intentional tort exception in Florida

2010The intentional tort exception is applicable where the employer is “shown to have either ‘exhibite[d] a deliberate intent to injure or engagefd] in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death.’ ” Id. at 687 . 2 In this case the plaintiff relies on the second alternative.

2009See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla.2000) (holding that the intentional tort exception to employer immunity “includes an objective standard to measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to result in injury”). 6 To obtain relief against Elson, Saleeby had to show that a reasonable person should have known or would have understood that Elson’s conduct in temporarily bracing the trusses was substantially certain to cause injury or death.

2009Upon consideration of Bakerman v. The Bombay Co., 961 So.2d 259 (Fla.2007), and the parties’ supplemental arguments on remand, I would again affirm entry of summary judgment in favor of Rodolfo Casas’ employer, Siemens Energy and Automation, Inc. I would do so because the pleadings and discovery demonstrate that, as a matter of law, Casas’ claim does not fall within the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity.

2009As the majority herein states, our original opinion in this case relied in part on this Court’s earlier decision in The Bombay Co. v. Bakerman, 891 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (“Bakerman I”), which “effectively held concealment to be an indispensable criterion of the substantial certainty analysis of the intentional tort exception [to workers’ compensation immunity].” Bakerman v. The Bombay Co., 961 So.2d 259, 263 (Fla.2007) (“Bakerman II”).

2009As the majority herein states, our original opinion in this case relied in part on this Court’s earlier decision in The Bombay Co. v. Bakerman, 891 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (“Bakerman I”), which “effectively held concealment to be an indispensable criterion of the substantial certainty analysis of the intentional tort exception [to workers’ compensation immunity].” Bakerman v. The Bombay Co., 961 So.2d 259, 263 (Fla.2007) (“Bakerman II”).

2009As the majority herein states, our original opinion in this case relied in part on this Court's earlier decision in The Bombay Co. v. Bakerman, 891 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (" Bakerman I "), which "effectively held concealment to be an indispensable criterion of the substantial certainty analysis of the intentional tort exception [to workers' compensation immunity]." Bakerman v. The Bombay Co., 961 So.2d 259, 263 (Fla.2007) (" Bakerman II ").

2018Gorham v. Zachry Indus., 105 So. 3d 629, 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2015Figueroa v. Delant Const. Co., 118 So.3d 272, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Boston, 112 So.3d at 657-58 ); see also Gorham v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 105 So.3d 629, 632-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2015As outlined above, Florida’s comparative fault statute provides: “In determining whether a case falls within the term fnegligence cases,’ the court shall look to-the substance of the action and not the eonclu-sory terms used ■ by the parties.” § 768.81(4)(a), Fla. Stat. The seminal case addressing whether an action is founded in negligence or- intentional tort is Merrill Grossings Associates v. McDonald, 705 So.2d 560 (Fla.1997).

2009The intentional tort exception to the comparative fault statutes promotes “a public policy that negligent tortfeasors ... should not be permitted to reduce their liability by shifting it to another tortfeasor whose intentional criminal conduct was a foreseeable result of their negligence.” Id. at 562-63 (“Thus, it would be irrational to allow a party who negligently fails to provide reasonable security measures to reduce its liability because there is an intervening intentional tort, where the intervening intentional tort is exactly what the security measures are supposed to protect against”)

2015Figueroa v. Delant Const. Co., 118 So.3d 272, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Boston, 112 So.3d at 657-58 ); see also Gorham v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 105 So.3d 629, 632-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2015Figueroa v. Delant Const. Co., 118 So.3d 272, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Boston, 112 So.3d at 657-58 ); see also Gorham v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 105 So.3d 629, 632-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2001See Eller v. Shova, 630 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1993) (stating that "employers are provided with immunity from suit by their employees so long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in or that is substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee") (citing Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen.

2000See Eller v. Shova, 630 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1993) (stating that "employers are provided with immunity from suit by their employees so long as the employer has not engaged in any intentional act designed to result in or that is substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee") (citing Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen.

1993See Folk v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 611 So.2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

1993See Folk v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 611 So.2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

2007However, the Third District additionally said: Of particular interest here, the Turner decision also points out that the cases finding liability under the intentional tort exception contain a "common thread of evidence that the employer tried to cover up the danger, affording the employees no means to make a reasonable decision as to their actions." 754 So.2d at 691 (citing Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Emergency One, Inc. v. Keffer, 652 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)).

