115 Oregon opinions name it 6 courts 2002–2026 58 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018Dept. v. Williams, 204 Or.App. 496 , 503, 130 P.3d 801 (2006), we held that DHS cannot be "excused based solely on a parent's incarceration, without more ." (Emphases added.) In that case, father had been acquitted of all charges but one, and he was scheduled to be released about three and a half months after the permanency hearing. 2018Dept. v. Williams, 204 Or.App. 496 , 503, 130 P.3d 801 (2006), we held that DHS cannot be "excused based solely on a parent's incarceration, without more ." (Emphases added.) In that case, father had been acquitted of all charges but one, and he was scheduled to be released about three and a half months after the permanency hearing. | 4 | 8 |
Department of Human Services v. S. S.green2 sentences2017In S. S., we held that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s reasonable-efforts determination because, even assuming that DHS engaged in reasonable efforts for the four months leading up to the permanency hearing, DHS failed to engage in adequate efforts for the six months preceding that four-month period. 278 Or App at 738 . 2017H., 283 Or App at 310-12 (concluding that, even if DHS had made reasonable efforts in the months leading up to the permanency hearing, the agency’s failure to contact the mother and her prison counselor for almost half a year rendered its efforts over the life of the case insufficient); S. S., 278 Or App at 736-37 (concluding that four months of efforts by DHS was “too short” to allow the court to “meaningfully assess” parental progress in light of DHS’s failure to make any efforts for six months); State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. H. | 3 | 4 |
State Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. Shugarsgreen2 sentences2022Third, father contends that DHS “did not make any efforts that were directed at the jurisdictional basis until four months before the permanency hearing” and, therefore, did not make efforts “for a period of time that was sufficient in length.” In support of that contention, father cites two cases in which we reversed a permanency judgment—State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Shugars, 208 Or App 694 , 145 P3d 354 (2006), and State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. H. 2022Third, father contends that DHS “did not make any efforts that were directed at the jurisdictional basis until four months before the permanency hearing” and, therefore, did not make efforts “for a period of time that was sufficient in length.” In support of that contention, father cites two cases in which we reversed a permanency judgment—State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Shugars, 208 Or App 694 , 145 P3d 354 (2006), and State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. H. | 2 | 6 |
Department of Human Services v. S. M. H.green2 sentences2026Id. 2 ORS 419B.476(2)(a) provides: “At a permanency hearing the court shall: “(a) If the case plan at the time of the hearing is to reunify the family, determine whether the Department of Human Services has made reasonable efforts or, if the ward is an Indian child, active efforts as described in ORS 419B.645 to make it possible for the ward to safely return home and whether the parent has made sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely return home. 2020H., 283 Or App at 306-09 (although DHS provided services to mother in the two or three months immediately preceding the permanency hearing, it provided no services for approximately six months after mother was incarcer- ated). | 2 | 4 |
State Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. S. L.green2 sentences2013ORS 419B.476(2)(a) provides that, “[i]f the case plan at the time of the hearing is to reunify the family,” at the permanency hearing, the court shall “determine whether the Department of Human Services has made reasonable efforts *** and whether the parent has made sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely return home.” “ [T] o warrant a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption under the circumstances described in ORS 419B.476(2)(a), the court must find that, despite DHS’s reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return home safely, a pa 2013ORS 419B.476(2)(a) provides that, “[i]f the case plan at the time of the hearing is to reunify the family,” at the permanency hearing, the court shall “determine whether the Department of Human Services has made reasonable efforts *** and whether the parent has made sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely return home.” “ [T] o warrant a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption under the circumstances described in ORS 419B.476(2)(a), the court must find that, despite DHS’s reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return home safely, a pa | 2 | 4 |
