13 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Douglas Countygreen2 sentences2024Dion v. City of Omaha, 311 Neb. 522 , 973 N.W.2d 666 (2022); Williams, supra; Edwards v. Douglas County, 308 Neb. 259 , 953 N.W.2d 744 (2021). 2021So even applying a broad reading to the intentional tort exception, cases like the instant matter are not barred where there is independent negligence by the government. - 288 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 308 Nebraska Reports EDWARDS v. DOUGLAS COUNTY Cite as 308 Neb. 259 Given the above, the Nebraska Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court clearly share the same approach to the statutory language at issue. | 2 | 5 |
Jill B. & Travis B. v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Under § 13-910(7), the PSTCA shall not apply to “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, mali- cious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepre- sentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” Section 13-910(7) sets forth what is generally referred to as the “inten- tional tort” exemption. 19 We have discussed that a similar intentional tort exemp- tion from the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act 20 reflects public policy determinations against allowing government employees to engage at the government’s e 2020For example, as recently as in 2017, we considered another portion of the intentional tort exception provision, mis- representation, and said: “We must strictly construe the misrep- resentation exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in favor of the State . . . .” Jill B. & Travis B. v. State, 297 Neb. 57, 95 , 899 N.W.2d 241 , 266 (2017) (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 3 |
Abbott v. Gould, Inc.green2 sentences2023In Abbott v. Gould, Inc., 232 Neb. 907 , 443 N.W.2d 591 (1989), employees sought to sue their employer in tort based on allegations that the employer inten- tionally subjected the employees to toxins and concealed from the employees the dangers of such exposure. 2013To do anything other than affirm the dismissal of the employ- ees’ complaints, we explained, would subvert the primary object of the Act. [6] The primary object of the Act, we said, is “‘to do away with the inadequacies and defects of the common-law remedies, to destroy the common-law defenses, and, in the employments affected, to give compensation, regardless of the fault of the employer.’”15 Furthermore, an intentional tort exception would re-focus the inquiry from whether it arose out of and in the course of employment to the state of mind of the employer and employee.16 We disapproved even | 1 | 2 |
Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co.green2 sentences2023See, e.g., Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., Inc., 139 Ill. 2d 455 , 564 N.E.2d 1222 , 151 Ill. 2023See, e.g., Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., Inc., 139 Ill. 2d 455 , 564 N.E.2d 1222 , 151 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Rene Alvarez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020Ed. 2d 67 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that given the language and history of the FTCA, even where a governmental employee’s conduct makes certain claims not - 43 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 307 Nebraska Reports MOSER v. STATE Cite as 307 Neb. 18 actionable due to an exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h), a claim- ant is not barred by that statute from pursuing a distinct claim “arising out of other aspects of the Government’s conduct.” As stated in a concurrence to an opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit: “So it is clear that any suggestion that [the i | 1 | 1 |
Sherrod v. State of Nebraska Department of Correctional Servicesgreen2 sentences2015See Sherrod v. State, 251 Neb. 355 , 557 N.W.2d 634 (1997) (hold- ing that exceptions found in § 81-8,219 to general waiver of tort immunity are matters of defense which must be pled and proved by State). 2015See Sherrod v. State, 251 Neb. 355 , 557 N.W.2d 634 (1997) (hold- ing that exceptions found in § 81-8,219 to general waiver of tort immunity are matters of defense which must be pled and proved by State). | 1 | 1 |
Kawaauhau v. Geigergreen2 sentences2004See, Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S. Ct. 974 , 140 L. 2004See, Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 118 S. Ct. 974 , 140 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nebraska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moser v. State
green
2 sentences2024The majority of this court reads the intentional tort exception broadly and concludes, as it has since Moser v. State, 307 Neb. 18 , 948 N.W.2d 194 (2000), that injuries resulting from assaults caused by nongovernmental actors are claims to which the exception applies and that therefore, DHHS is shielded by sovereign immunity. 2024The majority of this court reads the intentional tort exception broadly and concludes, as it has since Moser v. State, 307 Neb. 18 , 948 N.W.2d 194 (2000), that injuries resulting from assaults caused by nongovernmental actors are claims to which the exception applies and that therefore, DHHS is shielded by sovereign immunity. | 4 | 2020–2024 |
Dion v. City of Omaha
green
2 sentences2022Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-928 (Reissue 2012). 15 § 13-902. 16 § 13-908. 17 Edwards v. Douglas County, supra note 9 . - 539 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports DION v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 311 Neb. 522 If an exemption under § 13-910 applies, the political subdivi- sion is immune from the claim and the proper remedy is to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 18 (a) Arising Out of Listed Intentional Tort At issue in this case is subsection (7) of § 13-910. 2022The district court found as follows: “The elements of a - 558 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports DION v. CITY OF OMAHA Cite as 311 Neb. 522 battery have clearly been met when this Court applies the ele- ments to the evidence in this case.” That is, the district court found that the City’s officers had committed the intentional tort of battery, the death arose from the battery, and the action was barred by the sovereign immunity retained by the City under the intentional tort exception found in § 13‑910(7). | 3 | 2022–2024 |
