reckless disregard standard in New York

2026Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 was applicable to Carrig's conduct ( see Thomas v City of New York , 172 AD3d 1132 , 1133) and that Carrig's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others ( see Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d 494, 503 ; McGough v City of Long Beach , 174 AD3d 698 , 699-700).

2026The reckless disregard standard is more demanding than ordinary negligence ( Frezzell , 24 NY3d at 217 , citing Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]).

2025Initially, we note that there is no dispute that the officer's conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), rather than the ordinary negligence standard of care, inasmuch as the officer was operating an "authorized emergency vehicle" (§ 101) and was " 'engage[d] in . . . specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b)' " ( Torres-Cummings v Niagara Falls Police Dept. , 193 AD3d 1372, 1374 [4th Dept 2021], quoting Kabir v County of Monroe , 16 NY3d 217, 220 [2011]), i.e., exceeding the

2025Initially, we note that there is no dispute that the officer's conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), rather than the ordinary negligence standard of care, inasmuch as the officer was operating an "authorized emergency vehicle" (§ 101) and was " 'engage[d] in . . . specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b)' " ( Torres-Cummings v Niagara Falls Police Dept. , 193 AD3d 1372, 1374 [4th Dept 2021], quoting Kabir v County of Monroe , 16 NY3d 217, 220 [2011]), i.e., exceeding the

2025Although the reckless disregard standard is a heightened standard compared to ordinary negligence, it "retains and recognizes the potential for liability as a protection for the general public against disproportionate, overreactive conduct" ( Campbell v City of Elmira , 84 NY2d 505, 512 [1994]).

2025Although the reckless disregard standard is a heightened standard compared to ordinary negligence, it "retains and recognizes the potential for liability as a protection for the general public against disproportionate, overreactive conduct" ( Campbell v City of Elmira , 84 NY2d 505, 512 [1994]).

2025Liability may attach under the reckless disregard standard upon a showing that " 'the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow' and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" ( Frezzell v City of New York , 24 NY3d 213, 217 [2014], quoting Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994], quoting Prosser and Keaton, Torts § 34, at 213 [5th ed]; see also Szczerbiak v Pilat , 90 NY2d 553, 557 [1997]; Green v Covington , 299 AD2d 636, 637-638 [3d Dept 2002])

2025Liability may attach under the reckless disregard standard upon a showing that " 'the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow' and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" ( Frezzell v City of New York , 24 NY3d 213, 217 [2014], quoting Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994], quoting Prosser and Keaton, Torts § 34, at 213 [5th ed]; see also Szczerbiak v Pilat , 90 NY2d 553, 557 [1997]; Green v Covington , 299 AD2d 636, 637-638 [3d Dept 2002])

2026The reckless disregard standard is more demanding than ordinary negligence ( Frezzell , 24 NY3d at 217 , citing Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d 494, 501 [1994]).

2025Here, the City defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by demonstrating that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) was applicable to Carbone's conduct ( see Frezzell v City of New York , 24 NY3d 213, 217 ) and that his conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others ( De Corona v Village of Val.

2023Here, in opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing that his vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle and that the defendant driver's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; Balgobin v McKenzie , 213 AD3d 893, 894 ), the defendants argue that their vehicle was "actually engaged in work on a highway" within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), such that they should be held to a reckless disregard standard of care rather than an ordinary negligence standard of care ( see id .; Riley v County of Broome , 95 NY2

2018The reckless disregard standard "requires a showing of more than a momentary judgment lapse" ( Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d 494, 502 [1994]; see Riley , 95 NY2d at 466 ).

2022As a result, the court erred in determining that defendant was operating an authorized emergency vehicle and that his conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care in section 1104 (e), rather than the ordinary negligence standard of care ( see generally McLoughlin v City of Syracuse , 206 AD3d 1600 , 1600-1601 [4th Dept 2022]; LoGrasso v City of Tonawanda , 87 AD3d 1390, 1391 [4th Dept 2011]).