Dept. of Human Services v. V. A. R.green2 sentences2022A. R., 301 Or App at 570-71 (where DHS delayed providing the recommended type of training, so that mother had only five sessions by the time of the permanency hearing, mother was not given a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that, with those services, she could become a minimally adequate parent). 2021A. R., 301 Or App at 570-71 (DHS’s efforts were not reasonable where it was undisputed that the mother required hands-on training to become minimally adequate parent, but, as of the permanency hearing, training had not been going on long enough to allow for the meaningful assessment of the mother’s progress). | 2 | 3 |
Dept. of Human Services v. S. S.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. S. S., 337 Or App 270, 275-76 , 562 P3d 670 (2025) (upholding the juve- nile court’s reasonable efforts determination when mother and daughter were estranged prior to the permanency hearing). 2025See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. S. S., 337 Or App 270, 275-76 , 562 P3d 670 (2025) (upholding the juve- nile court’s reasonable efforts determination when mother and daughter were estranged prior to the permanency hearing). | 2 | 2 |
Department of Human Services v. A. E. R.green2 sentences2024R., 278 Or App at 407 (“It was the court’s decision to proceed in father’s absence, after being unable to arrange for his par- ticipation by telephone, that denied father the opportunity to present the rest of his case. 2024R., 278 Or App at 407 (“It was the court’s decision to proceed in father’s absence, after being unable to arrange for his par- ticipation by telephone, that denied father the opportunity to present the rest of his case. | 2 | 2 |
Couey v. Atkinsgreen2 sentences2023See 357 Or at 471 . 2023See 357 Or at 471 . | 2 | 2 |
Department of Human Services v. D. J.green2 sentences2024J., 259 Or App 638, 645 , 314 P3d 998 (2013) (concluding that juve- nile court erred in proceeding with a permanency hearing after attempts to call the father to have him testify by phone failed; noting that the father’s “demeanor, credibility, and persuasiveness in [his testimony] (whether observed visu- ally or, as would have been the case here, through hearing the parent’s speech patterns, tone, and pitch of voice) may be critical to the court’s ultimate determination”); A. E. 2024J., 259 Or App 638, 645 , 314 P3d 998 (2013) (concluding that juve- nile court erred in proceeding with a permanency hearing after attempts to call the father to have him testify by phone failed; noting that the father’s “demeanor, credibility, and persuasiveness in [his testimony] (whether observed visu- ally or, as would have been the case here, through hearing the parent’s speech patterns, tone, and pitch of voice) may be critical to the court’s ultimate determination”); A. E. | 1 | 5 |
Department of Human Services v. S. W.green2 sentences2020Id. at 290-93 . 2020When assessing whether DHS’s reunification efforts have been reasonable, the juvenile court must consider those efforts over the life of the dependency case and in light of a parent’s and child’s specific circumstances, with the child’s health and safety being the court’s “ ‘paramount concerns.’ ” Id. at 290 (quoting 6 ORS 419B.476 provides, in relevant part: “(2) At a permanency hearing the court shall: “(a) If the case plan at the time of the hearing is to reunify the family, determine whether the Department of Human Services has made reason- able efforts * * * to make it possible for the wa | 1 | 5 |
Department of Human Services v. T. L.green2 sentences2017At that point, “‘the parent’s status as the preferred placement for the child is effectively terminated, unless and until the plan is changed at a subsequent permanency hearing.’” Id. (quoting T. 2016Although the change is not irreversible — ORS 419B.470(5) entitles parents to request new permanency hearings so long as their parental rights have not been terminated — it gives rise to the operating assumption that the child will not be returning to parents: “where [a] court changes a case plan from reunification to a permanent plan such as guardianship or [another planned permanent living arrangement], the parent’s status as the preferred placement for the child is effectively terminated, unless and until the plan is changed at a subsequent permanency hearing.” Id. at 693 . | 1 | 4 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Geistgreen2 sentences2016Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statement in Geist that a child’s best interests will generally be served by terminating the parental rights of a parent who is “unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable time,” 310 Or at 189 , that point does not obviate the need to conduct the analysis required by ORS 419B.476C5) and ORS 419B.498(2)—i.e., the “child-centered” determination involving a particular child’s circumstances and needs at the time of the permanency hearing. 2016Id. at 189-90 . 7 ORS 419B.476(5) provides, in part: “(5) The court shall enter an order within 20 days after the permanency hearing. | 1 | 3 |
