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12 California opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Annette F. v. Sharon S.green2 sentences2025(Edward v. Ellis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 780 , 793.) “The actual malice standard . . . requires a showing that the allegedly false statement was made ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’ [Citation.] The reckless disregard standard requires a ‘high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ [Citation.]” (Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167 .) “The 2020Actual malice “requires a showing that the allegedly false statement was made ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’ [Citation.] The reckless disregard standard requires a ‘high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167 .) We conclude Eram did not make a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain her burden of demonstrating a high probability TheWeatherMan published the defamatory statements knowing of their falsity or while entertaining serious dou | 3 | 6 |
Christian Research Institute v. Alnorgreen2 sentences2014Actual Malice “A public figure suing for defamation ‘must demonstrate “actual malice” by clear and convincing evidence.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor[, supra,] 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 84 (Christian Research).) Actual malice ‘requires a showing that the allegedly false statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” [Citation.] The reckless disregard standard requires a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity . . . .” [Citation.]’ (Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167 (Annette F.).) ‘The ques 2013Actual Malice A public figure suing for defamation “must demonstrate ‘actual malice’ by clear and convincing evidence.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 84 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 600 ] (Christian Research).) Actual malice “requires a showing that the allegedly false statement was made ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’ [Citation.] The reckless disregard standard requires a ‘high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1167 [ 15 | 3 | 3 |
Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025“A defamation plaintiff may rely on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence to show actual malice.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 71, 84 (Christian Research Institute).) “Considerations such as ‘anger and hostility toward the plaintiff,’ ‘reliance upon sources known to be unreliable [citations] or known to be biased against the plaintiff,’ and ‘failure to investigate’ may, ‘in an appropriate case, indicate that the publisher himself had serious doubts regarding the truth of his publication.’ [Citation.] Such evidence is relevant ‘to the extent that it refl 2005(Id. at p. 1167; see New York Times Co. v. *1579 Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at pp. 279-280; Copp v. Paxton, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 .) To meet the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such “ ‘as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” (Annette F. v. Sharon S., supra, at p. 1167.) The reckless disregard test requires a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the defendant’s statement. “ ‘There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ ” | 2 | 3 |
St. Amant v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2005Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 731 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 ].) This is a subjective test, focused on the defendant’s attitude toward the veracity of the published material, as opposed to his or her attitude toward the plaintiff. 2005Amant v. Thompson (1968) 390 U.S. 727, 731 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 ].) This is a subjective test, focused on the defendant’s attitude toward the veracity of the published material, as opposed to his or her attitude toward the plaintiff. | 2 | 2 |
McGarry v. University of San Diegogreen2 sentences2020(Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358, 366 .) “The reckless disregard test is not a negligence test measured by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing, the defamatory statement.” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 114 .) Instead, a reckless disregard for truth or falsity is demonstrated when there is “ ‘sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,’ ” but published the statement anyway. 2020(Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358, 366 .) "The reckless disregard test is not a negligence test measured by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing, the defamatory statement." (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 114 .) Instead, a reckless disregard for truth or falsity is demonstrated when there is " 'sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,' " but published the statement anyway. | 1 | 3 |
Garrison v. Louisianared2 sentences2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w 2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w | 1 | 1 |
Conroy v. Spitzergreen2 sentences2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w 2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w | 1 | 1 |
Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w 2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w | 1 | 1 |
Beilenson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w 2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Copp v. Paxton
green
2 sentences2013It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” (Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 .) “The reckless disregard test requires a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the defendant’s statement. ‘ “There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” ’ [Citations.] This is a subjective test, focused on the defendant’s attitude toward the veracity of the published material, as opposed to his or her attitude toward the plaintiff. [Citation. 2005(Id. at p. 1167; see New York Times Co. v. *1579 Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at pp. 279-280; Copp v. Paxton, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 .) To meet the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such “ ‘as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” (Annette F. v. Sharon S., supra, at p. 1167.) The reckless disregard test requires a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the defendant’s statement. “ ‘There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’ ” | 4 | 2005–2020 |
Davis v. Kiewit Pacific CA4/1
green
2 sentences2020(Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358, 366 .) “The reckless disregard test is not a negligence test measured by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing, the defamatory statement.” (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 114 .) Instead, a reckless disregard for truth or falsity is demonstrated when there is “ ‘sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,’ ” but published the statement anyway. 2020(Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358, 366 .) "The reckless disregard test is not a negligence test measured by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing, the defamatory statement." (McGarry v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 114 .) Instead, a reckless disregard for truth or falsity is demonstrated when there is " 'sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication,' " but published the statement anyway. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Ampex Corp. v. Cargle
green
2 sentences2014Clear and convincing evidence of malice As we have discussed, ante, Rogers qualifies as a "limited purpose public figure." As such, she must "prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the] alleged defamatory statement[s were] made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth." (Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577 .) "To meet the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such ' "as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." ' [Citation.] [¶] The reckless disregard test requires a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of 2013It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ ” (Copp, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 846 .) “The reckless disregard test requires a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of the defendant’s statement. ‘ “There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” ’ [Citations.] This is a subjective test, focused on the defendant’s attitude toward the veracity of the published material, as opposed to his or her attitude toward the plaintiff. [Citation. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2004(Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ]; Conroy v. Spitzer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1454 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 443 ]; Beilenson v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 944, 953 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 ].) “The clear and convincing standard requires that the evidence be such as to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citation.]” (Beilenson v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 950 .) The actual malice standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, requires a showing that the allegedly false statement w | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Time, Inc. v. Hill
green
2 sentences1974(See fn. 12, infra.) 12 The Briscoe court noted (at p. 543, fn. 18): “A publisher does have every reason to know, before publication that identification of a man as a form.er criminal will be highly offensive to the individual involved.” On the other hand, the court indicated that Briscoe must be contrasted with Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 456 , 87 S.Ct. 5341 , stating (at p. 542, fn. 17) “most people would not consider their momentary status as a hostage of escaped criminals to be so offensive or discreditable as to render the disclosure of this fact outrageous.” 13 Civil C 1974(See fn. 12, infra.) 12 The Briscoe court noted (at p. 543, fn. 18): “A publisher does have every reason to know, before publication that identification of a man as a form.er criminal will be highly offensive to the individual involved.” On the other hand, the court indicated that Briscoe must be contrasted with Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 456 , 87 S.Ct. 5341 , stating (at p. 542, fn. 17) “most people would not consider their momentary status as a hostage of escaped criminals to be so offensive or discreditable as to render the disclosure of this fact outrageous.” 13 Civil C | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.