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17 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1944–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Tinneygreen1 sentence2021Analysis Appellant Mingle alleges trial court error, arguing: (1) paragraph 3 of the Agreement is unambiguous, simply requiring her to “remove all unauthorized occupants within seven days of filing” the Agreement, with no continuing obligation to remove unauthorized occupants after May 21, 2018, for the duration of the Agreement; (2) even if paragraph 3 were ambiguous, a reasonable person would construe the provision in her favor; (3) the trial court sua sponte raised Mingle’s lease as a basis for Oak Street’s requested relief, even though Oak Street failed to allege a violation of the lease a | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021Analysis Appellant Mingle alleges trial court error, arguing: (1) paragraph 3 of the Agreement is unambiguous, simply requiring her to “remove all unauthorized occupants within seven days of filing” the Agreement, with no continuing obligation to remove unauthorized occupants after May 21, 2018, for the duration of the Agreement; (2) even if paragraph 3 were ambiguous, a reasonable person would construe the provision in her favor; (3) the trial court sua sponte raised Mingle’s lease as a basis for Oak Street’s requested relief, even though Oak Street failed to allege a violation of the lease a | 1 | 1 |
Kaiser v. Rapleygreen1 sentence2007See Kaiser v. Rapley, 380 A.2d 995, 997 (D.C.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Grubb v. WM. CALOMIRIS INVESTMENT CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2004Calomiris Investment Corp., 588 A.2d 1144, 1147 (D.C.1991) (per curiam), this court recognized that it is within the trial court’s discretion to grant possession to the landlord where there has been a lease violation, even if that violation has been belatedly cured after the expiration of the notice to cure or quit. 2004Calomiris Investment Corp., 588 A.2d 1144, 1147 (D.C.1991) (per curiam), this court recognized that it is within the trial court's discretion to grant possession to the landlord where there has been a lease violation, even if that violation has been belatedly cured after the expiration of the notice to cure or quit. | 1 | 1 |
Pritch v. Henrygreen1 sentence1998The notice requirement generally dealing with defaults in lease obligations is that contained in D.C.Code § 45-2551(b): “a housing provider may recover possession of a rental unit where the tenant is violating an obligation of tenancy and fails to correct the violation within 30 days after receiving from the housing provider a notice to correct the violation or vacate.” In Pritch v. Henry, 543 A.2d 808, 811-12 (D.C.1988), we construed this provision to require more than a strict thirty-days’ notice when the alleged lease violation is the obligation to pay rent in a timely manner. 6 For all oth | 1 | 1 |
Cormier v. McRaegreen1 sentence1998Cormier v. McRae, 609 A.2d 676, 681 (D.C.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Sherwood v. Elgartgreen2 sentences1997Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower court’s judgment on either the probate court’s reasoning that the lease claim was presented to it and properly denied, or on the second alternative ground, the Superior Court’s reasoning, that the probate court had jurisdiction to hear the claim on the merits but that the landlord had waived its right to present the claim on the merits, or on the third alternative ground, based on the landlord’s argument, that even if the claim was not before the probate court, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to further delay distri 1997Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower court’s judgment on either the probate court’s reasoning that the lease claim was presented to it and properly denied, or on the second alternative ground, the Superior Court’s reasoning, that the probate court had jurisdiction to hear the claim on the merits but that the landlord had waived its right to present the claim on the merits, or on the third alternative ground, based on the landlord’s argument, that even if the claim was not before the probate court, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to further delay distri | 1 | 1 |
Brefries East End, Inc. v. Plattgreen2 sentences1990See Brefries East End Inc. v. Platt, 116 Misc.2d 574, 575 , 457 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (N.Y.App.Term 1982) (per curiam) (under lease and statutory provisions requiring tenant to provide landlord with notice and obtain consent before subletting apartment, where tenant failed to take such steps “it is no answer to say, after the fact, that had the required notice been given, consent could not have been reasonably withheld”). 1990See Brefries East End Inc. v. Platt, 116 Misc.2d 574, 575 , 457 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (N.Y.App.Term 1982) (per curiam) (under lease and statutory provisions requiring tenant to provide landlord with notice and obtain consent before subletting apartment, where tenant failed to take such steps “it is no answer to say, after the fact, that had the required notice been given, consent could not have been reasonably withheld”). | 1 | 1 |
Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.green2 sentences1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 | 1 | 1 |
Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.green2 sentences1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 | 1 | 1 |
Sutton Mutual Insurance v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc.green2 sentences1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 | 1 | 1 |
Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.green2 sentences1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 1987Thus whether Dixon correctly interpreted the lease is irrelevant because he “had no duty to act upon or report it.” Sutton Mutual Insurance Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 440-41 , 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968); see also Barcon Associates, Inc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 160 N.J.Super. 559, 574-76 , 390 A.2d 684, 692 (1978) (knowledge of corporate employee will be imputed to corporation “only where the corporate employee has some functional responsibility with respect to the knowledge or notice”), aff 'd, 172 N.J.Super. 186 , 411 A.2d 709 (1980), aff'd, 86 N.J. 179 , 430 A.2d 214 (19 | 1 | 1 |
Larsen Sheep Co. v. Sjogrengreen2 sentences1985Schlegel v. Bott, 93 N.J.Eq. 607, 610, 117 A. 605, 606-07 (1922); Larsen v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447, 463-466 , 226 P.2d 177, 182 (1951). 1985Schlegel v. Bott, 93 N.J.Eq. 607, 610, 117 A. 605, 606-07 (1922); Larsen v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447, 463-466 , 226 P.2d 177, 182 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., Inc.green2 sentences1985Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 457 F.Supp. 896, 904 (W.D.Pa.1978) (option in lease treated as entirely separate agreement, and without express language in contract that default shall prevent securing of specific performance of the option, such default shall be no bar), aff'd, 610 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.1979); Leisure Sports Investment Corp. v. Riverside Enterprises, Inc., 7 Mass.App. 489, 492-493 , 388 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1979) (court will not read implied condition into lease that lessee must not be in default of any of the lease provisions in order to exercise option). 10 Thus, a defau 1985Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 457 F.Supp. 896, 904 (W.D.Pa.1978) (option in lease treated as entirely separate agreement, and without express language in contract that default shall prevent securing of specific performance of the option, such default shall be no bar), aff'd, 610 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.1979); Leisure Sports Investment Corp. v. Riverside Enterprises, Inc., 7 Mass.App. 489, 492-493 , 388 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1979) (court will not read implied condition into lease that lessee must not be in default of any of the lease provisions in order to exercise option). 10 Thus, a defau | 1 | 1 |
Schlegel v. Bottgreen1 sentence1985Schlegel v. Bott, 93 N.J.Eq. 607, 610, 117 A. 605, 606-07 (1922); Larsen v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447, 463-466 , 226 P.2d 177, 182 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
Leisure Sports Investment Corp. v. Riverside Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences1985Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 457 F.Supp. 896, 904 (W.D.Pa.1978) (option in lease treated as entirely separate agreement, and without express language in contract that default shall prevent securing of specific performance of the option, such default shall be no bar), aff'd, 610 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.1979); Leisure Sports Investment Corp. v. Riverside Enterprises, Inc., 7 Mass.App. 489, 492-493 , 388 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1979) (court will not read implied condition into lease that lessee must not be in default of any of the lease provisions in order to exercise option). 10 Thus, a defau 1985Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 457 F.Supp. 896, 904 (W.D.Pa.1978) (option in lease treated as entirely separate agreement, and without express language in contract that default shall prevent securing of specific performance of the option, such default shall be no bar), aff'd, 610 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.1979); Leisure Sports Investment Corp. v. Riverside Enterprises, Inc., 7 Mass.App. 489, 492-493 , 388 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1979) (court will not read implied condition into lease that lessee must not be in default of any of the lease provisions in order to exercise option). 10 Thus, a defau | 1 | 1 |
Small v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1985Small v. Clark, 97 Me. 304, 310 , 54 A. 758, 760 (1903). 6 A lease continues to be valid as against a lessee in breach of a lease covenant until such time as the landlord manifests some intent to take action based on the lease violation. 1985Small v. Clark, 97 Me. 304, 310 , 54 A. 758, 760 (1903). 6 A lease continues to be valid as against a lessee in breach of a lease covenant until such time as the landlord manifests some intent to take action based on the lease violation. | 1 | 1 |
Ackerhalt v. Smithgreen1 sentence1984Cf., e.g., Ackerhalt v. Smith, 141 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C.1958) (constructive eviction may result when landlord refuses to make repairs and premises become untenantable). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp.
