OAG motion in Texas

2011Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2011Neyland v. Raymond , 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); Boyd v. Boyd , 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2011Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2011Neyland v. Raymond , 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); Boyd v. Boyd , 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).

2025See Cadle Co. v. Lobingier, 50 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) (“A contempt judgment is reviewable only via a petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is confined) or a petition for writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved).”); Tex. R.

2024In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018).

2024P. 192.4; see also In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239 , 253 (Tex. 2021) (describing Rule 192.4 as imposing a “proportionality standard”); In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2017) (“Reasonableness and its bedfellow, proportionality, require a case-by-case balancing of jurisprudential considerations, which is informed by factors the discovery rules identify as limiting the scope of discovery . . . .”). 3 The trial court later denied OAG’s motion for entry of judgment, which asked the trial court to “enter judgment on Plaintiffs’ sole claim under the Texas Whistleblowe

2024P. 192.4; see also In re K & L Auto Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239 , 253 (Tex. 2021) (describing Rule 192.4 as imposing a “proportionality standard”); In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2017) (“Reasonableness and its bedfellow, proportionality, require a case-by-case balancing of jurisprudential considerations, which is informed by factors the discovery rules identify as limiting the scope of discovery . . . .”). 3 The trial court later denied OAG’s motion for entry of judgment, which asked the trial court to “enter judgment on Plaintiffs’ sole claim under the Texas Whistleblowe

2022See Parson v. Lakewind, LLC, No. 06-15- 00035-CV, 2015 WL 9434668 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 16, 2015, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because order from which appellant attempted to appeal was signed after trial court’s plenary power was expired and was thus void); In re M.V., No. 14-08-00418-CV, 2009 WL 6407539 , at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that even though parties did not challenge validity of order, appellate court would sua sponte address whether order was void because appellate courts hav

2022Granting of New Trial In his first issue, Father claims the trial court erred in granting the OAG’s motion for new trial following the entry of default judgment because the OAG failed to establish the factors set out in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939). 4 Generally, an order granting a motion for new trial within the trial court’s plenary power “is not subject to review either by direct appeal from that order or from a final judgment rendered after further proceedings in the trial court.” Cummins v. Paisan Constr.

2022Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1984); see also In re Columbia Med.

2021Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1995)). 27

2021Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Feinblatt, 82 S.W.3d 513, 521 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (comparing Texas Whistleblower Act with Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

2020See Malooly Bros., 461 S.W.2d at 121 ; Flakes, 547 S.W.3d at 318 .

2016The Burrescia Family Revocable Living Trust v. City of Dallas, No. 05-14-01311-CV, 2016 WL 1393989 , at *4 n.6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 7, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Humphries v. Advanced Print Media, 339 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Dallas Cnty. v. Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d 94, 104 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2006, pets. denied)). –5– Rule of civil procedure 131 provides that the “successful party to a suit shall recover of his adversary all costs incurred therein, except where otherwise provided.” TEX.

2016The Burrescia Family Revocable Living Trust v. City of Dallas, No. 05-14-01311-CV, 2016 WL 1393989 , at *4 n.6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 7, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Humphries v. Advanced Print Media, 339 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Dallas Cnty. v. Gonzales, 183 S.W.3d 94, 104 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2006, pets. denied)). –5– Rule of civil procedure 131 provides that the “successful party to a suit shall recover of his adversary all costs incurred therein, except where otherwise provided.” TEX.

2016Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); Blaylock, 2014 WL 3736210 , at *2. 4 In his reply brief, Davis also argues the trial court erred by not sanctioning the OAG under rule of civil procedure 13 and the “Frivolous Claim Act.” Generally, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.

2015See King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 752 (noting motion asserted there was no evidence of the defendant’s alleged extrinsic fraud or the plaintiffs’ lack of negligence); Doonan v. Wood, 224 S.W.3d 271, 273-74 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding motion that specifically enumerated each of the elements of the causes of action as to which there was no evidence was not defective). attorney expressly raised and argued the issue of limitations at the hearing on the OAG’s motion, limitations was extensively discussed at the hearing, and both parties addressed limitations in the supplemental bri

2015See King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 752 (noting motion asserted there was no evidence of the defendant’s alleged extrinsic fraud or the plaintiffs’ lack of negligence); Doonan v. Wood, 224 S.W.3d 271, 273-74 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding motion that specifically enumerated each of the elements of the causes of action as to which there was no evidence was not defective). attorney expressly raised and argued the issue of limitations at the hearing on the OAG’s motion, limitations was extensively discussed at the hearing, and both parties addressed limitations in the supplemental bri

2015See King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 752 (noting motion asserted there was no evidence of the defendant’s alleged extrinsic fraud or the plaintiffs’ lack of negligence); Doonan v. Wood, 224 S.W.3d 271, 273-74 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding motion that specifically enumerated each of the elements of the causes of action as to which there was no evidence was not defective). attorney expressly raised and argued the issue of limitations at the hearing on the OAG’s motion, limitations was extensively discussed at the hearing, and both parties addressed limitations in the supplemental bri

2015See King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 752 (noting motion asserted there was no evidence of the defendant’s alleged extrinsic fraud or the plaintiffs’ lack of negligence); Doonan v. Wood, 224 S.W.3d 271, 273-74 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (holding motion that specifically enumerated each of the elements of the causes of action as to which there was no evidence was not defective). attorney expressly raised and argued the issue of limitations at the hearing on the OAG’s motion, limitations was extensively discussed at the hearing, and both parties addressed limitations in the supplemental bri

2014See In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 575–76.

2014See In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d 570 , 575–76 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (awarding sanctions against OAG in a Title IV- D case).

2014Cf. Cherry Petersen Landry Albert LLP v. Cruz, 443 S.W.3d 441, 455 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. filed) (“The sanctions order contained many conclusions about [sanctionee’s conduct], but did not include facts to justify those conclusions.”).

2014See Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, 2 The declaratory judgment does not order sanctions; it awards attorney’s fees based on “good cause.” In the hearing on OAG’s motion for new trial, the trial court expressly stated it was ordering attorney’s fees under In re A.C.B.; In re A.C.B. affirmed sanctions under Rule 13.

2011See Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 926 .

2011See Wiseman, 821 S.W.2d at 442 .