judge did not commit error in Massachusetts

2023See Commonwealth v. Kendall, 451 Mass. 10, 13-14 (2008). 3 The parties agree that the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense in the circumstances of this case.

2023Moreover, as we recognized in Moreno, "although the court in Wolfe stated that it is the better practice to respond to a jury question with a general instruction only, the court did not state that it is error to deliver the Downs instruction as well." Moreno, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 328.9 Under the circumstances, the judge did not commit error by exercising her discretion to forcefully respond to the jury's question with instructions that included the more specific Downs admonition "not to mention [the breathalyzer] or consider it in any way whatsoever, either for or against either side.

2015Because the evidence, 5 viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, see Commonwealth v. Little, 431 Mass. 782, 783 (2000), did not show “debilitating intoxication” that could support a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was capable of forming the requisite criminal intent, see Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 789 (1997), the evidence did not warrant a voluntary intoxication instruction and the judge did not commit error by declining to give it. ii.

2015The judge did not commit error by instructing that, in deciding whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty, they (the jury) served as “the representatives of the conscience of the community.” Commonwealth v. Barros, 425 Mass. 572, 585-586 (1997), and cases cited. ix.

2015Because the evidence, 5 viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, see Commonwealth v. Little, 431 Mass. 782, 783 (2000), did not show “debilitating intoxication” that could support a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was capable of forming the requisite criminal intent, see Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 789 (1997), the evidence did not warrant a voluntary intoxication instruction and the judge did not commit error by declining to give it. ii.

2013Cf. Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 162, 172-174 (2012). 2.

2012See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 (1996); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 392 (1992). 5.

2012See Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 (1996); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 392 (1992). 5.

2010Judgment affirmed. 1 The plaintiff makes no claim that the statute’s provisions regarding notice, see Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. 269, 274 (1990) (party seeking to offer report at trial must satisfy statute’s notice requirements), and attestation, see Knight v. Maersk Container Serv.

2008“The elements necessary to find criminal culpability for vehicular homicide . . . are: ‘(1) operation of a motor vehicle, (2) upon a public way, (3) recklessly or negligently so as to endanger human life or safety, (4) thereby causing the death of a person.” Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 446 Mass, at 137, quoting from Commonwealth v. Burke, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 697, 699 (1978).

1998Commonwealth v. Titus, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 219-220 (1992).

1996This limited exception is available to Probate Court judges “[bjecause of the delicacy of cases involving interests of children which may be adverse to that of their parents.” Id. at 915 .

1996In Adoption of Arthur, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 914, 915 (1993), we held that a judge did not commit error in considering a petition to dispense with the consent of Arthur’s parents to his adoption, where the judge gave weight to the fourteen year old boy’s preference for adoption, which occurred in a private session, in the presence of the child’s counsel, but not in the presence of his parents or their lawyer.

1994See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-600 (1990). 2 See Domegan v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.

1994See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-600 (1990). 2 See Domegan v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.

1992See Wheelock v. Zevitas, 229 Mass. 167, 170 (1918) (“as the evidence was conflicting, this question [of the existence of a partnership agreement] was properly submitted to the jury.”) 2.

1992Id. at 794 (“Generally, questions of causation, proximate and intervening, present issues for the jury to decide”).

1991Even if this type of agreement is valid, it must be free from fraud and coercion and meet the requirements set forth in Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 436 (1976).

1989The judge did not commit error in charging the jury on the lesser included offense because the jury could rationally “acquit[ ] the defendant of [aggravated rape] and convict[ ] him of [rape].” Commonwealth v. Egerton, 396 Mass. at 503 , quoting from Commonwealth v. Santo, 375 Mass. 299, 305 (1978). 3.

1989L. c. 40A, § 3. 5 While the 500 gallon limitation, applicable to single family dwellings, does not explicitly prohibit the construction of a greenhouse, given the climate in New England and the nature of the agricultural use, its practical effect is a prohibition. 6 See Cumberland Farms of Conn., Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeal of No. Attleborough, 359 Mass. 68, 74 (1971) (“[d]e facto prohibition of the expansion of agricultural use of land may not be accomplished by unreasonable regulation”).