rationale supporting rule (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

rationale supporting rule in California

13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2016 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (21)

CaseFollowedCited
Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchisinggreen
calctapp · 2000 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013(Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175 (Franklin & Franklin).) “The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

2013(Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ] (Franklin & Franklin).) “The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

22
Collin v. CalPortland Co. CA3green
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(Id. at pp. 65-67, 71; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 601 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 279 ] (Collin).) “Because . . . sophisticated users are charged with knowing the *511 particular product’s dangers, the failure to warn about those dangers is not the legal cause of any harm that product may cause. [Citation.] The rationale supporting the defense is that ‘the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer’s employees or downstream purchasers.’ [Citation.]

2016(Id. at pp. 65-67, 71; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 601 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 279 ] (Collin).) “Because . . . sophisticated users are charged with knowing the *511 particular product’s dangers, the failure to warn about those dangers is not the legal cause of any harm that product may cause. [Citation.] The rationale supporting the defense is that ‘the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer’s employees or downstream purchasers.’ [Citation.]

11
Iannelli v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006An exception to Wharton’s Rule exists “where one of the actors joins with third persons on his side of the transaction . . . .” (People v. Lewis (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 799, 801 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 825 ]; see Iannelli v. United States, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 782, fn. 15 .) “The rationale supporting this exception appears to be that the addition of a third party enhances the dangers presented by the crime.” (Iannelli, at p. 782, fn. 15.) We do not rely on this exception because, given the evidence adduced at trial, it is impossible to determine whether Devine was involved in a conspiracy to smuggle any

11
People v. Lewisgreen
calctapp · 1963 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006An exception to Wharton’s Rule exists “where one of the actors joins with third persons on his side of the transaction . . . .” (People v. Lewis (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 799, 801 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 825 ]; see Iannelli v. United States, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 782, fn. 15 .) “The rationale supporting this exception appears to be that the addition of a third party enhances the dangers presented by the crime.” (Iannelli, at p. 782, fn. 15.) We do not rely on this exception because, given the evidence adduced at trial, it is impossible to determine whether Devine was involved in a conspiracy to smuggle any

2006An exception to Wharton’s Rule exists “where one of the actors joins with third persons on his side of the transaction . . . .” (People v. Lewis (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 799, 801 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 825 ]; see Iannelli v. United States, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 782, fn. 15 .) “The rationale supporting this exception appears to be that the addition of a third party enhances the dangers presented by the crime.” (Iannelli, at p. 782, fn. 15.) We do not rely on this exception because, given the evidence adduced at trial, it is impossible to determine whether Devine was involved in a conspiracy to smuggle any

11
Myers v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1946 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Golden etc. Co. v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 811, 815-816 [ 221 P.2d 218 ]; Myers v. Superior Court (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 925, 929 [ 172 P.2d 84 ]; Gorman v. Superior Court (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 173, 176 [ 72 P.2d 774 ].) The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

2000Golden etc. Co. v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 811, 815-816 [ 221 P.2d 218 ]; Myers v. Superior Court (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 925, 929 [ 172 P.2d 84 ]; Gorman v. Superior Court (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 173, 176 [ 72 P.2d 774 ].) The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

11
Gorman v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1937 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Golden etc. Co. v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 811, 815-816 [ 221 P.2d 218 ]; Myers v. Superior Court (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 925, 929 [ 172 P.2d 84 ]; Gorman v. Superior Court (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 173, 176 [ 72 P.2d 774 ].) The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

2000Golden etc. Co. v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 811, 815-816 [ 221 P.2d 218 ]; Myers v. Superior Court (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 925, 929 [ 172 P.2d 84 ]; Gorman v. Superior Court (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 173, 176 [ 72 P.2d 774 ].) The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

11
MH Golden Etc. Co. v. Superior Court of Imperial Countygreen
calctapp · 1950 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Golden etc. Co. v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 811, 815-816 [ 221 P.2d 218 ]; Myers v. Superior Court (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 925, 929 [ 172 P.2d 84 ]; Gorman v. Superior Court (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 173, 176 [ 72 P.2d 774 ].) The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

2000Golden etc. Co. v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 811, 815-816 [ 221 P.2d 218 ]; Myers v. Superior Court (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 925, 929 [ 172 P.2d 84 ]; Gorman v. Superior Court (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 173, 176 [ 72 P.2d 774 ].) The rationale supporting the rule is a highly practical one.