| Department of Human Services v. C. L. H.green | 1 | 2 |
| Dep't of Human Servs. v. S. J. K. (In re S. R. K.)green | 1 | 2 |
| Department of Human Services v. S. J. M.green | 1 | 2 |
| Department of Human Services v. N. S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Human Services v. DMGgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Human Services v. E. M.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. G. S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Human Services v. A. R. S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Ca
green
2 sentences2012A. (A139693), 227 Or App 172, 181 , 205 P3d 36 (2009) (although the parent did not request findings required by ORS 419B.476(5) at the permanency hearing, preservation principles were inapplicable when the findings were required in a later judgment, and the parent had no way of knowing that they would not be included). 2012A. (A139693), 227 Or App 172, 181 , 205 P3d 36 (2009) (although the parent did not request findings required by ORS 419B.476(5) at the permanency hearing, preservation principles were inapplicable when the findings were required in a later judgment, and the parent had no way of knowing that they would not be included). | 8 | 2009–2022 |
State Ex Rel. Dhs v. Hsc
green
2 sentences2016S. C., 218 Or App 415, 426 , 180 P3d 39 (2008) (“DHS is obliged to undertake reasonable efforts to make it possible for the ward to safely return home based on the circumstances existing during the period prior to the permanency hearing and that period must be sufficient in length to afford a good opportunity to assess parental progress.”). 2016S. C., 218 Or App 415, 426 , 180 P3d 39 (2008) (“DHS is obliged to undertake reasonable efforts to make it possible for the ward to safely return home based on the circumstances existing during the period prior to the permanency hearing and that period must be sufficient in length to afford a good opportunity to assess parental progress.”). | 7 | 2009–2022 |
Dept. of Human Services v. C. H.
green
2 sentences2025H., 373 Or at 47-48 . 2025H., 373 Or at 47-48 . | 5 | 2024–2025 |
Dep't of Human Servs. v. S.J.M. (In re L.B.M.)
green
2 sentences2018As the majority indicates, Dept. of Human Services v. S.J.M. , 364 Or. 37 , 430 P.3d 1021 (2018), a juvenile court will not consider the question under ORS 419B.498 (2)(b) -that is, whether there is a compelling reason that filing a petition to terminate parental rights would not be in the best interests of the child-until the court already has determined that "the permanency plan for the ward should be adoption." ORS 419B.476(5)(d) ; see also ORS 419B.498(3) ("No petition to terminate the parental rights of a child or ward's parents *** may be filed until the court has determined that the per 2018As the majority indicates, Dept. of Human Services v. S.J.M. , 364 Or. 37 , 430 P.3d 1021 (2018), a juvenile court will not consider the question under ORS 419B.498 (2)(b) -that is, whether there is a compelling reason that filing a petition to terminate parental rights would not be in the best interests of the child-until the court already has determined that "the permanency plan for the ward should be adoption." ORS 419B.476(5)(d) ; see also ORS 419B.498(3) ("No petition to terminate the parental rights of a child or ward's parents *** may be filed until the court has determined that the per | 4 | 2018–2024 |
Department of Human Services v. M. H.
neutral
2 sentences2025H., 266 Or App 361, 367-68 , 337 P3d 976 (2014) (discussing the impor- tance of the findings required at a permanency hearing in developing a permanency plan that is “most likely to lead to a positive outcome for the child”). 2025H., 266 Or App 361, 367-68 , 337 P3d 976 (2014) (discussing the impor- tance of the findings required at a permanency hearing in developing a permanency plan that is “most likely to lead to a positive outcome for the child”). | 3 | 2017–2025 |
Dept. of Human Services v. W. M.
neutral
2 sentences2022M., 310 Or App 594, 598 , 485 P3d 316 (2021). 2022“Although we take into account DHS’s efforts over the life of the dependency case, the focus is on the period of time lead- ing up to the permanency hearing.” Id. at 598 . | 3 | 2022–2022 |
Department of Human Services v. R. D.