green
2 sentences1995Moreover, nothing in the consent order suggests that Camalier would be foreclosed from taking the customary steps to relieve itself from a forfeiture of the lease under the doctrine of Trans-Dux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144 (D.C.1947), in the event that Sandoz applied for a writ of restitution. 1995Moreover, nothing in the consent order suggests that Camalier would be foreclosed from taking the customary steps to relieve itself from a forfeiture of the lease under the doctrine of Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144 (D.C.1947), in the event that Sandoz applied for a writ of restitution. | 2 | 1988–1995 |
South Street Inn, Inc. v. Muehsam
green
2 sentences1992Mister Donut, supra, 330 N.E.2d at 812 ; South Street Inn, supra, 81 N.E.2d at 823 . 1990Mister Donut, supra, 368 Mass. at 222 , 330 N.E.2d at 812 ; South Street Inn, supra, 323 Mass. at 312 , 81 N.E.2d at 823 . | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Kemp
green
2 sentences1992Mister Donut, supra, 330 N.E.2d at 812 ; South Street Inn, supra, 81 N.E.2d at 823 . 1990Mister Donut, supra, 368 Mass. at 222 , 330 N.E.2d at 812 ; South Street Inn, supra, 323 Mass. at 312 , 81 N.E.2d at 823 . | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002For this proposition he relies mainly on Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 539 F.Supp. 402 (D.Colo.1982), in which a dispute arose between Peugeot Motors and one of its dealers. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co.
green
2 sentences1997Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower court’s judgment on either the probate court’s reasoning that the lease claim was presented to it and properly denied, or on the second alternative ground, the Superior Court’s reasoning, that the probate court had jurisdiction to hear the claim on the merits but that the landlord had waived its right to present the claim on the merits, or on the third alternative ground, based on the landlord’s argument, that even if the claim was not before the probate court, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to further delay distri 1997Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower court's judgment on either the probate court's reasoning that the lease claim was presented to it and properly denied, or on the second alternative ground, the Superior Court's reasoning, that the probate court had jurisdiction to hear the claim on the merits but that the landlord had waived its right to present the claim on the merits, or on the third alternative ground, based on the landlord's argument, that even if the claim was not before the probate court, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to further delay distri | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Stevenson v. Silverman
green
2 sentences1997The question before us is whether the “ultimate and controlling issues [in the present litigation] have been decided in a prior proceeding.” Stevenson, supra, 208 A.2d at 788 . 1997The question before us is whether the "ultimate and controlling issues [in the present litigation] have been decided in a prior proceeding." Stevenson, supra, 208 A.2d at 788 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jones v. Brawner Co.
green
1 sentence1987In Jones v. Brawner Co., 435 A.2d 54 (D.C.1981), a landlord delivered a notice to cure a lease violation, and later delivered a notice to quit for failure to cure the violation. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence1985Owens Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 457 F.Supp. 896, 904 (W.D.Pa.1978) (option in lease treated as entirely separate agreement, and without express language in contract that default shall prevent securing of specific performance of the option, such default shall be no bar), aff'd, 610 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir.1979); Leisure Sports Investment Corp. v. Riverside Enterprises, Inc., 7 Mass.App. 489, 492-493 , 388 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1979) (court will not read implied condition into lease that lessee must not be in default of any of the lease provisions in order to exercise option). 10 Thus, a defau | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. The Madison Hotel, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985We note that even prior to our decision in Mendes v. Johnson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, although upholding a lease clause in Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 168 U.S.App.D.C. 149 , 162 n. 93, 513 F.2d 407 , 420 n. 93 (1975), decried the “dark-of-night lock-changing method of eviction ... instead of invocation of the processes of law for that purpose.” We hold that the right-to-enter provision in the parties’ agreement did not relieve appellants of their obligation to comply with the statutory remedies. 1985We note that even prior to our decision in Mendes v. Johnson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, although upholding a lease clause in Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 168 U.S.App.D.C. 149 , 162 n. 93, 513 F.2d 407 , 420 n. 93 (1975), decried the “dark-of-night lock-changing method of eviction ... instead of invocation of the processes of law for that purpose.” We hold that the right-to-enter provision in the parties’ agreement did not relieve appellants of their obligation to comply with the statutory remedies. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Merritt v. Kay
neutral
2 sentences1944We cited Merritt v. Kay, 54 App.D.C. 152 , 295 F. 973 . 1944We cited Merritt v. Kay, 54 App.D.C. 152 , 295 F. 973 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.