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17 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beetle v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.green1 sentence2023“The rationale supporting this rule is that the nature and circumstances surrounding the traumatic event are such that the injured party is thereby put on notice that actionable conduct might be involved.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 363 . ¶ 47 “A traumatic injury is one in which the damage is caused by external violence or in which the injury is immediate and caused by an external force.” Beetle v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 326 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Castello v. Kalisgreen1 sentence2022“The rationale supporting this rule is that the nature and circumstances surrounding the traumatic event are such that the injured party is thereby put on notice that actionable conduct might be involved.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 363 . ¶ 21 Further, and most notably here, knowledge that an injury has been wrongfully caused “does not mean knowledge of a specific defendant’s negligent conduct or knowledge of the existence of a cause of action.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Castello v. Kalis, 352 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of the Estate of Johnny VAJGRT, Deceased, Bill Ernst, Inc., Intervenor-Appellantgreen2 sentences2014See Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d at 577 n.6; see also Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174, 1177 (N.H. 1978) (holding that, although New Hampshire law does not allow for punitive damages, compensatory damages survive the death of the tortfeasor and “compensatory damages awarded may reflect the aggravating circumstances” when wanton, malicious, or oppressive conduct is involved (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 89 Justice Hecht, dissenting in Vajgrt, believed that the rationale supporting the rule against punishing the wrongdoer’s heirs for his or her malicious conduct was gravely flawed. 2014Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d at 578 (Hecht, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Munson v. Raudonisgreen1 sentence2014See Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d at 577 n.6; see also Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174, 1177 (N.H. 1978) (holding that, although New Hampshire law does not allow for punitive damages, compensatory damages survive the death of the tortfeasor and “compensatory damages awarded may reflect the aggravating circumstances” when wanton, malicious, or oppressive conduct is involved (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 89 Justice Hecht, dissenting in Vajgrt, believed that the rationale supporting the rule against punishing the wrongdoer’s heirs for his or her malicious conduct was gravely flawed. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Sutliffgreen2 sentences2012A mere breach of a contract does not amount to a fraud, and neither a -9- knowledge of inability to perform, nor an intention not to do so, would make the transaction fraudulent.” Miller v. Sutliff, 241 Ill. 521, 526-27 , 89 N.E. 651, 652 (1909). ¶ 33 This promissory fraud doctrine is limited, however, by the rule that even such fraud is actionable if it was part of a scheme or artifice to defraud. 2012A mere breach of a contract does not amount to a fraud, and neither a -9- knowledge of inability to perform, nor an intention not to do so, would make the transaction fraudulent.” Miller v. Sutliff, 241 Ill. 521, 526-27 , 89 N.E. 651, 652 (1909). ¶ 33 This promissory fraud doctrine is limited, however, by the rule that even such fraud is actionable if it was part of a scheme or artifice to defraud. | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Trefonasgreen1 sentence1968See People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill2d 92, 136 NE2d 817 (1956), for the rationale supporting this rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Golla v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences2023“The rationale supporting this rule is that the nature and circumstances surrounding the traumatic event are such that the injured party is thereby put on notice that actionable conduct might be involved.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 363 . ¶ 47 “A traumatic injury is one in which the damage is caused by external violence or in which the injury is immediate and caused by an external force.” Beetle v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 326 Ill. 2022“The rationale supporting this rule is that the nature and circumstances surrounding the traumatic event are such that the injured party is thereby put on notice that actionable conduct might be involved.” Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 363 . ¶ 21 Further, and most notably here, knowledge that an injury has been wrongfully caused “does not mean knowledge of a specific defendant’s negligent conduct or knowledge of the existence of a cause of action.” (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Castello v. Kalis, 352 Ill. | 7 | 1996–2023 |
In re Marriage of Olsen
green
1 sentence1996Olsen, 229 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center
green
2 sentences1994(Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 519 , 513 N.E.2d at 393 .) The rationale supporting the doctrine is that the physician functions as the learned intermediary between the manufacturer and the patient and decides which drug to prescribe and which warnings should be conveyed to the patient. 1994(Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 519 , 513 N.E.2d at 393 .) The rationale supporting the doctrine is that the physician functions as the learned intermediary between the manufacturer and the patient and decides which drug to prescribe and which warnings should be conveyed to the patient. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Nix v. Williams
green
2 sentences1991(Nix, 467 U.S. 431 , 81 L. 1991(Nix, 467 U.S. 431 , 81 L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Hicks
green
1 sentence1989The majority decides that by initiating conversation with the police officer about the Fayette Service Co-op burglary, defendant completely waived his previously invoked right to counsel, including his right to have counsel present during police interrogation pertaining to crimes unrelated to the Fayette Service Co-op burglary. ( 132 Ill.2d at 495 .) The majority concludes: "Logic would suggest that if the virtue of a bright line rule — the ease of application — supports cutting off all interrogation when an accused requests counsel, then the virtue of a bright line rule would permit interroga | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Harry v. Harry
neutral
1 sentence1981App. 3d 776, 778 , 349 N.E.2d 69 , appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 596 .) The rationale supporting such a rule (i.e., adequate notice of claim cures error in form) does not apply with equal force to the present situation. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. Wright
green
1 sentence1976“Since it is the failure to deny that is significant; an equivocal or evasive response may similarly be used against him.” (McCormick, Evidence §270, at 651-53 (2d ed. 1972).) The problem of the evasive answer (as opposed to silence) is considered in 3 Warton’s Criminal Evidence §701, at 505 (13th ed. 1973): “An evasive or unresponsive reply to an incriminating or accusatory statement is tantamount to silence, in which case the statement and the reply are admissible as an admission of the statement’s truth.” The case of People v. Wright, 65 Ill. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Leggett
green
2 sentences1972People v. Leggett, 2 Ill.App.3d 962 , 275 N.E.2d 651 , and People v. Short, 4 Ill.App.3d 849 , 281 N.E.2d 785 , are based on the premise that reversing the conviction for the lesser offense growing out of the same conduct is a complimentary application of the main rule even though the issue has not been specifically discussed in Supreme Court decisions. 1972People v. Leggett, 2 Ill.App.3d 962 , 275 N.E.2d 651 , and People v. Short, 4 Ill.App.3d 849 , 281 N.E.2d 785 , are based on the premise that reversing the conviction for the lesser offense growing out of the same conduct is a complimentary application of the main rule even though the issue has not been specifically discussed in Supreme Court decisions. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
People v. Short
green
2 sentences1972People v. Leggett, 2 Ill.App.3d 962 , 275 N.E.2d 651 , and People v. Short, 4 Ill.App.3d 849 , 281 N.E.2d 785 , are based on the premise that reversing the conviction for the lesser offense growing out of the same conduct is a complimentary application of the main rule even though the issue has not been specifically discussed in Supreme Court decisions. 1972People v. Leggett, 2 Ill.App.3d 962 , 275 N.E.2d 651 , and People v. Short, 4 Ill.App.3d 849 , 281 N.E.2d 785 , are based on the premise that reversing the conviction for the lesser offense growing out of the same conduct is a complimentary application of the main rule even though the issue has not been specifically discussed in Supreme Court decisions. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.