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17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schlessinger v. Rosenfelds, Meyer & Susmangreen2 sentences2026Instead, notwithstanding the language in section 1282.2, subdivision (d), parties to an arbitration proceeding “may be heard on the papers rather than at a live hearing.” (Royal Alliance, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108 , citing Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1105 .) Although arbitration procedures that interfere with a party’s right to a fair hearing are reviewable on appeal, there is no requirement that a live, in-person evidentiary hearing be held. 2025Presenting Evidence Section 1282.2, subdivision (d) provides “parties” in arbitration “are entitled to be heard, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing, but rules of evidence and rules of judicial procedure need not be observed.” Similarly, a trial “court shall vacate the” arbitration result if the arbitrator refused “to hear evidence material to the controversy[.]” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a) & (a)(5).) It “does not mean,” however, “that the evidence must be orally presented or that live testimony is required.” (Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1995) 40 | 2 | 3 |
Doe v. Regents of the University of Californiagreen2 sentences2024(Boermeester, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 92 [“We must decide whether fair procedure requires private universities to provide accused students the opportunity to directly or indirectly cross-examine the accuser and other witnesses at a live hearing with the accused student in attendance . . . . we hold that it does not”]; Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1084 (Regents) [“There is no requirement under California law that, in an administrative hearing, an accused is entitled to cross-examine witnesses”].) We conclude that the sanctions Stanford imposed on John, consisti 2023Were we to assume, however, that a private university must provide an accused student the opportunity to indirectly cross-examine the accuser or third party witnesses outside of the context of a live hearing when the credibility of the accuser or third party witnesses is central to the adjudication, as some lower courts have held (see Claremont McKenna, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 ; University II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237 ; Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639; see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 ), we would find USC’s failure to provide Boermeester the o | 2 | 3 |
Doe v. Alleegreen2 sentences2021In Doe v. Allee (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1069 (Allee), the court held in university disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of sexual misconduct, when the sanction is severe and credibility is central to the adjudication, the university must provide cross-examination at a live hearing before a neutral adjudicator who was not also the investigator as a matter of fair process. 2021In Doe v. Allee (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1069 (Allee), the court held in university disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of sexual misconduct, when the sanction is severe and credibility is central to the adjudication, the university must provide cross-examination at a live hearing before a neutral adjudicator who was not also the investigator as a matter of fair process. | 2 | 2 |
John Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal.green2 sentences2023(Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 638 ; accord, Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1070 (Claremont McKenna); Doe v. University of Southern California (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1212, 1237 (University II); see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 28 BOERMEESTER v. CARRY Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. p. 1084.) In University II, for example, the court directed the private university to give the accused student “an opportunity to submit a list of questions” for the university’s adjudicators to ask the accuser if it proceeded with a new disciplinary proceeding upon 2023Were we to assume, however, that a private university must provide an accused student the opportunity to indirectly cross-examine the accuser or third party witnesses outside of the context of a live hearing when the credibility of the accuser or third party witnesses is central to the adjudication, as some lower courts have held (see Claremont McKenna, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 ; University II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237 ; Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639; see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 ), we would find USC’s failure to provide Boermeester the o | 1 | 3 |
Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhabergreen2 sentences2026Further, the court held that the arbitrator’s obligation to “hear evidence” pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (e), “does not mean that the evidence must be orally presented or that live testimony is required.” Instead, it explained, “[t]he parties may be heard on the papers rather than at a live hearing,” citing Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1108 (Royal Alliance). 2026Instead, notwithstanding the language in section 1282.2, subdivision (d), parties to an arbitration proceeding “may be heard on the papers rather than at a live hearing.” (Royal Alliance, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108 , citing Schlessinger v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1105 .) Although arbitration procedures that interfere with a party’s right to a fair hearing are reviewable on appeal, there is no requirement that a live, in-person evidentiary hearing be held. | 1 | 2 |