2022As a result, the court erred in determining that defendant was operating an authorized emergency vehicle and that his conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care in section 1104 (e), rather than the ordinary negligence standard of care ( see generally McLoughlin v City of Syracuse , 206 AD3d 1600 , 1600-1601 [4th Dept 2022]; LoGrasso v City of Tonawanda , 87 AD3d 1390, 1391 [4th Dept 2011]).

2025Initially, we note that there is no dispute that the officer's conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), rather than the ordinary negligence standard of care, inasmuch as the officer was operating an "authorized emergency vehicle" (§ 101) and was " 'engage[d] in . . . specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b)' " ( Torres-Cummings v Niagara Falls Police Dept. , 193 AD3d 1372, 1374 [4th Dept 2021], quoting Kabir v County of Monroe , 16 NY3d 217, 220 [2011]), i.e., exceeding the

2025Initially, we note that there is no dispute that the officer's conduct is governed by the reckless disregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), rather than the ordinary negligence standard of care, inasmuch as the officer was operating an "authorized emergency vehicle" (§ 101) and was " 'engage[d] in . . . specific conduct exempted from the rules of the road by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (b)' " ( Torres-Cummings v Niagara Falls Police Dept. , 193 AD3d 1372, 1374 [4th Dept 2021], quoting Kabir v County of Monroe , 16 NY3d 217, 220 [2011]), i.e., exceeding the

2021Thus, the plaintiff's claim was governed by principles of ordinary negligence, and not the reckless disregard standard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), as contended by the defendants ( see Katanov v County of Nassau , 91 AD3d at 725 ; Tatishev v City of New York , 84 AD3d at 657 ).

2019Hosp. , 120 AD3d 453, 455 ; Fajardo v City of New York , 95 AD3d 820 ; Katanov v County of Nassau , 91 AD3d 723, 725 ).

2017We begin by observing that, although defendants did not move for summary judgment on the issue of reckless disregard, it is well settled that a court deciding a motion for summary judgment is empowered to search the record and may, even in the absence of a cross motion, grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party (see generally CPLR 3212 [b]; Horst v Brown, 72 AD3d 434, 437 [2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 743 [2010]).

2017We begin by observing that, although defendants did not move for summary judgment on the issue of reckless disregard, it is well settled that a court deciding a motion for summary judgment is empowered to search the record and may, even in the absence of a cross motion, grant summary judgment to a nonmoving party (see generally CPLR 3212 [b]; Horst v Brown, 72 AD3d 434, 437 [2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 743 [2010]).

2020Here, the defendants established that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 was applicable to McMahon's conduct because he was responding to a radio call of a motor vehicle accident with unknown injuries ( see Criscione v City of New York , 97 NY2d 152, 158 ).

2009We thus conclude that Mele was operating an authorized emergency vehicle while involved in an emergency operation (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 101, 114-b), and thus that the reckless disregard standard of liability pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), rather than that of ordinary negligence, applies to his actions (see Criscione v City of New York, 97 NY2d 152, 157-158 [2001]; Hughes v Chiera, 4 AD3d 872 [2004]).

2019Thus, "for liability to be predicated upon a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, there must be evidence that the actor had intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" ( Frezzell , 24 NY3d at 217 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Palmer , 13 AD3d at 1229 ).

2006That conduct is measured by the reckless disregard standard set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) (see Palmer v City of Syracuse, 13 AD3d 1229, 1230 [2004]; Hughes v Chiera, 4 AD3d 872, 873 [2004]).

2025Factors considered in determining whether a police officer acted recklessly in operating an emergency vehicle include the nature of the underlying police call, road conditions, traffic, weather, time of day, the speed of the officer's vehicle, and whether the officer followed departmental guidelines ( see Gernatt v Gregoire , 217 AD3d 1340, 1342 [4th Dept 2023]).

