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8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1918–1995 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kerr v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1978See Kerr v. Industrial Commission, 23 Ariz.App. 106 , 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), where we considered other off-premises exceptions to the going and coming rule after the Pauley decision. 1978See Kerr v. Industrial Commission, 23 Ariz.App. 106 , 530 P.2d 1139 (1975), where we considered other off-premises exceptions to the going and coming rule after the Pauley decision. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marlene Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile Club, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995Id. at 1198 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Gaona v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1988Gaona v. Industrial Comm’n, 128 Ariz. 445 , 626 P.2d 609 (1981). 1988Gaona v. Industrial Comm’n, 128 Ariz. 445 , 626 P.2d 609 (1981). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Booker
green
2 sentences1984Two of the stronger cases cited by petitioners, K-Mart Discount Stores v. Schroeder, 623 S.W.2d 900 (Ky.1981), and Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Booker, 553 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1977), come from jurisdictions which have consistently applied a very narrow application to the premises rule. 1984Two of the stronger cases cited by petitioners, K-Mart Discount Stores v. Schroeder, 623 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1981), and Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Booker, 553 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1977), come from jurisdictions which have consistently applied a very narrow application to the premises rule. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
K-Mart Discount Stores v. Schroeder
green
2 sentences1984Two of the stronger cases cited by petitioners, K-Mart Discount Stores v. Schroeder, 623 S.W.2d 900 (Ky.1981), and Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Booker, 553 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn.1977), come from jurisdictions which have consistently applied a very narrow application to the premises rule. 1984Two of the stronger cases cited by petitioners, K-Mart Discount Stores v. Schroeder, 623 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1981), and Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Booker, 553 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1977), come from jurisdictions which have consistently applied a very narrow application to the premises rule. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
green
2 sentences1979In McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950), we rejected the on premises rule; and our Court of Appeals in Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz. App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966) held that an employee who worked at the Arizona Biltmore Hotel and was injured while riding home on a motor scooter while still on a road on his employer's premises was not acting in the scope and course of his employment. 1979In McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950), we rejected the on premises rule; and our Court of Appeals in Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz. App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966) held that an employee who worked at the Arizona Biltmore Hotel and was injured while riding home on a motor scooter while still on a road on his employer's premises was not acting in the scope and course of his employment. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1979In McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950), we rejected the on premises rule; and our Court of Appeals in Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz. App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966) held that an employee who worked at the Arizona Biltmore Hotel and was injured while riding home on a motor scooter while still on a road on his employer's premises was not acting in the scope and course of his employment. 1979In McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 71 Ariz. 244 , 226 P.2d 147 (1950), we rejected the on premises rule; and our Court of Appeals in Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz. App. 309 , 420 P.2d 32 (1966) held that an employee who worked at the Arizona Biltmore Hotel and was injured while riding home on a motor scooter while still on a road on his employer's premises was not acting in the scope and course of his employment. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Pauley v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1979This court, however, in Pauley v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ariz. 298 , 508 P.2d 1160 (1973), reversed McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, supra, as well as cases following it, stating: "* * * We hold that when an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the employer's premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route of employee's travel or is otherwise injured in a place he may reasonably be expected to be." 109 Ariz. at 302 , 508 P.2d at 1164 . 1979This court, however, in Pauley v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ariz. 298 , 508 P.2d 1160 (1973), reversed McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, supra, as well as cases following it, stating: "* * * We hold that when an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the employer's premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route of employee's travel or is otherwise injured in a place he may reasonably be expected to be." 109 Ariz. at 302 , 508 P.2d at 1164 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Dependents of Pacheco v. Orchids of Hawaii
neutral
1 sentence1978After announcing its adoption of the premises exception to the going and coming rule, the Pauley court considered the applicability of the exception to the employee there: The converse of the above is that where an employee is free to leave his employer’s premises for a limited period for lunch or refreshments and he suffers an injury while off the employer’s premises, he is not from these facts alone in the furtherance [sic] of his employment and his injury is not subject to a hazard arising out of the employment when off the employer’s premises. . .We recognize that there is a distinct, mode | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Dependents of Pacheco v. Orchids of Hawaii
green
2 sentences1978After announcing its adoption of the premises exception to the going and coming rule, the Pauley court considered the applicability of the exception to the employee there: The converse of the above is that where an employee is free to leave his employer’s premises for a limited period for lunch or refreshments and he suffers an injury while off the employer’s premises, he is not from these facts alone in the furtherance [sic] of his employment and his injury is not subject to a hazard arising out of the employment when off the employer’s premises. . .We recognize that there is a distinct, mode 1978Id. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Nicholson v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1969She cites the cases of Goodyear Aircraft Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398 , 158 P.2d 511 (1945) and Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105 , 259 P.2d 547 (1953). 1969She cites the cases of Goodyear Aircraft Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398 , 158 P.2d 511 (1945) and Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105 , 259 P.2d 547 (1953). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1969She cites the cases of Goodyear Aircraft Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398 , 158 P.2d 511 (1945) and Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105 , 259 P.2d 547 (1953). 1969She cites the cases of Goodyear Aircraft Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398 , 158 P.2d 511 (1945) and Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 76 Ariz. 105 , 259 P.2d 547 (1953). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Lawrence v. State
green
2 sentences1939We held in the case of Lawrence v. State, 29 Ariz. 247, 256 , 240 Pac. 863 , 867: “ . . . 1939We held in the case of Lawrence v. State, 29 Ariz. 247, 256 , 240 Pac. 863 , 867: “ . . . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
McLean v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences1918In Moline v. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Or. 532 , 144 Pac. 572 , the court said: “The assignee of the lease becomes liable for the rent by reason of the privity of estate, and not by reason of the occupancy of the premises; and by mere abandonment thereof he cannot escape liability.” See, also, McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138 , 64 S. W. 16 ; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co. (Ill.), 25 N. E. 669 ; Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223 , 14 L. 1918In Moline v. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Or. 532 , 144 Pac. 572 , the court said: “The assignee of the lease becomes liable for the rent by reason of the privity of estate, and not by reason of the occupancy of the premises; and by mere abandonment thereof he cannot escape liability.” See, also, McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138 , 64 S. W. 16 ; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co. (Ill.), 25 N. E. 669 ; Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223 , 14 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Moline v. Portland Brewing Co.
green
2 sentences1918In Moline v. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Or. 532 , 144 Pac. 572 , the court said: “The assignee of the lease becomes liable for the rent by reason of the privity of estate, and not by reason of the occupancy of the premises; and by mere abandonment thereof he cannot escape liability.” See, also, McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138 , 64 S. W. 16 ; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co. (Ill.), 25 N. E. 669 ; Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223 , 14 L. 1918In Moline v. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Or. 532 , 144 Pac. 572 , the court said: “The assignee of the lease becomes liable for the rent by reason of the privity of estate, and not by reason of the occupancy of the premises; and by mere abandonment thereof he cannot escape liability.” See, also, McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138 , 64 S. W. 16 ; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co. (Ill.), 25 N. E. 669 ; Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223 , 14 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Bonetti v. Treat
green
1 sentence1918In Moline v. Portland Brewing Co., 73 Or. 532 , 144 Pac. 572 , the court said: “The assignee of the lease becomes liable for the rent by reason of the privity of estate, and not by reason of the occupancy of the premises; and by mere abandonment thereof he cannot escape liability.” See, also, McLean v. Caldwell, 107 Tenn. 138 , 64 S. W. 16 ; Chicago Attachment Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co. (Ill.), 25 N. E. 669 ; Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223 , 14 L. | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.