almost universal rule in Illinois

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1984(See Bowman v. Pettit (1900), 68 Ark. 126 , 56 S.W. 780 ; Palpar, Inc. v. Thayer (1953), 115 Cal. App. 2d 333 , 252 P.2d 51 ; Sawyer v. Powell (1973), 230 Ga. 309 , 196 S.E.2d 882 ; Norwood v. Parker (1929), 208 Iowa 62 , 224 N.W. 831 ; Dietsch v. Long (1942), 72 Ohio App. 349 , 43 N.E.2d 906 ; Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co. (1935), 125 Tex. 284 , 83 S.W.2d 638 .) Some courts have predicated their decisions on the necessity of protecting innocent third parties.

1975(City of Bloomington v. Bay, 42 Ill. 503 .) This is the almost universal rule in the United States, in the absence of a statute.

1974Such a holding is, I believe, contrary to both the letter and spirit of the statute and goes beyond the two principal cases relied on by either of my colleagues, namely, Ganzer v. Ganzer, 110 Ill.App.2d 394 , 249 N.E.2d 660 , and Spitler v. Spitler, 108 Ill. 120 .

1974Such a holding is, I believe, contrary to both the letter and spirit of the statute and goes beyond the two principal cases relied on by either of my colleagues, namely, Ganzer v. Ganzer, 110 Ill.App.2d 394 , 249 N.E.2d 660 , and Spitler v. Spitler, 108 Ill. 120 .

1974Such a holding is, I believe, contrary to both the letter and spirit of the statute and goes beyond the two principal cases relied on by either of my colleagues, namely, Ganzer v. Ganzer, 110 Ill.App.2d 394 , 249 N.E.2d 660 , and Spitler v. Spitler, 108 Ill. 120 .

1963A leading case in Illinois, cited in Am Jur, supra, is Mercer v. Meinel, 290 Ill 395, 125 NE 288 .

1936The conclusion here reached is supported by Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N. Y. 196 , wherein the court, in commenting on the case of Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433 , says: “The almost universal rule is that without any express rescission of the old contract, the promise is made simply for additional compensation, making the new promise a mere nudum pactum.” The only other case cited by plaintiff, upon which considerable reliance is placed, is Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 353 Ill. 614 .

1936The conclusion here reached is supported by Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N. Y. 196 , wherein the court, in commenting on the case of Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433 , says: “The almost universal rule is that without any express rescission of the old contract, the promise is made simply for additional compensation, making the new promise a mere nudum pactum.” The only other case cited by plaintiff, upon which considerable reliance is placed, is Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 353 Ill. 614 .

1936The conclusion here reached is supported by Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N. Y. 196 , wherein the court, in commenting on the case of Abbott v. Doane, 163 Mass. 433 , says: “The almost universal rule is that without any express rescission of the old contract, the promise is made simply for additional compensation, making the new promise a mere nudum pactum.” The only other case cited by plaintiff, upon which considerable reliance is placed, is Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 353 Ill. 614 .

1924Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court.” (See also People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 211 ; Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 106 .) In 13 Corpus Juris, page 63, it is further said: “It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process. * * * It seems that the court may adopt such mode of trying the question of contempt as it deems proper, only so that the person charged may be given an opportunity for explanation and

1924Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court.” (See also People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 211 ; Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 106 .) In 13 Corpus Juris, page 63, it is further said: “It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process. * * * It seems that the court may adopt such mode of trying the question of contempt as it deems proper, only so that the person charged may be given an opportunity for explanation and

1924Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court.” (See also People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 211 ; Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 106 .) In 13 Corpus Juris, page 63, it is further said: “It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process. * * * It seems that the court may adopt such mode of trying the question of contempt as it deems proper, only so that the person charged may be given an opportunity for explanation and

1924Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court.” (See also People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 211 ; Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 106 .) In 13 Corpus Juris, page 63, it is further said: “It is the almost universal rule that, where the contempt is direct, in the immediate presence of the court, summary punishment may be inflicted, without affidavit, notice, rule to show cause, or other process. * * * It seems that the court may adopt such mode of trying the question of contempt as it deems proper, only so that the person charged may be given an opportunity for explanation and

1924In People v. Cochrane, 307 Ill. 126 , Cochrane was a witness before the grand jury and refused to answer questions.

1909The authorities on this proposition are very numerous and an extensive collection of them will be found in Thompson on Corporations, (vol. 3, 2d ed. pp. 87, 108,) and in 10 Cyc. 1101; also, this rule is announced by Justice Scholfield in Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215 .

1905In Chicago Edison Co. v. Fay, 164 Ill. 323 , the court said : “While this court has held that a forged note may be ratified by the principal so as to bind him (Livings v. Wiler, 32 Ill. 387 ; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Id. 483 , and Hefner v. Dawson, 63 Id. 403 ), it has not, to our knowledge, been held in any case that a ratification of a forged instrument can be implied from a doubtful state of facts.” In Gleason, Admx., v. Henry, et al., 71 Ill. 109 , the court said, quoting from Parsons : “ ‘ It is,’ says Parsons, 1 an almost universal rule that the ratification must be made with full knowledg

1905In Chicago Edison Co. v. Fay, 164 Ill. 323 , the court said : “While this court has held that a forged note may be ratified by the principal so as to bind him (Livings v. Wiler, 32 Ill. 387 ; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Id. 483 , and Hefner v. Dawson, 63 Id. 403 ), it has not, to our knowledge, been held in any case that a ratification of a forged instrument can be implied from a doubtful state of facts.” In Gleason, Admx., v. Henry, et al., 71 Ill. 109 , the court said, quoting from Parsons : “ ‘ It is,’ says Parsons, 1 an almost universal rule that the ratification must be made with full knowledg

1905In Chicago Edison Co. v. Fay, 164 Ill. 323 , the court said : “While this court has held that a forged note may be ratified by the principal so as to bind him (Livings v. Wiler, 32 Ill. 387 ; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Id. 483 , and Hefner v. Dawson, 63 Id. 403 ), it has not, to our knowledge, been held in any case that a ratification of a forged instrument can be implied from a doubtful state of facts.” In Gleason, Admx., v. Henry, et al., 71 Ill. 109 , the court said, quoting from Parsons : “ ‘ It is,’ says Parsons, 1 an almost universal rule that the ratification must be made with full knowledg

1905In Chicago Edison Co. v. Fay, 164 Ill. 323 , the court said : “While this court has held that a forged note may be ratified by the principal so as to bind him (Livings v. Wiler, 32 Ill. 387 ; Hefner v. Vandolah, 62 Id. 483 , and Hefner v. Dawson, 63 Id. 403 ), it has not, to our knowledge, been held in any case that a ratification of a forged instrument can be implied from a doubtful state of facts.” In Gleason, Admx., v. Henry, et al., 71 Ill. 109 , the court said, quoting from Parsons : “ ‘ It is,’ says Parsons, 1 an almost universal rule that the ratification must be made with full knowledg