premises violation in Michigan

2016Id. at 497 .

2016In cases involving communal property, there is a presumption, in the context of a claim of adverse possession, that a tenant who occupies and possesses the premises recognizes and is honoring the rights of any cotenants to similarly possess and occupy the property unless there is evidence of acts or declarations that clearly establish the contrary and that unambiguously provide notice to the cotenants of an effort to displace or exclude them from the premises in violation of their property rights such that a cause of action arises. [Wengel, 270 Mich App at 97 .] In this case, there was no evid

2016As noted, other members used Outlot 9 throughout the years and there is no evidence to show that plaintiffs’ “unambiguously provide[ed] notice to the cotenants of an effort to displace or exclude them from the premises in violation of their property rights.” Wengel, 270 Mich App at 97 .

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

2006See Taylor v S S Kresge Co, 326 Mich 580, 588-589 ; 40 NW2d 636 (1950); Donohue v Vosper, 189 Mich 78, 90-91 ; 155 NW 407 (1915), aff d 243 US 59 ; 37 S Ct 350 ; 61 L Ed 592 (1917); Campau v Campau, 44 Mich 31, 34 ; 5 NW 1062 (1880) (all doubts arising out of the nature and character of the possession should weigh against ouster); Krueger v Hockley Union Nat’l Bank & Trust Co, 5 Mich App 362, 365-366 ; 146 NW2d 691 (1966).

1996There is no logical justification for expanding the premises concept to this situation. [38] In describing the underlying basis for the exceptions to the premises rule, Professor Larson explains: [W]hen a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the ["]course of employment["] extends as far as those conditions extend. [1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 15.15, p 4-73 (emphasis added).] [39] The dissent in Smith, su

1995Fischer has been criticized, however, for extending the premises rule too far, even threatening "demolition of the premises rule.” 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 15.12(b), pp 4-12-4-16; see also Tedford v Stouffer’s Northland Inn, supra. Of Fischer and a New Jersey case, Dinardo v Newark Bd of Ed, 118 NJ Super 536; 289 A2d 259 (1972), Larson, supra at pp 4-5-4-16, says: The real flaw in these opinions was that they ignored the special doctrine that accounts for extension of the premises rule to the trip to parking lots.

1982Since, even after Rakas , the Supreme Court, continues to acknowledge that the petitioner in Jones, supra, an overnight guest, had sufficient interest in the premises to challenge the search, defendant here, a resident of the searched premises, but not a named lessee, also had a substantial Fourth Amendment interest, conferring upon him standing to challenge the search here.

1982Since, even after Rakas , the Supreme Court continues to acknowledge that the petitioner in Jones, supra, an overnight guest, had sufficient interest in the premises to challenge the search, defendant here, a resident of the searched premises, but not a named lessee, also had a substantial Fourth Amendment interest, conferring upon him standing to challenge the search here.

1981Id., 202 . 2 Although a close question is involved, we believe the present situation is distinguishable from these exceptions to the premises rule.

1981In Jean v Chrysler Corp, 2 Mich App 564 ; 140 NW2d 756 (1966), compensation was awarded to the widow of an employee killed while crossing a public highway between his employer’s parking lot and his place of work.

1981In Jean v Chrysler Corp, 2 Mich App 564 ; 140 NW2d 756 (1966), compensation was awarded to the widow of an employee killed while crossing a public highway between his employer’s parking lot and his place of work.

1975Fass v Highland Park, 326 Mich 19 ; 39 NW2d 336 (1949).

1975Fass v Highland Park, 326 Mich 19 ; 39 NW2d 336 (1949).

1947On May 3, 1946, the trial court entered a decree herein determining that the county, city and school district were proper and necessary parties and had valuable rights and interests in the premises under the rule stated in School District No. 8 of Township of Ecorse v. State Land Office Board, 313 Mich. 560 , and that title to the property had vested in the State of Michigan in 1931.

1933The term “outbuilding” refers to a structure, with identity, characteristics, and use in connection with a principal building to which it is subservient. *125 In Smith v. Byrne, 208 Mich. 104 , a covenant in a deed restricted use of premises to a single private residence and the necessary outbuildings, and, in holding that the erection of a garage for rental purposes on the premises was in violation of the restriction, Mr. Justice Sharpe, speaking for the court, said: “It was intended to preserve the territory for a residential district, for a place for dwelling houses and the outbuildings nec

1928Other phases of them have been before this court and are reported in 240 Mich. 646 and 654. ’ Plaintiff Union Trust Company, as trustee, became purchaser of the premises at bar on sales made August 18, 1926, under decrees in mortgage foreclosure actions, in chancery.

1885High on Receivers, § 261; Hubbell v. Dana 9 How.