17 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1933–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doctor's Business Service, Inc. v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2008Three exceptions to the premises rule permit compensability of injuries occurring off-premises: "(1) special hazards on normal route; (2) travel between two parts of employer's premises; and (3) area where injury occurred actually used by the employer for his purposes." Id. 1995The going and coming rule, the exception thereto known as the premises rule, and the exceptions to the premises rule are explained in Doctor's Business Service, Inc. v. Clark, 498 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), review denied mem., 506 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 1987). | 3 | 5 |
Security Bureau, Inc. v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2016Security Bureau, Inc. v. Alvarez, 654 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). 1996Doctor's Business Serv., Inc. v. Clark, 498 So.2d 659, 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), review denied, 506 So.2d 1041 (Fla.1987); accord Security Bureau, Inc. v. Alvarez, 654 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Ryan v. Boehm, Brown, Rigdon, Seacrest & Fischergreen2 sentences2016See Ryan v. Boehm, Brown, Rigdon, Seacrest & Fischer, 673 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). 2016See Ryan v. Boehm, Brown, Rigdon, Seacrest & Fischer, 673 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gale, Robertgreen1 sentence2014Cf. United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that defendant who had previously been evicted from residence had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir.1998) (concluding *299 that defendant who squatted in a vacant house “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of having stayed a week in the vacant premises that he did not own or rent”); United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding trespassing defendant “lacked the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Curlingreen1 sentence2014Cf. United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that defendant who had previously been evicted from residence had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir.1998) (concluding *299 that defendant who squatted in a vacant house “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of having stayed a week in the vacant premises that he did not own or rent”); United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding trespassing defendant “lacked the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harold Carrgreen1 sentence2014Cf. United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that defendant who had previously been evicted from residence had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir.1998) (concluding *299 that defendant who squatted in a vacant house “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of having stayed a week in the vacant premises that he did not own or rent”); United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding trespassing defendant “lacked the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Fields Christopher Crawleygreen1 sentence2014In fact, many Fourth Amendment issues arise precisely because the defendants were engaged in illegal activity on the premises for which they claim privacy interests.” United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449 , 458-59 (7th Cir.2003) (“We may not justify the search after the fact, once we know illegal activity was afoot; the legitimate expectation of privacy does not depend on the nature of the defendant’s activities, whether innocent or criminal.... | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harold McRaegreen1 sentence2014Cf. United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir.2011) (concluding that defendant who had previously been evicted from residence had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence”); United States v. McRae, 156 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir.1998) (concluding *299 that defendant who squatted in a vacant house “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of having stayed a week in the vacant premises that he did not own or rent”); United States v. Gale, 136 F.3d 192, 195-96 (D.C.Cir.1998) (concluding trespassing defendant “lacked the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ in | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raymond F. Pitts, A/K/A Lonnie D. Sanders, and Erik T. Alexander, A/K/A John Eugene Mills, A/K/A Bruce Bonesgreen1 sentence2014In fact, many Fourth Amendment issues arise precisely because the defendants were engaged in illegal activity on the premises for which they claim privacy interests.” United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Pitts, 322 F.3d 449 , 458-59 (7th Cir.2003) (“We may not justify the search after the fact, once we know illegal activity was afoot; the legitimate expectation of privacy does not depend on the nature of the defendant’s activities, whether innocent or criminal.... | 1 | 1 |
Vigliotti v. K-Mart Corp.green1 sentence2008Vigliotti v. K-Mart Corp., 680 So.2d 466, 468-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Mullins v. Colbertgreen1 sentence2007Under either section 95.16 5 or section 95.18, Florida Statutes (2003) “the possession of the real property by the one asserting the right must be continuous, adverse, and exclusive of any other right.” Mullins v. Colbert, 898 So.2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Ocean Pavilion v. Betancourtgreen1 sentence1995See, e.g., Ocean Pavilion v. Betancourt, 578 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (off-premises injury not compensable in absence of evidence that the employer ever modified, *1026 closed, controlled or habitually used the road where the injury took place for its own purposes). | 1 | 1 |
Hammond v. Carlyongreen1 sentence1989See also Hammond v. Carlyon, 96 So.2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1957) (while basing a judgment upon a view of the premises was error, it was not reversible error, provided there was evidence of record which was otherwise sufficient to support the judgment). | 1 | 1 |
Weich v. Cookgreen1 sentence1983"It is a well-settled rule of law that if a pleading informs the defendant of the nature of the cause of action against him, this should be sufficient." Weich v. Cook, 250 So.2d 281, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fernando Fernandez v. Consolidated Box Co.
green
2 sentences1995The case cited in Doctor's Business Service, Inc. v. Clark, 498 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), review denied mem., 506 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 1987) as an example of this exception to the premises rule is Fernandez v. Consolidated Box Co., 249 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1971). 1986Another exception to the premises rule that which permits recovery for an injury occurring in an off-premises place which is brought within the "zone and environments" of the employment when it is habitually utilized for the purposes of the employer was applied by the court in Fernandez v. Consolidated Box Company, 249 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1971). | 2 | 1986–1995 |
Mitchell v. State
green
1 sentence2009The State responds that the trial court did not err for two reasons: (1) The instruction was not supported by the evidence because the evidence clearly showed that the defendant had actual possession of the drugs and gun; and (2) The proposed instruction would have been confusing if read in context with the standard jury instruction because the defendant never requested that the portion instructing on the “joint possession of an article” be deleted, as the defendant had in Mitchell v. State, 958 So.2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Povia Bros. Farms v. Velez
green
1 sentence1986Farms v. Velez, 74 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1954), somewhat helpful. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Beagle v. Bagwell
green
1 sentence1977As stated in Beagle v. Bagwell, 169 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964): "It is a generally accepted rule of law in Florida that under any standard of conduct, and in the absence of accompanying actual deception, artifice, or misconduct, where the means of knowledge are at hand and are equally available to both parties, and the subject matter is equally open to their inspection, if one of them does not avail himself of those means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he was deceived by the other's misrepresentations." AFFIRMED. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Bloom v. State
green
1 sentence1974Bloom v. State, Fla.App. 4th 1973, 283 So.2d 134 , invalidated a warrant directing seizure of "stolen property received and concealed upon the aforesaid premises in violation of Section 811.16, Florida Statutes," which cannot be said to describe particularly the property to be seized, as the Constitutions require. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
United States Ex Rel. Levey v. Stockslager
green
1 sentence1957His possession has, therefore, ripened into a title, which under the Statute of Illinois, is a bar to any adverse claim.” (Emphasis added.) To the same effect, see United States v. Stockslager, 120 U. S. 470 , 32 L. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Hausauer v. Dahlman
green
1 sentence1939(Hausauer v. Dahlman, 45 N. Y. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Ashmead v. Wilson
green
1 sentence1933Ency. of Law 486 Citing Ashmead v. Wilson, 22 Fla. 255 ; L’Engle v. Reed, 27 Fla. 345 ; Fla. So. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
L'Engle v. Reed
green
1 sentence1933Ency. of Law 486 Citing Ashmead v. Wilson, 22 Fla. 255 ; L’Engle v. Reed, 27 Fla. 345 ; Fla. So. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.