2024Defendant met its initial burden on the motion of establishing that the reckless disregard standard of care applies here by submitting evidence, including surveillance video, demonstrating that at the time of the accident the officer "was responding to a police call and was therefore operating an authorized emergency vehicle while involved in an emergency operation" ( Williams v Fassinger , 119 AD3d 1368, 1369 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 912 [2014] ; see Gernatt v Gregoire , 217 AD3d 1340, 1341 [4th Dept 2023]) and that he was engaged in privileged conduct inasmuch as his "fail[ure] to

2025The analysis of whether the reckless disregard standard has been met "is a fact-specific inquiry [,] and our analysis is focused on the precautionary measures taken by [the emergency responder] to avoid causing harm to the general public weighed against [the emergency responder's] duty to respond to an urgent emergency situation" ( id . at 217-218 [emphasis added]; see McElhinney v Fitzpatrick , 193 AD3d 1409, 1409-1410 [4th Dept 2021]).

2025The analysis of whether the reckless disregard standard has been met "is a fact-specific inquiry [,] and our analysis is focused on the precautionary measures taken by [the emergency responder] to avoid causing harm to the general public weighed against [the emergency responder's] duty to respond to an urgent emergency situation" ( id . at 217-218 [emphasis added]; see McElhinney v Fitzpatrick , 193 AD3d 1409, 1409-1410 [4th Dept 2021]).

2025Defendant's own submissions containing the contradictory deposition testimony of Trooper Finaro and Claimant Murray establish the existence of triable questions of fact as to whether Trooper Finaro acted with reckless disregard ( see Omrami v Socrates , 227 AD2d 459, 459-460 [2d Dept 1996] [holding that conflicting statements in the record present an issue of witness credibility which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment]; Butzer v Scharf, 263 AD2d 862, 863 [3d Dept 1999]).

2023Defendant's own submissions containing the contradictory deposition testimony of DiRusso and Smith establish the existence of several triable questions of fact relevant to the determination of liability under either a reckless disregard standard or principles of ordinary negligence ( see Omrami v Socrates , 227 AD2d 459, 459-460 [2d Dept 1996] [holding that conflicting statements in the record present an issue of witness credibility which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment]; Butzer v Scharf , 263 AD2d 862, 863 [3d Dept 1999] [same]).

2025Defendant's own submissions containing the contradictory deposition testimony of Trooper Finaro and Claimant Murray establish the existence of triable questions of fact as to whether Trooper Finaro acted with reckless disregard ( see Omrami v Socrates , 227 AD2d 459, 459-460 [2d Dept 1996] [holding that conflicting statements in the record present an issue of witness credibility which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment]; Butzer v Scharf, 263 AD2d 862, 863 [3d Dept 1999]).

2023Defendant's own submissions containing the contradictory deposition testimony of DiRusso and Smith establish the existence of several triable questions of fact relevant to the determination of liability under either a reckless disregard standard or principles of ordinary negligence ( see Omrami v Socrates , 227 AD2d 459, 459-460 [2d Dept 1996] [holding that conflicting statements in the record present an issue of witness credibility which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment]; Butzer v Scharf , 263 AD2d 862, 863 [3d Dept 1999] [same]).

2024Defendant met its initial burden on the motion of establishing that the reckless disregard standard of care applies here by submitting evidence, including surveillance video, demonstrating that at the time of the accident the officer "was responding to a police call and was therefore operating an authorized emergency vehicle while involved in an emergency operation" ( Williams v Fassinger , 119 AD3d 1368, 1369 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 912 [2014] ; see Gernatt v Gregoire , 217 AD3d 1340, 1341 [4th Dept 2023]) and that he was engaged in privileged conduct inasmuch as his "fail[ure] to

2024Defendant met its initial burden on the motion of establishing that the reckless disregard standard of care applies here by submitting evidence, including surveillance video, demonstrating that at the time of the accident the officer "was responding to a police call and was therefore operating an authorized emergency vehicle while involved in an emergency operation" ( Williams v Fassinger , 119 AD3d 1368, 1369 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 912 [2014] ; see Gernatt v Gregoire , 217 AD3d 1340, 1341 [4th Dept 2023]) and that he was engaged in privileged conduct inasmuch as his "fail[ure] to

2025The Court, however, finds that Defendant has failed to establish, prima facie , that Trooper Finaro was free from fault under the reckless disregard standard of care ( Reid v City of New York , 148 AD3d 739, 740 [2d Dept 2017]).

