almost universal rule in Nebraska

2000With respect to the authority of public officers, the Court stated in the Conway case, "[i]t may be said that the almost universal rule is that, in order to indicate office, the duties must partake in some degree of the sovereign powers of the state." 238 Neb. at 771 , 772 , 472 N.W.2d at 407 .

2000With respect to the authority of public officers, the Court stated in the Conway case, "[i]t may be said that the almost universal rule is that, in order to indicate office, the duties must partake in some degree of the sovereign powers of the state." 238 Neb. at 771 , 772 , 472 N.W.2d at 407 .

1982In the opinion, the court at 34, 173 N.W.2d at 782 , states: “In recognition of these, considerations the almost universal rule of law in this country is that if the insurable interest requirement is satisfied at the time the policy is issued, the proceeds of the policy must be paid upon the death of the life insured without regard to whether the beneficiary has an insurable interest at the time of death.” The court in Secor also recognized that there are cases that hold that a creditor who acquires insurance on his debtor’s life may not recover more than the amount of the debt and the premium

1982In this connection, however, the court at 37, 173 N.W.2d at 784 , stated: “This analysis has been rejected in the better-reasoned cases; it is contrary to the principle that the termination of an insurable interest does not affect the rights of an owner-beneficiary in a life policy.” The court also noted at 35, 173 N.W.2d at 783 : “Life insurance is not meant to assuage grief; its primary function is monetary.

1973Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600 , 43 S. Ct. 435 , 67 L.

1973Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600 , 43 S. Ct. 435 , 67 L.

1958No good reason exists why the owner should be required, when he uses the ordinary expressions employed in such contracts, to hedge it about with conditions limiting the authority of such a broker and preventing him from entering into a contract of sale without further consultation with the owner; but there is good reason why the broker should see that his authority to enter into a contract should affirmatively appear, if he desires his authority to extend beyond what is, as an almost universal rule, given to such brokers in the relation between a real estate agent and his principal.” Gould v.

1958No good reason exists why the owner should be required, when he uses the ordinary expressions employed in such contracts, to hedge it about with conditions limiting the authority of such a broker and preventing him from entering into a contract of sale without further consultation with the owner; but there is good reason why the broker should see that his authority to enter into a contract should affirmatively appear, if he desires his authority to extend beyond what is, as an almost universal rule, given to such brokers in the relation between a real estate agent and his principal.” Gould v.

1933Scroggin v. McClelland, 37 Neb. 644 ; Anderson v. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 542 ; Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W.

1933Scroggin v. McClelland, 37 Neb. 644 ; Anderson v. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 542 ; Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W.

1933Scroggin v. McClelland, 37 Neb. 644 ; Anderson v. Rodgers, 53 Kan. 542 ; Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W.

1929Law, 421, and Conrad v. Nall, 24 Mich. 275 .