.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Avoletta v. Torrington, 133 Conn. App. 215 , 223 n.8, 34 A.3d 445 (2012).

2022For this court to . . . consider [a] claim on the basis of a spe- cific legal ground not raised during trial would amount to trial by ambuscade, unfair both to the [court] and to the opposing party.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Avoletta v. Torrington, 133 Conn. App. 215 , 223 n.8, 34 A.3d 445 (2012).

2020E.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Eichten, 184 Conn. App. 727 , 782–83, 196 A.3d 328 (2018). ‘‘Although it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonethe- less, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent to injure on the part of the defendant. . . .

2020E.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Eichten, 184 Conn. App. 727 , 782–83, 196 A.3d 328 (2018). ‘‘Although it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonethe- less, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent to injure on the part of the defendant. . . .

2018This court first recognized this narrow intentional tort exception to workers' compensation exclusivity in **775 Jett v. Dunlap , 179 Conn. 215 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979).

2018This court first recognized this narrow intentional tort exception to workers' compensation exclusivity in **775 Jett v. Dunlap , 179 Conn. 215 , 425 A.2d 1263 (1979).

2017The employer must believe the injury was substantially certain to occur." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn.App. 516 , 527-28, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; see also Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp. , 79 Conn.App. 444 , 457-58, 830 A.2d 372 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 925 , 835 A.2d 473 (2003) (holding failure to teach employees proper safety procedure does not trigger substantial certainty exception).

2017The employer must believe the injury was substantially certain to occur." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn.App. 516 , 527-28, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; see also Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp. , 79 Conn.App. 444 , 457-58, 830 A.2d 372 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 925 , 835 A.2d 473 (2003) (holding failure to teach employees proper safety procedure does not trigger substantial certainty exception).

2017In McCoy v. New Haven , 92 Conn. App. 558 , 560, 886 A.2d 489 (2005), the plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted by a coemployee and that, "as the city affirmatively condoned and thereby positively fostered ... assaultive conduct by [the coemployee] against his co-workers, the city either intended or was *285 substantially certain that the plaintiff's injuries would occur." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court affirmed the trial court's granting of the city's motion to strike.

2017In McCoy v. New Haven , 92 Conn. App. 558 , 560, 886 A.2d 489 (2005), the plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted by a coemployee and that, "as the city affirmatively condoned and thereby positively fostered ... assaultive conduct by [the coemployee] against his co-workers, the city either intended or was *285 substantially certain that the plaintiff's injuries would occur." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This court affirmed the trial court's granting of the city's motion to strike.

2016We have recognized a narrow exception to this general rule when a plaintiff can establish an intentional tort claim by demonstrating that his employer either: (1) actually intended to injure [the employee] ... or (2) intentionally created a dangerous condition that made [the employee's] injuries substantially certain to occur...." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Motzer v. Haberli, 300 Conn. 733 , 743-44, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; see also Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 242 Conn. at 279 -80 , 698 A.2d 838 .

2016We have recognized a narrow exception to this general rule when a plaintiff can establish an intentional tort claim by demonstrating that his employer either: (1) actually intended to injure [the employee] ... or (2) intentionally created a dangerous condition that made [the employee's] injuries substantially certain to occur...." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Motzer v. Haberli, 300 Conn. 733 , 743-44, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; see also Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 242 Conn. at 279 -80 , 698 A.2d 838 .

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2001In Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 100 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985), the court expressly declined, however, to extend judicially the intentional tort exception to include employee injuries resulting from an employer’s intentional, wilful or reckless violation of safety standards established pursuant to federal and state laws. 10 See also Perille v. Raybestos-Manhattan-Europe, Inc., 196 Conn. 529, 536 , 494 A.2d 555 (1985); Ray v. Schneider, 16 Conn. App. 660, 673 , 548 A.2d 461 , cert. denied, 209 Conn. 822 , 551 A.2d 756 (1988).

2000Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 28 Conn. App. 660 , 666 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992).

2000Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 28 Conn. App. 660 , 666 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992).

1996Third, all twelve paragraphs of the first count sounding in negligence are incorporated into the second count, and paragraph fifteen of the second count alleges that Middlesex "knew or should have known that it would have been unsafe [for the plaintiff]." Therefore, the second count sounds in negligence and cannot be transformed into count for recklessness by the mere insertion of the words "intentional, reckless or wanton." Brown v. Branford, 12 Conn. App. 106 , 110 , 529 A.2d 743 (1987).

1996Third, all twelve paragraphs of the first count sounding in negligence are incorporated into the second count, and paragraph fifteen of the second count alleges that Middlesex "knew or should have known that it would have been unsafe [for the plaintiff]." Therefore, the second count sounds in negligence and cannot be transformed into count for recklessness by the mere insertion of the words "intentional, reckless or wanton." Brown v. Branford, 12 Conn. App. 106 , 110 , 529 A.2d 743 (1987).

1994Prohibiting a civil action in such a case “would allow a corporation to ‘cost-out’ an investment decision to kill workers.” Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 617 , 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (Celebrezze, J., concurring).

1994Prohibiting a civil action in such a case “would allow a corporation to ‘cost-out’ an investment decision to kill workers.” Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 617 , 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982) (Celebrezze, J., concurring).