psychiatrist-patient privilege in Connecticut

2013In the context of the psychiatrist-patient privilege, our Supreme Court has held that “a patient may claim the privilege of confidentiality between himself and his physician only if he had a justified expectation that his communications would not be publicly disclosed . . . .” State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2013In the context of the psychiatrist-patient privilege, our Supreme Court has held that “a patient may claim the privilege of confidentiality between himself and his physician only if he had a justified expectation that his communications would not be publicly disclosed . . . .” State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2013In the context of the psychiatrist-patient privilege, our Supreme Court has held that “a patient may claim the privilege of confidentiality between himself and his physician only if he had a justified expectation that his communications would not be publicly disclosed . . . .” State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2004“Connecticut has a broad psychiatrist-patient privilege that protects the confidential communications or records of a patient seeking diagnosis and treatment. [General Statutes] §§ 52-146d, 52-146e; see State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 629 , 424 A.2d 293 (1979); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 [ 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2013In the context of the psychiatrist-patient privilege, our Supreme Court has held that “a patient may claim the privilege of confidentiality between himself and his physician only if he had a justified expectation that his communications would not be publicly disclosed . . . .” State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 , 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2004“Connecticut has a broad psychiatrist-patient privilege that protects the confidential communications or records of a patient seeking diagnosis and treatment. [General Statutes] §§ 52-146d, 52-146e; see State v. Toste, 178 Conn. 626, 629 , 424 A.2d 293 (1979); State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234 , 363 A.2d 143 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 [ 96 S. Ct. 469 , 46 L.

2023Although, as the majority points out, the definition of ‘‘communi- cations and records’’ was not at issue in Falco v. Insti- tute of Living, supra, 254 Conn. 321 ; see part III A 1 of the majority opinion; we nevertheless relied on that case for the proposition that the legislative purpose behind the psychiatrist-patient privilege recognizes ‘‘ ‘that a stigma may attach to one who seeks psychiatric care, and that revealing a patient’s identity may subject [the individual] to embarrassment, harassment or dis- crimination.’ ’’ Freedom of Information Officer, Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Se

2016In Falco v. Institute of Living, 254 Conn. 321, 328 , 757 A.2d 571 (2000), the court, in considering the scope of the psychiatrist-patient privilege contained in § 52-146e, noted that ‘‘the principal purpose of [the psychiatrist- patient] privilege is to give the patient an incentive to make full disclosure to a physician in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from a doctor’s testimony. . . .

2000We previously have stated that the purpose of the psychiatrist-patient privilege is to safeguard “confidential communications or records of a patient seeking diagnosis and treatment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 379 , 545 A.2d 1048 (1988); so as “to protect [the] therapeutic relationship.” Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819 , 462 A.2d 1060 (1983).

2000We previously have stated that the purpose of the psychiatrist-patient privilege is to safeguard “confidential communications or records of a patient seeking diagnosis and treatment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 379 , 545 A.2d 1048 (1988); so as “to protect [the] therapeutic relationship.” Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819 , 462 A.2d 1060 (1983).

2000We previously have stated that the purpose of the psychiatrist-patient privilege is to safeguard “confidential communications or records of a patient seeking diagnosis and treatment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 379 , 545 A.2d 1048 (1988); so as “to protect [the] therapeutic relationship.” Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819 , 462 A.2d 1060 (1983).

2000We previously have stated that the purpose of the psychiatrist-patient privilege is to safeguard “confidential communications or records of a patient seeking diagnosis and treatment”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kelly, 208 Conn. 365, 379 , 545 A.2d 1048 (1988); so as “to protect [the] therapeutic relationship.” Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819 , 462 A.2d 1060 (1983).

2020We conclude that the defendant’s particular challenge in State v. Williams, supra, 206 Conn. 203—i.e., to the postinvocation grant of immunity pursuant to § 54-47a to a witness who testified against him—is substantially similar to the sole claim raised in the present appeal— i.e., that Washington should not have been permitted to testify after he initially invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

2017In Esposito , we determined that before an in camera review of psychiatric records is conducted, "there must be a showing that there is reasonable ground to believe that the failure to produce the information is likely to impair **762 the defendant's right of confrontation such that the witness' direct testimony should be stricken." (Emphasis added.) State v. Esposito , supra, 192 Conn. at 179 , 471 A.2d 949 . 20 In applying this standard, we have "urged trial courts to permit the defendant a certain latitude in his attempt to make [the preliminary showing required to obtain an in camera inspe

2017In Esposito , we determined that before an in camera review of psychiatric records is conducted, "there must be a showing that there is reasonable ground to believe that the failure to produce the information is likely to impair **762 the defendant's right of confrontation such that the witness' direct testimony should be stricken." (Emphasis added.) State v. Esposito , supra, 192 Conn. at 179 , 471 A.2d 949 . 20 In applying this standard, we have "urged trial courts to permit the defendant a certain latitude in his attempt to make [the preliminary showing required to obtain an in camera inspe

2017He claims that the trial court improperly declined to extend our holding in Esposito and thereby violated his constitutional right to present a defense when it refused to conduct an in camera review of certain records of the victim protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege; see General Statutes §§ 52-146d 1 **745 and 52-146e ; 2 even *901 though the defendant alleged that-those records may contain information pertinent to the defendant's claim of self-defense. 3 Although we agree **746 with the defendant that the psychiatrist-patient privilege may be surmounted when an accused makes a su

