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17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chrysler Corp. v. California Employment Stabilization Commissiongreen2 sentences1967(Chrysler Corp. v. California Emp. etc. Com., 116 Cal.App.2d 8,16,17 [ 253 P.2d 68 ].) The same facts which fulfill the volitional test also meet the causational test described in Ruberoid, supra. Bach of the separate acts of the UAW, taken in claimants’ behalf and in furtherance of their demands, was a separate link in the chain of causation that ultimately resulted in the Van Nuys claimants leaving their employment and the Oakland employees being left with no work to do. 1967(Chrysler Corp. v. California Emp. etc. Com., 116 Cal.App.2d 8,16,17 [ 253 P.2d 68 ].) The same facts which fulfill the volitional test also meet the causational test described in Ruberoid, supra. Bach of the separate acts of the UAW, taken in claimants’ behalf and in furtherance of their demands, was a separate link in the chain of causation that ultimately resulted in the Van Nuys claimants leaving their employment and the Oakland employees being left with no work to do. | 1 | 2 |
Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oaklandgreen1 sentence2022In order to 16 pass this test “[t]he remaining provisions must stand on their own, unaided by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague by their absence nor inextricably connected to them by policy considerations.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The volitional requirement for severability is met if the voters [or legislative body] likely would have adopted the initiative without the invalid provisions. [Citations.]” (MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1393 ; see also Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.A | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2013On this premise, Warren claims his proposed special instruction was an accurate statement of the law and "nothing in Williams suggested that it would be error for the trial court to augment the statutory language with the serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior language." Warren notes that Justice Kennard filed a concurring opinion in Williams in which she suggested that in future SVPA cases it "would be prudent" to explain to jurors "that defendants cannot be found to be sexually violent predators unless they have serious difficulty in controlling their behavior." (Williams, supr 2013The pinpoint instruction the Williams defendant requested stated that " 'the diagnosed mental disorder must render the person unable to control his dangerous behavior.' " (Williams, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 763 , italics omitted.) As Warren points out, this proposed instruction did not accurately reflect the law, which requires only a "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 413 .) Therefore, Warren would limit application of Williams to cases in which the alleged SVP failed to request an accurate pinpoint instruction regarding the volitional requirement impli | 1 | 1 |
Barlow v. Davisgreen2 sentences2005In order to pass this test ‘[t]he remaining provisions must stand on their own, unaided by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague by their absence nor inextricably connected to them by policy considerations.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 989; Barlow v. Davis (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1265-1266 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 ].) The volitional requirement for severability is met if the voters likely would have adopted the initiative without the invalid provisions. 2005In order to pass this test ‘[t]he remaining provisions must stand on their own, unaided by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague by their absence nor inextricably connected to them by policy considerations.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 989; Barlow v. Davis (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1265-1266 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 ].) The volitional requirement for severability is met if the voters likely would have adopted the initiative without the invalid provisions. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bridget M. Denny-Shaffergreen1 sentence1995(See English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law and the Volitional Insanity Defense (1988) 40 Hastings L.J. 1 , fn. 3; see also, U.S. v. Denny-Shaffer (10th Cir. 1993) 2 F.3d 999, 1003, fn. 1 .) These common law definitions generally included a volitional test for insanity. | 1 | 1 |
Isobe v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1979Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 584, 589 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 376 , 526 P.2d 528 ]). 1979Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 584, 589 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 376 , 526 P.2d 528 ]). | 1 | 1 |
Coast Packing Co. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1967Appeals Board, 64 Cal.2d 76, 79 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 410 P.2d 358 ].) The first element noted involves the volitional test, the second a eausational test. 1967Appeals Board, 64 Cal.2d 76, 79 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 854 , 410 P.2d 358 ].) The first element noted involves the volitional test, the second a eausational test. | 1 | 1 |
Depaoli v. Ernstgreen2 sentences1959(Cole v. Rush (1955), 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 355, 364 [7] [ 310 P.2d 1 ].) It also bears mention in connection with the question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our present rule governing construction and application of the volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, followed, and relied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop, or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [ 309 P.2d 363, 365-367 ]; Teamster 1959(Cole v. Rush (1955), 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 355, 364 [7] [ 310 P.2d 1 ].) It also bears mention in connection with the question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our present rule governing construction and application of the volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, followed, and relied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop, or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [ 309 P.2d 363, 365-367 ]; Teamster | 1 | 1 |