neutral
2 sentences2022D., 257 Or App 427, 432-33 , 307 P3d 487 (2013) (conclud- ing that DHS’s efforts were not reasonable where mother required sex offender treatment to address the basis for jurisdiction but 16 months had elapsed after the court took jurisdiction over the child and such treatment started only shortly before the permanency hearing); V. 2022D., 257 Or App 427, 432-33 , 307 P3d 487 (2013) (conclud- ing that DHS’s efforts were not reasonable where mother required sex offender treatment to address the basis for jurisdiction but 16 months had elapsed after the court took jurisdiction over the child and such treatment started only shortly before the permanency hearing); V. | 3 | 2016–2022 |
Dept. of Human Services v. S. E.
neutral
2 sentences2026ODHS relies on Dept. of Human Service v. S. E., 338 Or App 110 , 565 P3d 480 , rev den, 373 Or 736 (2025), to support its argument that, if our decision is to reverse and remand, the juvenile court may properly reevaluate the evidence from the April 2025 permanency hearing—with- out holding a new permanency hearing—and reconsider its reasonable-efforts determination based on a correct applica- tion of the law. 2026ODHS relies on Dept. of Human Service v. S. E., 338 Or App 110 , 565 P3d 480 , rev den, 373 Or 736 (2025), to support its argument that, if our decision is to reverse and remand, the juvenile court may properly reevaluate the evidence from the April 2025 permanency hearing—without holding a new permanency hearing—and reconsider its reasonable-efforts determination based on a correct applica- tion of the law. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Dept. of Human Services v. S. E. D.
green
2 sentences2026D., 337 Or App 448 , 563 P3d 1014 (2025), in support of that contention. 2026D., 337 Or App 448 , 563 P3d 1014 (2025), in support of that contention. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Dept. of Human Services v. M. N. B.
neutral
2 sentences2026It provides, as relevant here, “(4) At a permanency hearing the court may: “* * * * * “(c) If the court determines that further efforts will make it possible for the ward to safely return home within a reasonable time, order that the parents participate in specific services for a specific period of time and make spe- cific progress within that period of time[.]” Cite as 346 Or App 440 (2026) 451 Mother’s next argument is that the court should have done so in this case, given her recent progress in treat- ment. 2026It provides, as relevant here, “(4) At a permanency hearing the court may: “* * * * * “(c) If the court determines that further efforts will make it possible for the ward to safely return home within a reasonable time, order that the parents participate in specific services for a specific period of time and make spe- cific progress within that period of time[.]” Cite as 346 Or App 440 (2026) 451 Mother’s next argument is that the court should have done so in this case, given her recent progress in treat- ment. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10843282
green
2 sentences2026Cite as 348 Or App 494 (2026) 499 In response, ODHS agrees with mother that the juvenile court legally erred when it did not make a singular reasonable-efforts determination based on the totality of the circumstances. 2026Cite as 348 Or App 494 (2026) 499 In response, ODHS agrees with mother that the juvenile court legally erred when it did not make a singular reasonable-efforts determination based on the totality of the circumstances. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Dept. of Human Services v. T. H. R.
neutral
2 sentences2025Nonprecedential Memo Op: 339 Or App 474 (2025) 479 Having chosen to move for a change of plan, it was R’s burden to produce sufficient evidence to support a change of plan. 2025Nonprecedential Memo Op: 339 Or App 474 (2025) 479 Having chosen to move for a change of plan, it was R’s burden to produce sufficient evidence to support a change of plan. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Dept. of Human Services v. M. R. -C.