11
Davis v. LOCAL UNION NO. 11, INTERNAT.green
calctapp · 1971 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994Workers (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 692 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ].) “Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case, but rather on whether the one instigating the proceeding is possessed of knowledge, information, or facts sufficient to cause a reasonable, or a reasonably prudent, person to believe honestly that the charge is true.” (6 Cal.Jur.3d, Assault and Other Wilful Torts, § 330, p. 845, fhs. omitted.) This is an objective standard.

1994Workers (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 686, 692 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 562 ].) “Probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case, but rather on whether the one instigating the proceeding is possessed of knowledge, information, or facts sufficient to cause a reasonable, or a reasonably prudent, person to believe honestly that the charge is true.” (6 Cal.Jur.3d, Assault and Other Wilful Torts, § 330, p. 845, fhs. omitted.) This is an objective standard.

11
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Olikergreen
cal · 1989 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

11
Jensen v. Leonardgreen
calctapp · 1947 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

11
Kassan v. Bledsoegreen
calctapp · 1967 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
2 sentences

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

11
Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.green
calctapp · 1968 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1975–1975
1 sentence

1975Co., supra, 266 Cal.App.2d at p. 359.) We conclude that the facts as alleged in the complaint remove the instant case from the limited ambit of the “fireman’s rule.” In addition, recent California Supreme Court decisions have undercut the rationale supporting the rule, which militate against extending the ambit of the rule to the case at bench. *979 The Scott and Giorgi cases are factually distinguishable from the case at bench.

11
Olwell v. W. L. Hopkinsgreen
cal · 1946 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972
2 sentences

1972We now consider Allstate's contention that the doctrine of res judicata precludes petitioner from recovering in the instant proceeding before the Board. (3) Only a final judgment on the merits between the same parties or their privies and upon the same cause of action is entitled to the res judicata effect of bar or merger. ( Olwell v. Hopkins (1946) 28 Cal.2d 147, 152 [ 168 P.2d 972 ].) The finality of the judgment in which petitioner's cause of action has allegedly merged and its status as an adjudication on the merits are indisputable.

1972We now consider Allstate's contention that the doctrine of res judicata precludes petitioner from recovering in the instant proceeding before the Board. (3) Only a final judgment on the merits between the same parties or their privies and upon the same cause of action is entitled to the res judicata effect of bar or merger. ( Olwell v. Hopkins (1946) 28 Cal.2d 147, 152 [ 168 P.2d 972 ].) The finality of the judgment in which petitioner's cause of action has allegedly merged and its status as an adjudication on the merits are indisputable.

11
Perati v. Atkinsongreen
calctapp · 1963 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

11
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoffgreen
cal · 1952 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

11
Emden v. Vitzgreen
calctapp · 1948 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

11
Guillory v. Godfreygreen
calctapp · 1955 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

11
Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc.green
calctapp · 1950 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

11
Richardson v. Pridmoregreen
calctapp · 1950 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1966–1966
2 sentences

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

1966(State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 336-339 [ 240 P.2d 282 ] ; Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.App.2d 472, 474 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 898 ]; Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal.App.2d 628, 633 [ 286 P.2d 474 ]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [ 217 P.2d 113 ]; cf. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793, 795 [ 216 P.2d 571 ]; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 318 [ 198 P.2d 696 ]; Rest, of Law, Torts (1948 Supp.) § 46; Rest.2d Torts, § 46; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), p. 48.) 3 The rationale supporting this rule, absent evidentiary problems incident to a particular si

11
Shepard v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1933 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1962–1962
2 sentences

1962The fact that the declarations in the case at bar were offered in behalf of the defendant instead of against him is of no consequence in view of the rationale supporting the rule that holds them inadmissible, i.e., “that it is impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 895 ; see also Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 [ 54 S.Ct. 22 , 78 L.Ed. 196 ]; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 670 [ 245 P.2d 633 ].) There is no contention that the subject declarati

1962The fact that the declarations in the case at bar were offered in behalf of the defendant instead of against him is of no consequence in view of the rationale supporting the rule that holds them inadmissible, i.e., “that it is impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 895 ; see also Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 [ 54 S.Ct. 22 , 78 L.Ed. 196 ]; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 670 [ 245 P.2d 633 ].) There is no contention that the subject declarati

11
People v. Tallegreen
calctapp · 1952 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1962–1962
2 sentences

1962The fact that the declarations in the case at bar were offered in behalf of the defendant instead of against him is of no consequence in view of the rationale supporting the rule that holds them inadmissible, i.e., “that it is impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 895 ; see also Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 [ 54 S.Ct. 22 , 78 L.Ed. 196 ]; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 670 [ 245 P.2d 633 ].) There is no contention that the subject declarati