Cole v. Rushred2 sentences1959(Cole v. Rush (1955), 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 355, 364 [7] [ 310 P.2d 1 ].) It also bears mention in connection with the question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our present rule governing construction and application of the volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, followed, and relied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop, or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [ 309 P.2d 363, 365-367 ]; Teamster 1959(Cole v. Rush (1955), 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 355, 364 [7] [ 310 P.2d 1 ].) It also bears mention in connection with the question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our present rule governing construction and application of the volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, followed, and relied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop, or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [ 309 P.2d 363, 365-367 ]; Teamster | 1 | 1 |
State v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen2 sentences1959(Cole v. Rush (1955), 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 355, 364 [7] [ 310 P.2d 1 ].) It also bears mention in connection with the question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our present rule governing construction and application of the volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, followed, and relied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop, or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [ 309 P.2d 363, 365-367 ]; Teamster 1959(Cole v. Rush (1955), 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [8, 9] [ 289 P.2d 450 , 54 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; State v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 355, 364 [7] [ 310 P.2d 1 ].) It also bears mention in connection with the question as to whether we shall depart from or adhere to our present rule governing construction and application of the volitional test that the following out of state cases have cited, followed, and relied upon McKinley, Bunny's Waffle Shop, or Bodinson, or upon the volitional test principles expressed in those cases: Depaoli v. Ernst (1957), 73 Nev. 79 [ 309 P.2d 363, 365-367 ]; Teamster | 1 | 1 |
Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Employment Commissiongreen2 sentences1953Com., 24 Cal.2d 735, 741 [ 151 P.2d 224 ].) “The volitional test itself is based upon a just analysis of a substantial subjective element, and it cannot properly be extended or perverted by insistence upon mere form.” (McKinley v. California Emp. 1953Com., 24 Cal.2d 735, 741 [ 151 P.2d 224 ].) “The volitional test itself is based upon a just analysis of a substantial subjective element, and it cannot properly be extended or perverted by insistence upon mere form.” (McKinley v. California Emp. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bodinson Manufacturing Co. v. California Employment Commission
green
2 sentences1967Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [ 109 P.2d 935 ], established a volitional test to determine the applicability of the trade dispute disqualification. 1967Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [ 109 P.2d 935 ], established a volitional test to determine the applicability of the trade dispute disqualification. | 3 | 1961–1967 |
Gardner v. Director of Employment
green
2 sentences1989Petitioners rely on a statement in Gardner v. State of California that the volitional test should be enforced “against the party who strikes the first blow with the drastic economic weapon of strike or lockout.” (Supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 29 .) We do not believe the Gardner court meant by this statement to place form over substance. 1967The court said that there was no “basis for imposing upon a worker in the meatpacking industry a different test from that in the ease of other workers for the determination of when ‘he left his work because of a trade dispute. ’ ” (At pp. 80, 81.) The court in Gardner v. State of California, 53 Cal.2d 23 [ 346 P.2d 193 ], in approving the volitional test as set forth in McKinley v. California Emp. | 2 | 1967–1989 |
Ruberoid Co. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
green
2 sentences1979Appeals Board (1963) 59 Cal.2d 73 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 878 , 378 P.2d 102 ], the Supreme Court explained the effect of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1262 (see fn. 1, ante) as follows: “[T]he disqualification of the section must rest upon two elements: the worker must voluntarily leave or remain away from his employment because of a trade dispute. . . . [T]he first prerequisite involves a volitional test and the second, a causational test.” (Id., at p. 77.) Whether the employees voluntarily remain away from work because of the labor dispute is a determination that must be made in the context of 1979Appeals Board (1963) 59 Cal.2d 73 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 878 , 378 P.2d 102 ], the Supreme Court explained the effect of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1262 (see fn. 1, ante) as follows: “[T]he disqualification of the section must rest upon two elements: the worker must voluntarily leave or remain away from his employment because of a trade dispute. . . . [T]he first prerequisite involves a volitional test and the second, a causational test.” (Id., at p. 77.) Whether the employees voluntarily remain away from work because of the labor dispute is a determination that must be made in the context of | 2 | 1966–1979 |
MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee
green
