almost universal rule in Arizona

1969Citing State v. McKelvey, 30 Ariz. 265 , 246 P. 550 (1926): “It appears to be the almost universal rule that as a matter pf common law, where a defendant has entered upon the execution- of a valid-sentence, the court has no jurisdiction, even during the term at which the sentence was rendered, to set it aside and render a new sentence. [Citations omitted.] Nor can it indefinitely suspend the execution of its sentence, after the same has been pronounced, either in whole or in part, and any such order, made either after judgment or as a part thereof, is wholly void. [Citations omitted.] Therefor

1969Citing State v. McKelvey, 30 Ariz. 265 , 246 P. 550 (1926): “It appears to be the almost universal rule that as a matter pf common law, where a defendant has entered upon the execution- of a valid-sentence, the court has no jurisdiction, even during the term at which the sentence was rendered, to set it aside and render a new sentence. [Citations omitted.] Nor can it indefinitely suspend the execution of its sentence, after the same has been pronounced, either in whole or in part, and any such order, made either after judgment or as a part thereof, is wholly void. [Citations omitted.] Therefor

1970Walkeng Mining Co. v. Covey, 88 Ariz. 80 , 352 P.2d 768 ; Olds Bros.

1970Walkeng Mining Co. v. Covey, 88 Ariz. 80 , 352 P.2d 768 ; Olds Bros.

1970Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 3 Ariz.App. 330 , 414 P.2d 179 (1966); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751 , at 757 (1950).

1970Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Tocci, 3 Ariz.App. 330 , 414 P.2d 179 (1966); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 751 , at 757 (1950).

1969In State v. Lopez, 96 Ariz. 169 , 393 P.2d 263 (1964), the court held that: “ * * * the trial court in the absence of a specific rule or statute has inherent jurisdiction to modify and vacate its own judgments and order in criminal cases, in accordance with Rule 60(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, unless such jurisdiction is sooner terminated by the perfecting of an appeal * * 96 Ariz. at 172 , 393 P.2d at 266 .

1969In State v. Lopez, 96 Ariz. 169 , 393 P.2d 263 (1964), the court held that: “ * * * the trial court in the absence of a specific rule or statute has inherent jurisdiction to modify and vacate its own judgments and order in criminal cases, in accordance with Rule 60(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, unless such jurisdiction is sooner terminated by the perfecting of an appeal * * 96 Ariz. at 172 , 393 P.2d at 266 .

1966A.R.S. § 12-864 defines direct contempt as acts “committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice * * Or as was aptly stated in In re Pugh, supra, “ ‘It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process.’ ” 30 Ariz. at 132 , 245 P. at 274 .

1966A.R.S. § 12-864 defines direct contempt as acts “committed in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice * * Or as was aptly stated in In re Pugh, supra, “ ‘It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process.’ ” 30 Ariz. at 132 , 245 P. at 274 .

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. 2 The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor’s intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 44

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. 2 The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor’s intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 44

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. 2 The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor’s intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 44

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. [2] The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor's intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 4

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. 2 The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor’s intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 44

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. [2] The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor's intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 4

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. 2 The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor’s intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 44

1962It is an almost universal rule that if land abutting on a public way is conveyed by a description covering only the lot itself, nevertheless, the grantee takes title to the center line of the public way if the grantor owned the underlying fee, unless the contrary intention sufficiently appears from the granting instrument itself, or the circumstances surrounding the conveyance. 2 The rule is one of construction, and applies in the absence at the time of the grant of any indication as to the grantor’s intent in dealing with his interest in the public way, Crocker v. Cotting, 166 Mass. 183 , 44

1954Since the note is usurious, Conelly is barred from recovering attorney’s fees.” The first assignment is clarified by-appellant’s first proposition of law, namely: “The promise of a person to carry out a subsisting contract with the promissee is no consideration for another contract.” Supporting this, appellant quotes from the case of Dover Copper Mining Co. v. Doenges, 40 Ariz. 349, 356 , 12 P.2d 288, 291 , as follows: “We have held in the case of Pleasant v. Arizona Storage & Distributing Co., supra [ 34 Ariz. 68 , 267 P. 794 ], as follows: ‘It is the almost universal rule that the promise of

