premises doctrine in Kansas

1986That rule was recognized and followed by this court in Montague v. Burgerhoff, 150 Kan. 217, 223-24 , 92 P.2d 98 (1939).

1986That rule was recognized and followed by this court in Montague v. Burgerhoff, 150 Kan. 217, 223-24 , 92 P.2d 98 (1939).

1986It made a distinction between an injury resulting from a passive condition of the premises on the one hand and the *222 occupier's active negligence on the other by quoting the following language from Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 242-43 , 80 A.2d 76 (1951): `"`* * * `[P]assive negligence' denotes negligence which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the land itself. `Active negligence', on the other hand, is negligence occurring in connection with activities c

1986It made a distinction between an injury resulting from a passive condition of the premises on the one hand and the *222 occupier's active negligence on the other by quoting the following language from Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 242-43 , 80 A.2d 76 (1951): `"`* * * `[P]assive negligence' denotes negligence which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the land itself. `Active negligence', on the other hand, is negligence occurring in connection with activities c

1986Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446 ; and Britt v. Allen County Community Jr. College, 230 Kan. 502 .

1986Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446 ; and Britt v. Allen County Community Jr. College, 230 Kan. 502 .

2009Rinke, 282 Kan. at 753 , 148 P.3d 553 ; K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 44-508(f).

2009Rinke, 282 Kan. at 753 , 148 P.3d 553 ; K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 44-508(f).

2006Cf. Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 104 (“Under the circumstances of this case, the portion of the lot designated by [employer] for its employees’ use was effectively equivalent to an employer-owned lot.”); accord Simkins v. General Motors, 453 Mich. 703, 727 , 556 *758 N.W.2d 839 (1996) (under the going and coming rule, “an employee is injured in the course of his employment when traveling to or from work when . . . the injury occurred on property owned, leased, or maintained by the employer.”); DeHoyos v. Industrial Comm,., 26 Ill. 2d 110 , 185 N.E.2d 885 (1962) (for purp

2006Cf. Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 104 (“Under the circumstances of this case, the portion of the lot designated by [employer] for its employees’ use was effectively equivalent to an employer-owned lot.”); accord Simkins v. General Motors, 453 Mich. 703, 727 , 556 *758 N.W.2d 839 (1996) (under the going and coming rule, “an employee is injured in the course of his employment when traveling to or from work when . . . the injury occurred on property owned, leased, or maintained by the employer.”); DeHoyos v. Industrial Comm,., 26 Ill. 2d 110 , 185 N.E.2d 885 (1962) (for purp

2006Rinke, 34 Kan.

2005In considering whether the premises exception applied here, the Board relied heavily upon our Supreme Court’s opinion in Thompson, 256 Kan. 36 .

2003This court remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the premises exception or the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule applied to the facts of this case. 28 Kan.

1995The determining factor here deals with the term ‘premise[s].’ The Kansas Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 19 Kan.

1994Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 148 , 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959), the court adopted an absolute rule: ‘Where the employer's place of business is located in a building of which it occupies only a part, and two ways through the building are the only means of *45 ingress and egress to and from such place of business, both ways are parts of the employer’s premises within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law.” In Hansen v. Industrial Com’n of Arizona, 141 Ariz. 190 , 685 P.2d 1342 (1984), the court adopted a “range of risk” exception to the premises rule.

1994Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 148 , 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959), the court adopted an absolute rule: ‘Where the employer's place of business is located in a building of which it occupies only a part, and two ways through the building are the only means of *45 ingress and egress to and from such place of business, both ways are parts of the employer’s premises within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law.” In Hansen v. Industrial Com’n of Arizona, 141 Ariz. 190 , 685 P.2d 1342 (1984), the court adopted a “range of risk” exception to the premises rule.

1994Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 148 , 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959), the court adopted an absolute rule: ‘Where the employer's place of business is located in a building of which it occupies only a part, and two ways through the building are the only means of *45 ingress and egress to and from such place of business, both ways are parts of the employer’s premises within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law.” In Hansen v. Industrial Com’n of Arizona, 141 Ariz. 190 , 685 P.2d 1342 (1984), the court adopted a “range of risk” exception to the premises rule.

1994Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 148 , 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959), the court adopted an absolute rule: ‘Where the employer's place of business is located in a building of which it occupies only a part, and two ways through the building are the only means of *45 ingress and egress to and from such place of business, both ways are parts of the employer’s premises within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law.” In Hansen v. Industrial Com’n of Arizona, 141 Ariz. 190 , 685 P.2d 1342 (1984), the court adopted a “range of risk” exception to the premises rule.

1986It made a distinction between an injury resulting from apassive condition of the premises on the one hand and the occupier’s active negligence on the other by quoting the following language from Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 242-43 , 80 A.2d 76 (1951): ‘ * *‘[P]assive negligence’ denotes negligence which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the land itself. ‘Active negligence’, on the other hand, is negligence occurring in connection with activities conducted o

1986It made a distinction between an injury resulting from a passive condition of the premises on the one hand and the *222 occupier's active negligence on the other by quoting the following language from Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 242-43 , 80 A.2d 76 (1951): `"`* * * `[P]assive negligence' denotes negligence which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the land itself. `Active negligence', on the other hand, is negligence occurring in connection with activities c

1952S. 1949, 41-805, [1], knowledge of a violation of the act on the part of the owner of the premises on which the violation occurred is not made a condition precedent to the validity of a padlock order; and Chambers v. Herrick, 172 Kan. 510 , 241 P. 2d 748 , where it was held that for the purpose of suspension or cancellation of a retail liquor license it is unnecessary that the licensee have knowledge of the violation on the part of his employee.

1952S. 1949, 41-805, [1], knowledge of a violation of the act on the part of the owner of the premises on which the violation occurred is not made a condition precedent to the validity of a padlock order; and Chambers v. Herrick, 172 Kan. 510 , 241 P. 2d 748 , where it was held that for the purpose of suspension or cancellation of a retail liquor license it is unnecessary that the licensee have knowledge of the violation on the part of his employee.

1934In this respect the rule announced in Mayhew v. DeCoursey, 135 Kan. 184 , 10 P. 2d 10 , applies.

1934In this respect the rule announced in Mayhew v. DeCoursey, 135 Kan. 184 , 10 P. 2d 10 , applies.