premises violation in New York

2012Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action based on the absence of a special relationship between plaintiff and the police giving rise to a special duty (see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 199 [2009]).

2012Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action based on the absence of a special relationship between plaintiff and the police giving rise to a special duty (see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 199 [2009]).

2015As they contend, the rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed (see Mott v Richtmyer, 57 NY 49, 63 [1874]; Bannin v Peck, 266 App Div 209, 212-213 [1943], affd 291 NY 717 [1943]; Bates v Virolet, 33 App Div 436, 440 [1898]; 4-37 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 37.53 [2014]).

2015As they contend, the rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed (see Mott v Richtmyer, 57 NY 49, 63 [1874]; Bannin v Peck, 266 App Div 209, 212-213 [1943], affd 291 NY 717 [1943]; Bates v Virolet, 33 App Div 436, 440 [1898]; 4-37 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 37.53 [2014]).

2015As they contend, the rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed (see Mott v Richtmyer, 57 NY 49, 63 [1874]; Bannin v Peck, 266 App Div 209, 212-213 [1943], affd 291 NY 717 [1943]; Bates v Virolet, 33 App Div 436, 440 [1898]; 4-37 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 37.53 [2014]).

2015As they contend, the rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed (see Mott v Richtmyer, 57 NY 49, 63 [1874]; Bannin v Peck, 266 App Div 209, 212-213 [1943], affd 291 NY 717 [1943]; Bates v Virolet, 33 App Div 436, 440 [1898]; 4-37 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 37.53 [2014]).

2015As they contend, the rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed (see Mott v Richtmyer, 57 NY 49, 63 [1874]; Bannin v Peck, 266 App Div 209, 212-213 [1943], affd 291 NY 717 [1943]; Bates v Virolet, 33 App Div 436, 440 [1898]; 4-37 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 37.53 [2014]).

2015As they contend, the rules of construction applicable to deeds provide that where there is a conflict between the provisions set forth in the premises clause and those in the habendum clause relative to the extent of the conveyance, the premises clause will control, absent a clear indication of a contrary intent elsewhere in the deed (see Mott v Richtmyer, 57 NY 49, 63 [1874]; Bannin v Peck, 266 App Div 209, 212-213 [1943], affd 291 NY 717 [1943]; Bates v Virolet, 33 App Div 436, 440 [1898]; 4-37 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 37.53 [2014]).

2014It commenced this breach of contract action alleging “diversion of the ‘Advertising Revenues.’ ” As a preliminary matter, the court properly dismissed tenant’s claims for trespass, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, partial eviction, and improper accounting of the security deposit, which were raised for the first time in tenant’s opposition/ cross motion for partial summary judgment (see Ostrov v Rozbruch, 91 AD3d 147, 154 [1st Dept 2012]).

2014It commenced this breach of contract action alleging “diversion of the ‘Advertising Revenues.’ ” As a preliminary matter, the court properly dismissed tenant’s claims for trespass, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, partial eviction, and improper accounting of the security deposit, which were raised for the first time in tenant’s opposition/ cross motion for partial summary judgment (see Ostrov v Rozbruch, 91 AD3d 147, 154 [1st Dept 2012]).

2014Such notices of violation may be served by “delivering such notice to a person employed by the respondent on or in connection with the premises where the violation occurred” (NY City Charter § 1049-a [d] [2] [a] [i]), and may also be served “by affixing such notice in a conspicuous place to the premises where the violation occurred” (NY City Charter § 1049-a [d] [2] [a] [ii]), coupled with mailing of a copy of the notice of violation “to the respondent at the address of such premises” (NY City Charter § 1049-a [d] [2] [b]; see Matter of Wilner v Beddoe, 102 AD3d at 583 ).

2014Such notices of violation may be served by “delivering such notice to a person employed by the respondent on or in connection with the premises where the violation occurred” (NY City Charter § 1049-a [d] [2] [a] [i]), and may also be served “by affixing such notice in a conspicuous place to the premises where the violation occurred” (NY City Charter § 1049-a [d] [2] [a] [ii]), coupled with mailing of a copy of the notice of violation “to the respondent at the address of such premises” (NY City Charter § 1049-a [d] [2] [b]; see Matter of Wilner v Beddoe, 102 AD3d at 583 ).