Sheridan v. United States
green
2 sentences2021An assault by an inmate is not a “claim.” As I stated previously: In Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L. 2020Indeed, with respect to the former, Sheridan clarifies that in permitting the negligence claim to go forward, the assailant’s “employment status [at the moment of the incident] has [no] bearing on the basis for petitioners’ [negligence] claim for money damages, [and § 2680(h),] the intentional tort exception to the FTCA[,] is not applicable in this case.” 487 U.S. at 403 . | 3 | 2015–2021 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2021Before the hearing, Williams requested leave to amend the complaint to “allege additional facts further establishing . . . subject matter” jurisdiction of his claims and to “articulate additional facts establishing the ele- ments of [Williams’] negligence claim in greater detail.” In its written order, referring to the intentional tort exception in the STCA, § 81-8,219(4), the district court determined that Williams’ negligence claim was barred by sovereign immunity because it arose from “multiple layers of assault/battery.” Next, the district court denied Williams’ motion for leave to amend h 2021The Sheridan Court agreed with Judge (later Justice) Harlan’s reasoning in Panella based on statutory interpretation to the effect that the intentional tort exception only applied to claims already authorized by the waiver of sovereign immunity, that is, to claims - 605 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 310 Neb. 588 involving torts committed by governmental employees. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Chaney v. Evnen
green
2 sentences2021Because this presents 2 Moser v. State, 307 Neb. 18 , 948 N.W.2d 194 (2020). 3 Id. 4 Chaney v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 512 , 949 N.W.2d 761 (2020). - 594 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 310 Neb. 588 a question of subject matter jurisdiction, we address it as a threshold issue. 5 [5,6] Through the STCA, the Nebraska Legislature has enacted a limited waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity with respect to some, but not all, types of tort claims. 6 The STCA contains specific exceptions to the waiver of sover- eign immunity. 2021Because this presents 2 Moser v. State, 307 Neb. 18 , 948 N.W.2d 194 (2020). 3 Id. 4 Chaney v. Evnen, 307 Neb. 512 , 949 N.W.2d 761 (2020). - 594 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports WILLIAMS v. STATE Cite as 310 Neb. 588 a question of subject matter jurisdiction, we address it as a threshold issue. 5 [5,6] Through the STCA, the Nebraska Legislature has enacted a limited waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity with respect to some, but not all, types of tort claims. 6 The STCA contains specific exceptions to the waiver of sover- eign immunity. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Dolan v. United States Postal Service
green
2 sentences2020With the exception of Doe, our interpretation of this language has been consistent and the Legislature has not seen fit to correct us. 36 [9,10] Respect for precedent should not prevent us from restoring our adherence to the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. 37 We have said that while the doctrine of stare deci- sis is entitled to great weight, it is grounded in the public policy that the law should be stable, fostering both equality and predictability of treatment. 38 And we have recognized that overruling precedent is justified when the purpose is to elimi- nate inconsistency. 39 Thus, we 2020With the exception of Doe, our interpretation of this language has been consistent and the Legislature has not seen fit to correct us. 36 [9,10] Respect for precedent should not prevent us from restoring our adherence to the Nebraska Constitution and statutes. 37 We have said that while the doctrine of stare deci- sis is entitled to great weight, it is grounded in the public policy that the law should be stable, fostering both equality and predictability of treatment. 38 And we have recognized that overruling precedent is justified when the purpose is to elimi- nate inconsistency. 39 Thus, we | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Estate of Teague v. Crossroads Co-op Assn.
green
1 sentence2013Nebraska Advance Sheets ESTATE OF TEAGUE v. CROSSROADS CO-OP ASSN. 9 Cite as 286 Neb. 1 ordering employees to perform an extremely dangerous job, willfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, willfully violating a safety statute, or withholding information about worksite hazards, still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character.21 Even in jurisdictions adopting an intentional tort exception, anything short of genuine and specific intent to injure by the employer or the alter ego of the employer will fall within the exclusivity of the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2007Johnson v. State, 270 Neb. at 323 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 , citing Sheridan v. United States, supra (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). 2007Johnson v. State, 270 Neb. at 323 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 , citing Sheridan v. United States, supra (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co.
green
2 sentences1989Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co., 109 Neb. 506 , 191 N.W. 659 (1922), reh’g denied 109 Neb. 512 , 193 N.W. 768 (1923), for the proposition that this court has since adopted an intentional tort exception to the compensation act is misplaced. 1989Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Navracel v. Cudahy Packing Co., 109 Neb. 506 , 191 N.W. 659 (1922), reh’g denied 109 Neb. 512 , 193 N.W. 768 (1923), for the proposition that this court has since adopted an intentional tort exception to the compensation act is misplaced. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.