2017He claims that the trial court improperly declined to extend our holding in Esposito and thereby violated his constitutional right to present a defense when it refused to conduct an in camera review of certain records of the victim protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege; see General Statutes §§ 52-146d 1 **745 and 52-146e ; 2 even *901 though the defendant alleged that-those records may contain information pertinent to the defendant's claim of self-defense. 3 Although we agree **746 with the defendant that the psychiatrist-patient privilege may be surmounted when an accused makes a su

2017In Esposito , we determined that before an in camera review of psychiatric records is conducted, "there must be a showing that there is reasonable ground to believe that the failure to produce the information is likely to impair **762 the defendant's right of confrontation such that the witness' direct testimony should be stricken." (Emphasis added.) State v. Esposito , supra, 192 Conn. at 179 , 471 A.2d 949 . 20 In applying this standard, we have "urged trial courts to permit the defendant a certain latitude in his attempt to make [the preliminary showing required to obtain an in camera inspe

2017In Esposito , we determined that before an in camera review of psychiatric records is conducted, "there must be a showing that there is reasonable ground to believe that the failure to produce the information is likely to impair **762 the defendant's right of confrontation such that the witness' direct testimony should be stricken." (Emphasis added.) State v. Esposito , supra, 192 Conn. at 179 , 471 A.2d 949 . 20 In applying this standard, we have "urged trial courts to permit the defendant a certain latitude in his attempt to make [the preliminary showing required to obtain an in camera inspe

2017Rev. 1 , 50 (2007). 21 See also Bobo v. State , 256 Ga. 357 , 360, 349 S.E.2d 690 (1986) ("[i]n order to abrogate the psychiatrist-patient privilege, the defendant must make a showing of necessity, that is, that the evidence in question is critical to his defense and that substantially similar evidence is otherwise unavailable to him"); State v. Peseti , 101 Haw. 172 , 182, 65 P.3d 119 (2003) ("[a]lthough it stands to reason that the right of confrontation via cross-examination ... will not trump a statutory privilege in every case in which a conflict arises between the two, we believe that fu

2017Rev. 1 , 50 (2007). 21 See also Bobo v. State , 256 Ga. 357 , 360, 349 S.E.2d 690 (1986) ("[i]n order to abrogate the psychiatrist-patient privilege, the defendant must make a showing of necessity, that is, that the evidence in question is critical to his defense and that substantially similar evidence is otherwise unavailable to him"); State v. Peseti , 101 Haw. 172 , 182, 65 P.3d 119 (2003) ("[a]lthough it stands to reason that the right of confrontation via cross-examination ... will not trump a statutory privilege in every case in which a conflict arises between the two, we believe that fu

2016State v. Kemah, supra, 289 Conn. 411 , also is instruc- tive.

2004Accordingly, Ross provides no support for the state’s argument that the defendant’s claim of intoxication constituted an implied waiver of his right to invoke the psychiatrist-patient privilege. 21 See General Statutes § 53a-13. 22 See General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). 23 In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Appellate Court relied primarily on State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987).

2004Accordingly, Ross provides no support for the state’s argument that the defendant’s claim of intoxication constituted an implied waiver of his right to invoke the psychiatrist-patient privilege. 21 See General Statutes § 53a-13. 22 See General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). 23 In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Appellate Court relied primarily on State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714 , 529 A.2d 1260 (1987).

2004In each of the cases on which the state relies, however, the issue before the court was whether the accused’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by a court order requiring the accused to submit to a psychiatric examination. 20 See State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 362 ; State v. Manfredi, 213 Conn. 500, 512 , 569 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818 , 111 S. Ct. 62 , 112 L.

2004In each of the cases on which the state relies, however, the issue before the court was whether the accused’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by a court order requiring the accused to submit to a psychiatric examination. 20 See State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 362 ; State v. Manfredi, 213 Conn. 500, 512 , 569 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818 , 111 S. Ct. 62 , 112 L.

2004State v. Jenkins, 73 Conn. App. 150, 171 , 807 A.2d 485 (2002).

2004State v. Jenkins, 73 Conn. App. 150, 171 , 807 A.2d 485 (2002).

2004In each of the cases on which the state relies, however, the issue before the court was whether the accused’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by a court order requiring the accused to submit to a psychiatric examination. 20 See State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 362 ; State v. Manfredi, 213 Conn. 500, 512 , 569 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818 , 111 S. Ct. 62 , 112 L.

2004In each of the cases on which the state relies, however, the issue before the court was whether the accused’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by a court order requiring the accused to submit to a psychiatric examination. 20 See State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 362 ; State v. Manfredi, 213 Conn. 500, 512 , 569 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818 , 111 S. Ct. 62 , 112 L.

2004In each of the cases on which the state relies, however, the issue before the court was whether the accused’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated by a court order requiring the accused to submit to a psychiatric examination. 20 See State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 362 ; State v. Manfredi, 213 Conn. 500, 512 , 569 A.2d 506 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818 , 111 S. Ct. 62 , 112 L.

2004Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who introduces psychiatric evidence has “no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of [the psychiatric reports of the defendant’s experts] by the prosecution.” Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

2004Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who introduces psychiatric evidence has “no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of [the psychiatric reports of the defendant’s experts] by the prosecution.” Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

1999The state claims that our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 652-58 , 526 A.2d 1283 (1987), establishes that the psychiatrist-patient privilege does not protect any communications or records relating to the diagnosis or treatment of alcohol related disorders.

1999The state claims that our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 652-58 , 526 A.2d 1283 (1987), establishes that the psychiatrist-patient privilege does not protect any communications or records relating to the diagnosis or treatment of alcohol related disorders.

1995Lieb v. Department of Health Services, 14 Conn. App. 552 , 553-554 .

1988In support of its argument, the department cites In re Board of Medical Review Investigation, 463 A.2d 1373 (R.I. 1983).