Doe v. Claremont McKenna Coll.green2 sentences2023Were we to assume, however, that a private university must provide an accused student the opportunity to indirectly cross-examine the accuser or third party witnesses outside of the context of a live hearing when the credibility of the accuser or third party witnesses is central to the adjudication, as some lower courts have held (see Claremont McKenna, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 ; University II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237 ; Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639; see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 ), we would find USC’s failure to provide Boermeester the o 2019(CMC, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072–1073.) The court held “that where . . . [an accused student] was facing potentially severe consequences and the [review] Committee’s decision against him turned on believing [his accuser], the Committee’s procedures should have included an opportunity for the Committee to assess [the accuser’s] credibility by her appearing at the hearing in person or by videoconference or similar technology, and by the Committee’s asking her appropriate questions proposed by [the accused] or the Committee itself.” (Id. at p. 1057.) In Cincinnati, university procedures pe | 1 | 2 |
Goldberg v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIF.green1 sentence2023Reg., supra, at p. 41505) requires universities “to provide for a live hearing with advisor-conducted cross- examination in all cases” (id. at p. 41507). | 1 | 1 |
Silver v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authoritygreen2 sentences2017(Silver v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 338, 352 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 287 ].) Even if Reddy had complied with the Rules of Court in requesting a live hearing, we would have no hesitation in affirming the trial court’s decision not to take oral testimony. 2017(Silver v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 338, 352 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 287 ].) Even if Reddy had complied with the Rules of Court in requesting a live hearing, we would have no hesitation in affirming the trial court’s decision not to take oral testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associatesgreen2 sentences2016On request of any party to the arbitration, the testimony of witnesses shall be given under oath.” Section 1282.2, subdivision (d) is incorporated into section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) by the phrase “other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.” Both statutes codify within the CAA the fundamental principle that “[ajrbitration should give both parties an opportunity to be heard.” (Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 689 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 ].) The parties may be heard on the papers rather than at a live hearing (Schlessinger 2016On request of any party to the arbitration, the testimony of witnesses shall be given under oath.” Section 1282.2, subdivision (d) is incorporated into section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) by the phrase “other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.” Both statutes codify within the CAA the fundamental principle that “[ajrbitration should give both parties an opportunity to be heard.” (Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 689 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 ].) The parties may be heard on the papers rather than at a live hearing (Schlessinger | 1 | 1 |
Haraguchi v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2013And, as pointed out by the People, “that the trial court’s findings were based on declarations and other written evidence does not lessen the deference due those findings.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711, fn. 3 .) Quite simply, a live hearing was not required. | 1 | 1 |
Warner v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1991(See Warner v. Superior Court (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 821, 824 [ 273 P.2d 89 ].) The question presented is whether this rule was abrogated with the enactment, in 1970, of Code of Civil Procedure section 1211.5, which provides in relevant part: “(a) If no objection is made to the sufficiency of such affidavit or statement during the hearing on the charges contained therein, jurisdiction of the subject matter shall not depend on the averments of such affidavit or statement, but may be established by the facts found by the trial court to have been proved at such hearing, and the court shall cause t 1991(See Warner v. Superior Court (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 821, 824 [ 273 P.2d 89 ].) The question presented is whether this rule was abrogated with the enactment, in 1970, of Code of Civil Procedure section 1211.5, which provides in relevant part: “(a) If no objection is made to the sufficiency of such affidavit or statement during the hearing on the charges contained therein, jurisdiction of the subject matter shall not depend on the averments of such affidavit or statement, but may be established by the facts found by the trial court to have been proved at such hearing, and the court shall cause t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John Doe v. Westmont Coll.