2025The Court, however, finds that Defendant has failed to establish, prima facie , that Trooper Finaro was free from fault under the reckless disregard standard of care ( Reid v City of New York , 148 AD3d 739, 740 [2d Dept 2017]).

2016Here, plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions raise issues of fact whether Fitzpatrick sounded his siren “loud enough to be heard and . . . soon enough to be acted upon” (Abood, 30 NY2d at 299 ).

2009Because the bus was a “[correction vehicle” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 109-a) rather than a “police vehicle” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 132-a), the bus was exempt from traffic regulations governing directions of movement and was subject to the reckless disregard standard of liability only if it satisfied the siren and light requirements set forth in section 1104 (c) (see generally Abood v Hospital Ambulance Serv., 30 NY2d 295, 297-299 [1972]).

2020Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that by attempting to execute a U-turn in response to another trooper's radio call for assistance, Balletto's conduct was exempted from the rules of the road by section 1104(b)(4), and that, as a result, his conduct was governed by the reckless disregard standard of care in section 1104(e) ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104[b][4]; Flood v City of Syracuse , 166 AD3d 1573 ; Dodds v Town of Hamburg , 117 AD3d 1428, 1429 ; see also Thomas v City of New York , 172 AD3d at 1133; Jones v Albany County Sheriffs Dept. , 123 AD3d 1331 , 1332-1333).

2019Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 was applicable to Meyer's conduct ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 101, 114-b, 1104[b][4]; Kabir v County of Monroe , 16 NY3d at 220 ; Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d at 499 ; Dodds v Town of Hamburg , 117 AD3d 1428, 1429 ), and that Meyer's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others ( see Frezzell v City of New York , 24 NY3d at 217-218 ; Saarinen v Kerr , 84 NY2d at 503 ; Dodds v T

2014(Riley, 95 NY2d at 466 ; Saarinen, 84 NY2d at 501 .) The “reckless disregard” test requires a showing of more than a “momentary judgment lapse.” (Saarinen at 502 .) In arguing that defendant Fiore’s actions were not reckless, the Utica defendants cite to Herod v Mele ( 62 AD3d 1269 [4th Dept 2009]).

2009We thus conclude that, inasmuch as the accident occurred while the Deputy was operating a police vehicle and while he was engaged in an emergency operation, his conduct should be measured according to the reckless disregard standard of liability set forth in section 1104 (e), not ordinary negligence (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [a], [e]; see generally Herod, 62 AD3d at 1270 ).

2009We thus conclude that Mele was operating an authorized emergency vehicle while involved in an emergency operation (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 101, 114-b), and thus that the reckless disregard standard of liability pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), rather than that of ordinary negligence, applies to his actions (see Criscione v City of New York, 97 NY2d 152, 157-158 [2001]; Hughes v Chiera, 4 AD3d 872 [2004]).

2006That conduct is measured by the reckless disregard standard set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) (see Palmer v City of Syracuse, 13 AD3d 1229, 1230 [2004]; Hughes v Chiera, 4 AD3d 872, 873 [2004]).

2026However, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint because their moving papers failed to eliminate all issues of material fact regarding whether Degere acted recklessly by either traveling at a high speed in the center turn lane in a school zone with poor lighting conditions or abruptly merging into the center turn lane without first looking to his left or activating his turn signal ( see Kolvenbach v Cunningham , 224 AD3d 826 , 828; Bourdierd v City of Yonkers , 213 AD3d 899, 901 ; Rodriguez-Garcia v Southampton Po

2023"The reckless disregard standard requires evidence that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome" ( id. at 901 [internal quotation marks omitted]).