2006See, e.g., EAC USA, Inc. v. Kawa, 805 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that employer could be subject to contribution claim based on the intentional tort exception to workers' compensation immunity when there was evidence that employer had removed safety guards from printing presses; had been warned of the dangers but refused to reinstall the guards, disregarding safety notices about the machinery; and had instructed employees to engage in dangerous practices); Connelly v. Arrow Air, Inc., 568 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (allowing case to go forward against employer that ignored known prob

2015Figueroa v. Delant Const. Co., 118 So.3d 272, 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting Boston, 112 So.3d at 657-58 ); see also Gorham v. Zachry Indus., Inc., 105 So.3d 629, 632-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

2013See Boston, 112 So.3d at 657 (affirming entry of final summary judgment on workers’ compensation immunity, noting that the intentional tort exception set forth in section 440.11(l)(b)2. “adopts a ‘virtual certainty5 standard ..., requiring that the employer’s conduct be virtually certain to result in injury or death in order to overcome immunity”); List Indus., Inc. v. Dalien, 107 So.3d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (noting that based on the “stringent” virtual certainty standard required to overcome an employer’s statutory immunity under section 440.11(l)(b)2., the issue of whether the exception is

2010See State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp., 354 So.2d 353, 358 (Fla.1977) (finding that the Legislature’s inclusion of an effective date in enacting legislation amending existing law “effectively rebuts any argument that retroactive application of the law was intended”); see also Feraci v. Grundy Marine Constr. *99 Co., 315 F.Supp.2d 1197 , 1205 n. 11 (N.D.Fla.2004) (citing Zuckerman-Vemon Corp. for the proposition that because Chapter 2003-412 of the Laws of Florida set an effective date of October 1, 2003 for an amendment to section 440.11 with respect to the intentional tort exce

2007The employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of compensation to all such borrowed employees as required in s. 440.10, except when such payment has been secured by the help supply services company. [3] In 2003, the legislature amended section 440.11(1), requiring that a plaintiff-employee prove the existence of the intentional tort exception by "clear and convincing evidence." See Feraci, 315 F.Supp.2d at 1205 n. 11 (citing § 440.11(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003)).

2007In Fisher v. Shenandoah General Construction Co., 498 So.2d 882 (Fla.1986), we held that "[i]n order for an employer's actions to amount to an intentional tort, the employer must either exhibit a deliberate intent to injure or engage in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death." Id. at 883 . [2] In Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683 (Fla.2000), this Court reaffirmed the existence of an intentional tort exception to workers' compensation immunity, requiring an objective analysis to "measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to res

2007In Fisher v. Shenandoah General Construction Co., 498 So.2d 882 (Fla.1986), we held that "[i]n order for an employer's actions to amount to an intentional tort, the employer must either exhibit a deliberate intent to injure or engage in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death." Id. at 883 . [2] In Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683 (Fla.2000), this Court reaffirmed the existence of an intentional tort exception to workers' compensation immunity, requiring an objective analysis to "measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to res

2024For this reason alone, the intentional torts alleged in the Amended Complaint could not have been “calculated to inflict a direct injury upon a resident of Florida,” Rensin, 18 So. 3d at 576 , and cannot support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the exception to the corporate shield doctrine. 14 to produce any evidence to establish jurisdiction under the intentional-tort exception to the corporate shield doctrine.7 Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to render an order dismissing Harrison from the underlying action.

2018Without clearly stated allegations asserting that Appellant “personally and intentionally engaged in the tortious conduct,” we cannot say that “the specific conduct of the nonresident corporate officer was calculated to inflict a direct injury upon a resident of Florida.” Rensin, 18 So. 3d at 576.

2017This court held, “Section 768.81 does not permit the reduction of compensatory damages by plaintiff’s comparative fault where the suit is based upon an intentional tort (‘the intentional tort exception’).” Id.

2017See Schoeff, 178 So. 3d at 492 (quoting R.J.

2017In its analysis of Reynolds’ claim that the plaintiff waived any argument regarding the intentional tort exception, this court stated: The case with the most in depth discussion on waiver is Hiott, 129 So. 3d at 479–82.

2017In its analysis of Reynolds’ claim that the plaintiff waived any argument regarding the intentional tort exception, this court stated: The case with the most in depth discussion on waiver is Hiott, 129 So. 3d at 479–82.

2007Id. at 691-93 (discussing Bourassa v. Busch Entm't Corp., 929 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Casas v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc., 927 So.2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Allstates Fireproofing, Inc. v. Garcia, 876 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc. v. Reeves, 833 So.2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), quashed on other grounds, 889 So.2d 812 (Fla.2004)).

2006For that reason, we conclude that the evidence was legally insufficient to support liability under the intentional tort exception to worker's compensation immunity."), review granted, 903 So.2d 189 (Fla.2005); Allstates, 876 So.2d at 1226 (noting that Allstates did not attempt to conceal the dangers of scaffolding and did not prevent the employee from making an informed decision whether to expose himself to the risk); Tinoco v. Resol, Inc., 783 So.2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (noting that the defect in the machine that injured the employee was obvious to everyone working around it and that theref

1996Aetna cites Judge Griffin's concurring opinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Conde, 595 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) in which she criticized the practice of including spurious negligence claims to compel an insurance company to provide a defense on an intentional tort claim.

1996See id. at 1008-09 (Griffin, J., concurring).

2023Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Whitmire, 260 So. 3d 536, 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)))); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. White, 675 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Trusell, 131 So. 2d at 733 ).

2023Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Whitmire, 260 So. 3d 536, 540 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)))); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. White, 675 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (citing Trusell, 131 So. 2d at 733 ).

2020Haines Constr., LLC v. Santamaria, 161 So. 3d 528, 530-31 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014); see also § 440.11(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (the intentional tort exception).