1962The fact that the declarations in the case at bar were offered in behalf of the defendant instead of against him is of no consequence in view of the rationale supporting the rule that holds them inadmissible, i.e., “that it is impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 895 ; see also Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 [ 54 S.Ct. 22 , 78 L.Ed. 196 ]; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 670 [ 245 P.2d 633 ].) There is no contention that the subject declarati

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. green
cal · 2008
2 sentences

2016(Id. at pp. 65-67, 71; Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 601 [ 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 279 ] (Collin).) “Because . . . sophisticated users are charged with knowing the *511 particular product’s dangers, the failure to warn about those dangers is not the legal cause of any harm that product may cause. [Citation.] The rationale supporting the defense is that ‘the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer’s employees or downstream purchasers.’ [Citation.]

2009(Owen, Products Liability Law (2005) § 9.5, p. 599.) The rationale supporting the defense is that ‘the failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer’s employees or downstream purchasers.’ (Ibid.) This is because the user’s knowledge of the dangers is the equivalent of prior notice. [Citation.]” (American Standard, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 65 .) *555 Noting that “there is little functional difference between the two theories . . . ,” the Supreme Court held that the defen

42009–2016
Fierro v. International Harvester Co. green
calctapp · 1982
2 sentences

2014(Id. at p. 65.) Plaintiff relies on Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.4th 56 and Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (Fierro).

2014(Id. at p. 65.) Plaintiff relies on Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.4th 56 and Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (Fierro).

22014–2014
Walsh v. Bronson green
calctapp · 1988
1 sentence

1994(Ibid.) When there are no disputed questions of fact about respondents’ preparation and knowledge prior to the institution of the proceeding giving rise to the malicious prosecution claim, “the existence or absence of probable cause has traditionally been viewed as a question of law to be determined by the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 ]; Walsh v. Bronson, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 265 .) In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, the Supreme Court explained the rationale s

11994–1994
Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss green
nyed · 1963
2 sentences

1972Conversely, a judgment for the defendant in an action based upon the federal statute on the ground that the employment was in intrastate commerce does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining an action based upon the State statute.” 10 (Rest., Judgments, supra, § 65, com. k; cf. Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss (E.D.N.Y. 1963) 218 F.Supp. 696, 699 .) The rationale supporting the rule precluding a successful plaintiff’s second action obviously does not apply when the first judgment is for the defendant.

1972Conversely, a judgment for the defendant in an action based upon the federal statute on the ground that the employment was in intrastate commerce does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining an action based upon the State statute." [10] (Rest., Judgments, supra, § 65, com. k; cf. Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss (E.D.N.Y. 1963) 218 F. Supp. 696, 699 .) The rationale supporting the rule precluding a successful plaintiff's second action obviously does not apply when the first judgment is for the defendant.

11972–1972
Alsteen v. Gehl green
wis · 1963
2 sentences

1966(Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349 [ 124 N.W.2d 312, 316 ].) Particularly pertinent to the ease at bench is the issue of intent.

1966(Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349 [ 124 N.W.2d 312, 316 ].) Particularly pertinent to the ease at bench is the issue of intent.

11966–1966
People v. Hamilton green
cal · 1961
1 sentence

1962The fact that the declarations in the case at bar were offered in behalf of the defendant instead of against him is of no consequence in view of the rationale supporting the rule that holds them inadmissible, i.e., “that it is impossible for the jury to separate the state of mind of the declarant from the truth of the facts contained in the declarations.” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 55 Cal.2d 881, 895 ; see also Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 106 [ 54 S.Ct. 22 , 78 L.Ed. 196 ]; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 670 [ 245 P.2d 633 ].) There is no contention that the subject declarati

11962–1962

Where else courts name it

IL 17 (1968–2023) CA 13 (1962–2016) TX 8 (1985–2021) MI 7 (1990–2017) NC 4 (1976–2018) TN 4 (2018–2025) IN 4 (1981–1999) WA 4 (1997–2000) VA 3 (1990–2025) ND 3 (1981–2009) NY 3 (1991–2021) IA 3 (1995–2010) NJ 2 (2000–2007) SC 2 (2021–2021) MD 2 (1990–2016) PA 2 (1946–1991) OH 2 (2005–2007) CO 2 (1982–2014) LA 2 (1989–1997) KY 2 (1985–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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