2026Any arguments regarding unjust enrichment, must be properly raised to the Legislature [See Chazon LLC v Maugenest, 19 NY3d 410 [2012]).

2026Any arguments regarding unjust enrichment, must be properly raised to the Legislature [See Chazon LLC v Maugenest, 19 NY3d 410 [2012]).

2008An owner of a de facto multiple dwelling is entitled to a judgment of ejectment where the tenant occupies the premises in violation of the terms of the lease (see 99 Commercial St. v Llewellyn, 240 AD2d 481 [1997]). “[T]he absence of the certificate of occupancy does not bar the [owner] from recovering possession of the premises” (99 Commercial St. v Llewellyn, 240 AD2d at 483 ).

2008An owner of a de facto multiple dwelling is entitled to a judgment of ejectment where the tenant occupies the premises in violation of the terms of the lease (see 99 Commercial St. v Llewellyn, 240 AD2d 481 [1997]). “[T]he absence of the certificate of occupancy does not bar the [owner] from recovering possession of the premises” (99 Commercial St. v Llewellyn, 240 AD2d at 483 ).

2024The intent element of trespass is satisfied where a defendant's alleged acts are such as "will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of foreign matter" into the plaintiffs property l (see Phillips v Sun Oil Co., 307 NY 328,331 [1954][intemal quotation marks and citation omitted]); Kanayama v Kesy, LLC, 219 AD3d 1222 [1st Dept 2023]), there remains an issue of fact to be determined at trial as to whether Prince Holdings caused water, construction material, and debris to enter plaintiffs' apartments, whether by their alleged inaction to address the recurring conditions or by their alleg

2016The inspector’s one attempt at personal service satisfies the “reasonable attempt” requirement set forth in section 1049-a (d) (2) (b) (Matter of Mestecky v City of New York, 133 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2015]).

2015Even if this were not the case, the specific implied covenant that defendants propose – an agreement intended to capture some private profit through the evasion of building code compliance – is void as contrary to this state's public policy (see Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18, 23 [2008]; see generally Town Law §§ 130 [1], 138).

2015Even if this were not the case, the specific implied covenant that defendants propose — an agreement intended to capture some private profit through the evasion of building code compliance — is void as contrary to this state’s public policy (see Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18, 23 [2008]; see generally Town Law §§ 130 [1]; 138).

2010Under the common law, “[a]n owner of a de facto multiple dwelling is entitled to a judgment of ejectment where the tenant occupies the premises in violation of the terms of the lease” (Caldwell v American Package Co., Inc., 57 AD3d 15, 26 [2008]; see RPAPL art 6).

2010“No statute abrogates the common-law rule that notice is unnecessary to maintain an ejectment action against a tenant who wrongfully holds over after expiration of a fixed and definite term” (Alleyne v Townsley, 110 AD2d 674, 675 [1985]; see 99 Commercial St. v Llewellyn, 240 AD2d 481, 483 [1997]).

2009However, while the allegations in a complaint are to be accepted as true when considering a motion to dismiss, “factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration” (Dinerman v Jewish Bd. of Family & Children’s Servs., Inc., 55 AD3d 530, 531 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2009Assoc, v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]).

2008The Supreme Court correctly held that the plaintiffs use of the premises in violation of the Town zoning law prohibited it from receiving a property tax exemption pursuant to RPTL § 420-a (see Matter of Oxford Group-Moral Re-Armament, MRA, Inc. v Sweet, 309 NY 744 [1955]; Matter of Colella v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 266 AD2d 286, 287 [1999], revd on other grounds 95 NY2d 401 [2000]; see also Matter of Legion of Christ v Town of Mount Pleasant, 1 NY3d 406, 412 [2004]; cf. Sephardic Congregation of S. Monsey v Town of Ramapo, 47 AD3d 915 [2008]).

2008The proposed claim is not viable in light of the lack of evidence that defendants were on notice of repeated criminal activity on the premises, or that the decedent’s injuries were a foreseeable result of defendants’ inaction in failing to remove the alleged drug dealers from the building (see Maria S. v Willow Enters., 234 AD2d 177, 178-179 [1996]).