green
2 sentences2023(Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 638 ; accord, Doe v. Claremont McKenna College (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1070 (Claremont McKenna); Doe v. University of Southern California (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1212, 1237 (University II); see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at 28 BOERMEESTER v. CARRY Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. p. 1084.) In University II, for example, the court directed the private university to give the accused student “an opportunity to submit a list of questions” for the university’s adjudicators to ask the accuser if it proceeded with a new disciplinary proceeding upon 2023Were we to assume, however, that a private university must provide an accused student the opportunity to indirectly cross-examine the accuser or third party witnesses outside of the context of a live hearing when the credibility of the accuser or third party witnesses is central to the adjudication, as some lower courts have held (see Claremont McKenna, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070 ; University II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237 ; Westmont, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639; see also Regents I, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 ), we would find USC’s failure to provide Boermeester the o | 3 | 2020–2023 |
Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center
green
2 sentences2021(Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069 .) Previously, courts recognized, “Overlapping investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions do not necessarily deny a fair hearing and are common before most administrative boards.” (Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels etc. Medical Center (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1142 ; USC II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1235 , fn. 29 [quoting Hongsathavij].) 27 As a preliminary matter, respondent argues John forfeited this claim because he never requested the opportunity to conduct live cross-examination and never objected to any aspect of the Procedures dur 2021(Allee, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069 .) Previously, courts recognized, “Overlapping investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions do not necessarily deny a fair hearing and are common before most administrative boards.” (Hongsathavij v. Queen of Angels etc. Medical Center (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1142 ; USC II, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1235 , fn. 29 [quoting Hongsathavij].) 27 As a preliminary matter, respondent argues John forfeited this claim because he never requested the opportunity to conduct live cross-examination and never objected to any aspect of the Procedures dur | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Hoso Foods, Inc. v. Columbus Club, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026(Royal Alliance, supra, at p. 1105 , citing Hoso Foods, Inc. v. Columbus Club, Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 881, 888 .) The absence of such a hearing in the arbitration process here did not constitute a denial of Kokinos’s due process. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Heimlich v. Shivji
green
1 sentence2025The statutory right to present evidence in an arbitration proceeding “is not ‘a back door … through which parties may routinely test the validity of legal theories of arbitrators.’ [Citation.] Instead, it was designed as a ‘safety valve in private arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an arbitrator has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’ ” (Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368 .) Here, the arbitrator did not prevent Sanchez from fairly presenting her case. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
green
1 sentence2025(Doe v. Regents of University of California (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 44, 56 .) Private universities are not required to provide an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, directly or indirectly, at a live hearing with the accused student present. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lewis v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2024(Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1245, 1250-1251.) In McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 49 Cal.3d at page 195 , the language of the statute at issue, Penal Code section 1050, subdivision (d), clearly contemplated the trial court would hold a live hearing, in contrast to the language in section 2023.030 at issue here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2024The court held that procedural due process requires “ ‘[n]otice prior of 10 The Barrientos court stated the attorneys who were sanctioned “should have been provided with an opportunity to explain, on the record, their conduct before the court made its decision.” (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 71 .) In the context of the case, where the court imposed sanctions during a live hearing, we do not interpret this statement to mean that an opportunity to respond in writing would not have been sufficient, but as a recognition that the judge and the attorneys were presen | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance
green
1 sentence2024(Lewis v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1245, 1250-1251.) In McCullough v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 49 Cal.3d at page 195 , the language of the statute at issue, Penal Code section 1050, subdivision (d), clearly contemplated the trial court would hold a live hearing, in contrast to the language in section 2023.030 at issue here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Louis
green
1 sentence2023The Court of Appeal majority reasoned that the accused student must be able to engage in adversarial back-and-forth questioning with the accuser and other witnesses at a live hearing in order to assess witness credibility and to “fully present his [or her] defense.” (Boermeester v. Carry, supra, B290675.) While live adversarial questioning may be considered essential in the context of a criminal trial (People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969 , 982–983), there is no absolute right to a live hearing with cross-examination in administrative proceedings, even where constitutional due process applies. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Swarthout v. Cooke
green
2 sentences2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a 2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex
green
2 sentences2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a 2022(Citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) 442 U.S. 1 [ 60 L.Ed.2d 668 ] & Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216 [ 178 L.Ed.2d 732 ].) He believes “taken together the two cases make clear that a live hearing is the minimum process required to comply with procedural due process.” In his view, “[t]hat conclusion follows from 1) the fact that Greenholtz involved a parole procedure where inmates could appear in person and speak to the Parole Board [citation], and 2) Swarthout’s clear statement that ‘the minimum procedures adequate for due process protection’ a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
John Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati
green
1 sentence2019(Cincinnati, supra, 872 F.3d at p. 396 .) However, the complaining witness chose not to appear, and the accused student had no opportunity to question her, indirectly or otherwise. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)
green
1 sentence2013(Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 201 .) 6 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.