1 sentence2022In order to 16 pass this test “[t]he remaining provisions must stand on their own, unaided by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague by their absence nor inextricably connected to them by policy considerations.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] The volitional requirement for severability is met if the voters [or legislative body] likely would have adopted the initiative without the invalid provisions. [Citations.]” (MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1393 ; see also Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.A | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kansas v. Crane
green
1 sentence2013The pinpoint instruction the Williams defendant requested stated that " 'the diagnosed mental disorder must render the person unable to control his dangerous behavior.' " (Williams, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 763 , italics omitted.) As Warren points out, this proposed instruction did not accurately reflect the law, which requires only a "serious difficulty in controlling behavior." (Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 413 .) Therefore, Warren would limit application of Williams to cases in which the alleged SVP failed to request an accurate pinpoint instruction regarding the volitional requirement impli | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Calfarm Insurance v. Deukmejian
green
1 sentence1997Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 821, 836.) This rule applies to an initiative provision held invalid under article II, section 12. ( 48 Cal.3d at p. 836 .) 21 The volitional requirement concerns whether the voters would have adopted the initiative without the invalid provisions. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
California Gillnetters Ass'n v. Department of Fish & Game
green
2 sentences1997(Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715; California Gillnetters Assn. v. Department of Fish & Game, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159 .) “ ‘The test is whether it can be said with confidence that the electorate’s attention was sufficiently focused upon the parts to be severed so that it would have separately considered and adopted them in the absence of the invalid portions.’ ” (Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715, italics deleted.) In applying this test, “[w]e may examine the proposition itself, as well as the ballot materi 1997(Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715; California Gillnetters Assn. v. Department of Fish & Game, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159 .) “ ‘The test is whether it can be said with confidence that the electorate’s attention was sufficiently focused upon the parts to be severed so that it would have separately considered and adopted them in the absence of the invalid portions.’ ” (Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715, italics deleted.) In applying this test, “[w]e may examine the proposition itself, as well as the ballot materi | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
green
1 sentence1987Appeals Bd., supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 575 .) A two-part test is applied for determining whether a claimant is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits pursuant to section 1262: First, the employee must voluntarily leave or remain away from his employment (a volitional test); and second, the employee must leave or remain away from *1526 his employment because of the trade dispute (a causation test). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Commission
green
2 sentences1967Com., 34 Cal.2d 239 [ 209 P.2d 602 ]; Bunny’s and Bodinson, supra, used the following language: “As applied in the subject and cited eases the rule works impartially as to both employes and employers and puts each group on notice that the one which creates and first applies the economic weapon in a trade dispute under circumstances such as those present in Bunny’s Waffle Shop, or McKinley or here, may have to bear responsibility for foreseeable reprisals. ” (At p. 30; italics added.) The volitional test is a subjective test to determine who is responsible for claimants’ unemployment. 1967Com., 34 Cal.2d 239 [ 209 P.2d 602 ]; Bunny’s and Bodinson, supra, used the following language: “As applied in the subject and cited eases the rule works impartially as to both employes and employers and puts each group on notice that the one which creates and first applies the economic weapon in a trade dispute under circumstances such as those present in Bunny’s Waffle Shop, or McKinley or here, may have to bear responsibility for foreseeable reprisals. ” (At p. 30; italics added.) The volitional test is a subjective test to determine who is responsible for claimants’ unemployment. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employment Commission
green
1 sentence1965Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 695, 707 .) To determine whether the claimant was responsible for his own *343 unemployment and therefore should he denied the aid of benefits or was forced to leave his work because of the acts of others and therefore was still entitled to benefits, it was necessary under the volitional test to inquire into the economic realities of the circumstances resulting in the unemployment. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers, Locals No. 222 & 976 of International Brotherhood v. Orange Transportation Co.
green
2 sentences1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. 1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Schoenwiesner v. Division of Employment Security
neutral
2 sentences1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. 1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. 1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Lexes v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. 1959Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 45 [ 296 P.2d 291, 294 ]; Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission (1952), 121 Utah 525 [ 243 P.2d 951, 956-959 ]; Lexes v. Industrial Commission *30 (1952), 121 Utah 551 [ 243 P.2d 964, 966-969 ]; Schoenwiesner v. Board of Review (1957), 44 N.J.Super. 377 [ 130 A.2d 648 ]; Climax Fire Brick Co. v. Unemployment Comp. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.