1954Since the note is usurious, Conelly is barred from recovering attorney’s fees.” The first assignment is clarified by-appellant’s first proposition of law, namely: “The promise of a person to carry out a subsisting contract with the promissee is no consideration for another contract.” Supporting this, appellant quotes from the case of Dover Copper Mining Co. v. Doenges, 40 Ariz. 349, 356 , 12 P.2d 288, 291 , as follows: “We have held in the case of Pleasant v. Arizona Storage & Distributing Co., supra [ 34 Ariz. 68 , 267 P. 794 ], as follows: ‘It is the almost universal rule that the promise of

1954Since the note is usurious, Conelly is barred from recovering attorney’s fees.” The first assignment is clarified by-appellant’s first proposition of law, namely: “The promise of a person to carry out a subsisting contract with the promissee is no consideration for another contract.” Supporting this, appellant quotes from the case of Dover Copper Mining Co. v. Doenges, 40 Ariz. 349, 356 , 12 P.2d 288, 291 , as follows: “We have held in the case of Pleasant v. Arizona Storage & Distributing Co., supra [ 34 Ariz. 68 , 267 P. 794 ], as follows: ‘It is the almost universal rule that the promise of

1954Since the note is usurious, Conelly is barred from recovering attorney’s fees.” The first assignment is clarified by-appellant’s first proposition of law, namely: “The promise of a person to carry out a subsisting contract with the promissee is no consideration for another contract.” Supporting this, appellant quotes from the case of Dover Copper Mining Co. v. Doenges, 40 Ariz. 349, 356 , 12 P.2d 288, 291 , as follows: “We have held in the case of Pleasant v. Arizona Storage & Distributing Co., supra [ 34 Ariz. 68 , 267 P. 794 ], as follows: ‘It is the almost universal rule that the promise of

1950State v. Davey, 27 Ariz. 254 , 232 P. 884 ; Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co. et al., 25 Ariz. 381 , 218 P. 139 . 6.

1950State v. Davey, 27 Ariz. 254 , 232 P. 884 ; Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co. et al., 25 Ariz. 381 , 218 P. 139 . 6.

1950State v. Davey, 27 Ariz. 254 , 232 P. 884 ; Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co. et al., 25 Ariz. 381 , 218 P. 139 . 6.

1950State v. Davey, 27 Ariz. 254 , 232 P. 884 ; Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Standard Oil Co. et al., 25 Ariz. 381 , 218 P. 139 . 6.

1928Templin v. Hobson, 10 Colo. App. 525 , 51 Pac. 1019 ; King v. Duluth etc. R.

1928De Mund v. Benson, 32 Ariz. 99 , 255 Pac. 995 ; Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817 ; Dyea Elec.

1928De Mund v. Benson, 32 Ariz. 99 , 255 Pac. 995 ; Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817 ; Dyea Elec.

1928De Mund v. Benson, 32 Ariz. 99 , 255 Pac. 995 ; Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817 ; Dyea Elec.

1928De Mund v. Benson, 32 Ariz. 99 , 255 Pac. 995 ; Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 Pac. 817 ; Dyea Elec.

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1924Santa Rita Land etc. Co. v. Mercer, 3 Ariz. 181 , 73 Pac. 398 ; Evans v. Glencross, 4 Ariz. 222 , 36 Pac. 212 ; Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Marks, 7 Ariz. 74 , 60 Pac. 938 ; Copper Belle Mining Co. v. Costello, 11 Ariz. 334 , 95 Pac. 94 ; Dey v. Hill (theory of case), 20 Ariz. 466 , 181 Pac. 462 .

1920Lewisburg etc. Co. v. Hinds, 134 Tenn. 293 , L.