neutral
2 sentences2025The court established jurisdiction over H, who was five years old at the time of the permanency hearing, on five bases.1 The juvenile court ordered supervised visitation 1 The juvenile court took jurisdiction on the following bases: “The mother’s substance abuse interferes with her ability to safely par- ent the child[;] “The mother has another child for * * * whom she is not a parental resource and the conditions or circumstances that were the basis for the mother not having custody of that child, which include the following: mental health conditions, have not changed or been ameliorated, and 2025The court established jurisdiction over H, who was five years old at the time of the permanency hearing, on five bases.1 The juvenile court ordered supervised visitation 1 The juvenile court took jurisdiction on the following bases: “The mother’s substance abuse interferes with her ability to safely par- ent the child[;] “The mother has another child for * * * whom she is not a parental resource and the conditions or circumstances that were the basis for the mother not having custody of that child, which include the following: mental health conditions, have not changed or been ameliorated, and | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Dept. of Human Services v. T. G.
neutral
2 sentences2025Such compelling reasons include, but are not limited to: “* * * * * “(C) If the child is an Indian child, the court finds that tribal customary adoption, as described in ORS 419B.656, is an appropriate permanent plan Cite as 342 Or App 548 (2025) 555 ORS 419B.476(5)(g). 2025Such compelling reasons include, but are not limited to: “* * * * * “(C) If the child is an Indian child, the court finds that tribal customary adoption, as described in ORS 419B.656, is an appropriate permanent plan for the child and the Indian child’s tribe consents to the tribal customary adoption[.]” Cite as 342 Or App 548 (2025) 555 ORS 419B.476(5)(g). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Dept. of Human Services v. M. G. J.
green
2 sentences2025Cite as 374 Or 228 (2025) 267 finding in the orders it submitted that TCA was in the chil- dren’s best interests “as described in ORS 419B.612.” The court also could confirm from the content of the TCA resolu- tion itself that it was consistent with the expectations set at the permanency hearing, including the children’s continued placement in accordance with the preferences under ORS 419B.654 and, relatedly, placement with an Indian relative. 2025Cite as 374 Or 228 (2025) 267 finding in the orders it submitted that TCA was in the chil- dren’s best interests “as described in ORS 419B.612.” The court also could confirm from the content of the TCA resolu- tion itself that it was consistent with the expectations set at the permanency hearing, including the children’s continued placement in accordance with the preferences under ORS 419B.654 and, relatedly, placement with an Indian relative. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Dept. of Human Services v. K. K.
neutral
2 sentences2024F. to argue that DHS “referred mother to programs related to some of the jurisdictional bases, but it failed to assist with others.” In particular, she contends that DHS “failed to direct any efforts toward mother’s ‘residen- tial instability,’ which became a jurisdictional basis three Nonprecedential Memo Op: 335 Or App 436 (2024) 441 months before the permanency hearing[,]” and she asserts that DHS’s “efforts must address all the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction[.]” But mother reads T. 2024F. to argue that DHS “referred mother to programs related to some of the jurisdictional bases, but it failed to assist with others.” In particular, she contends that DHS “failed to direct any efforts toward mother’s ‘residen- tial instability,’ which became a jurisdictional basis three Nonprecedential Memo Op: 335 Or App 436 (2024) 441 months before the permanency hearing[,]” and she asserts that DHS’s “efforts must address all the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction[.]” But mother reads T. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Dept. of Human Services v. R. M. E.
neutral
2 sentences2024Specifically, the court found: Cite as 336 Or App 853 (2024) 855 “1. 2024Specifically, the court found: Cite as 336 Or App 853 (2024) 855 “1. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
| Department of Human Services v. N. M. S. green | 2 | 2014–2020 |
| Dep't of Human Servs. v. L.L.S. (In re Z.S.) green | 2 | 2019–2020 |
| Department of Human Services v. N. P. green | 2 | 2013–2014 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. R. B. neutral | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| cluster 10869557 neutral | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Department of Human Services v. K. H. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Oidor neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Department of Human Services v. K. H. neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. T. M. K. F. neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. T. R. P. neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. G. K. C. neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. M. G. J. neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Vanornum green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Department of Human Services v. A. S. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. N. A. neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. A. H. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. J. D. neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. H. K. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. J. D. R. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. D. M. neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. M. O. B. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Department of Human Services v. T.L. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Dept. of Human Services v. M. C. C. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.