almost universal rule in Kentucky

1944Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845, 61 , S. W. (2d) 874; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 ; McIntosh v. Com., 209 Ky. 203 , 272 S. W. 423 .

1943Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845 , 61 S. W. (2d) 874 ; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514, 516 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 , and cases cited.

1944Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845, 61 , S. W. (2d) 874; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 ; McIntosh v. Com., 209 Ky. 203 , 272 S. W. 423 .

1943Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845 , 61 S. W. (2d) 874 ; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514, 516 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 , and cases cited.

1944Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845, 61 , S. W. (2d) 874; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 ; McIntosh v. Com., 209 Ky. 203 , 272 S. W. 423 .

1943Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845 , 61 S. W. (2d) 874 ; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514, 516 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 , and cases cited.

2020Co. v. Bennett, 183 Ky. 445 , 209 S.W. 358 ; Illinois Cent.

2020Co. v. Bennett, 183 Ky. 445 , 209 S.W. 358 ; Illinois Cent.

2020It is the rule in this state, and the almost universal rule, that a carrier is liable for assaults committed on passengers by its employees whether the assault is in the supposed interest and discharge of a supposed duty to the carrier or was merely that of an individual motivated by conceptions of personal wrong and entirely disconnected with the performance of a duty. 13 C.J.S., Carriers, § 689, p. 1273, 10 A.J. 263, Restatement of the Law, Agency, 475; Payne v. Moore, 196 Ky. 454 , 244 S.W. 869 ; Louisville & N. R.

2020It is the rule in this state, and the almost universal rule, that a carrier is liable for assaults committed on passengers by its employees whether the assault is in the supposed interest and discharge of a supposed duty to the carrier or was merely that of an individual motivated by conceptions of personal wrong and entirely disconnected with the performance of a duty. 13 C.J.S., Carriers, § 689, p. 1273, 10 A.J. 263, Restatement of the Law, Agency, 475; Payne v. Moore, 196 Ky. 454 , 244 S.W. 869 ; Louisville & N. R.

2000Vanover, 506 S.W.2d at 519 ; see also Transport Ins.

1997To do so, however, would ignore the almost universal rule that privileges should be strictly construed, because they contravene the fundamental principle that “the public ... has a right to every man’s evidence.” United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724, 730 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950).

1997To do so, however, would ignore the almost universal rule that privileges should be strictly construed, because they contravene the fundamental principle that “the public ... has a right to every man’s evidence.” United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724, 730 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950).

1997See also Trammel v. United States, supra note 1, 445 U.S. at 50 , 100 S.Ct. at 912 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 ; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 , 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108-09 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); cf. Meenach v. General Motors Corp., Ky., 891 S.W.2d 398, 402 (1995).

1997See also Trammel v. United States, supra note 1, 445 U.S. at 50 , 100 S.Ct. at 912 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 ; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 , 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108-09 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); cf. Meenach v. General Motors Corp., Ky., 891 S.W.2d 398, 402 (1995).

1974Co. v. Shelton, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 344 .

1974Co. v. Shelton, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 344 .

1974If there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the tractor was an automobile within the meaning of the policy endorsements, the almost universal rule that the doubt should be resolved in favor of the insured would suggest a determination that the tractor was not an automobile as used in the policy. 7 Blashfield Auto Law 3rd Ed., section 292.7; State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trautwein, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 587 (1967); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

1974If there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the tractor was an automobile within the meaning of the policy endorsements, the almost universal rule that the doubt should be resolved in favor of the insured would suggest a determination that the tractor was not an automobile as used in the policy. 7 Blashfield Auto Law 3rd Ed., section 292.7; State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trautwein, Ky., 414 S.W.2d 587 (1967); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1973We think the proper rule is as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 395.” That same Restatement then also contained the following rule of law, which today is expressed as section 385 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second: “One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the

1951The case of Whitaker v. Smith, 255 Ky. 339 , 73 S.W.2d 1105, 1106 , 95 A.L.R. 727 , has this to say concerning transactions that are void ab initio, to wit: “The almost universal rule regarding such contracts (void contracts) is that they are void and may not be enforced, not only as between the original parties thereto, but likewise are they prohibited from enforcement by one who may become the holder of them in due course, and which is upon the ground that being void they never had any obligatory force and are' no more binding upon thé maker than if he had never executed' them.

1951The case of Whitaker v. Smith, 255 Ky. 339 , 73 S.W.2d 1105, 1106 , 95 A.L.R. 727 , has this to say concerning transactions that are void ab initio, to wit: “The almost universal rule regarding such contracts (void contracts) is that they are void and may not be enforced, not only as between the original parties thereto, but likewise are they prohibited from enforcement by one who may become the holder of them in due course, and which is upon the ground that being void they never had any obligatory force and are' no more binding upon thé maker than if he had never executed' them.

1950Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548 , 185 So. 625 , 120 A.L.R. 742 .

1950Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548 , 185 So. 625 , 120 A.L.R. 742 .

1945Southern Exchange Bank v. American Surety Co., 284 Ky. 251 , 146 S. W. 2d 203 .

1944Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845, 61 , S. W. (2d) 874; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 ; McIntosh v. Com., 209 Ky. 203 , 272 S. W. 423 .

1944Hudson v. Com., 249 Ky. 845, 61 , S. W. (2d) 874; Moore v. Com., 266 Ky. 514 , 99 S. W. (2d) 715 ; McIntosh v. Com., 209 Ky. 203 , 272 S. W. 423 .

1944Lowry, etc., Co. v. Turley, etc., Co., 248 Ky. 285 , 58 S. W. (2d) 591 ; Chicago, M. & St.

1944Lowry, etc., Co. v. Turley, etc., Co., 248 Ky. 285 , 58 S. W. (2d) 591 ; Chicago, M. & St.

1938Hodnett v. Stewart, 131 Ga. 67 , 61 S. E. 1124 ;, Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Me. 231 , 79 Am.

1938Hodnett v. Stewart, 131 Ga. 67 , 61 S. E. 1124 ;, Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Me. 231 , 79 Am.

1938Hodnett v. Stewart, 131 Ga. 67 , 61 S. E. 1124 ;, Newbert v. Cunningham, 50 Me. 231 , 79 Am.