permanency hearing in California

2024“Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310 .) The termination of reunification services and setting a permanency hearing were necessary to serve the minors’ “ ‘need for prompt resolution of [their] custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.’ ” (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 95 .) There was no abuse of discretion in denying Mother’s section 388 petition.

1995In particular, we note that the Legislature has set an outer limit of 12 months, or under some circumstances 18 months, “for the court to determine whether the child is to be returned to the parents or permanently placed elsewhere.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1776 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 ].) The court must conduct a review hearing six months after the initial dispositional hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); § 366, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1460.) Unless the child is then returned to the custody of the parents or the case referred to a permanency hearing, the court will set a

2026(See id. at p. 631 [“‘the norm . . . remains adoption’”]; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53 .) When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a continued parent-child relationship, the juvenile court orders adoption.

2025(In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .) First, the court determines if there is clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted.

2016(See In re K.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 456 , 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 [granting motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 because SSA was not seeking to introduce evidence to overturn the order regarding termination of parental rights, but to show the evidence proved the appeal was moot].) Accordingly, we reject U.S.'s and J.V.'s arguments that the order terminating parental rights should be reversed because the child abuse report investigation was pending at the time of the permanency hearing.

2016(See In re K.M., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 456 , 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 [granting motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 because SSA was not seeking to introduce evidence to overturn the order regarding termination of parental rights, but to show the evidence proved the appeal was moot].) Accordingly, we reject U.S.'s and J.V.'s arguments that the order terminating parental rights should be reversed because the child abuse report investigation was pending at the time of the permanency hearing.

2014The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) Prior to the permanency hearing, there are periodic status reviews as ordered by the court, but not less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing [the six-month review hearing], the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his 26 or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a

2014The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) Prior to the permanency hearing, there are periodic status reviews as ordered by the court, but not less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing [the six-month review hearing], the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a pr

2014Family Reunification Services When the dependent child is removed from parental custody, the juvenile court is ordinarily required to provide the parent with services to facilitate the reunification of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 303 .)20 As explained by one court: “The importance of reunification services in the dependency system cannot be gainsaid.

2014If the court at the 12-month permanency review hearing does not return the child to the parent, it must find by a preponderance of the evidence that such return would result in a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection or well-being (physical or emotional). (§ 366.21(f); see also Bridget A., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 306 .) If it does not find a factual basis for continuing the permanency hearing for six more months (but for not more than 18 months after the child’s initial removal) under section 366.21(g)(1), the court then sets a section .26 selection and implement

2014The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) Prior to the permanency hearing, there are periodic status reviews as ordered by the court, but not less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing [the six-month review hearing], the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his 26 or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a

2014The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) Prior to the permanency hearing, there are periodic status reviews as ordered by the court, but not less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing [the six-month review hearing], the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a pr

2022(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293; In re G.C. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1399 .) 9 (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435 , 456 [appellate courts infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support a judgment in juvenile dependency].) K.O., who was approximately two years old by the time of the permanency hearing, had never been in Mother’s care.

1995In particular, we note that the Legislature has set an outer limit of 12 months, or under some circumstances 18 months, “for the court to determine whether the child is to be returned to the parents or permanently placed elsewhere.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1776 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 ].) The court must conduct a review hearing six months after the initial dispositional hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); § 366, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1460.) Unless the child is then returned to the custody of the parents or the case referred to a permanency hearing, the court will set a

2025(See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [finding forfeiture of claim that due process required a new finding of parental unfitness before proceeding to a permanency hearing]; D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625 , 632–633.) Father could have objected to the rulings he is now challenging, but he did not.

2025(See In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [finding forfeiture of claim that due process required a new finding of parental unfitness before 10 proceeding to a permanency hearing]; D.Z. v. L.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625 , 632–633; People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590 .) C.

2020At a permanency hearing, under section 366.26, subdivision (b), the court must select the dependent child’s permanent plan from a number of statutory alternatives, including adoption, TCA, guardianship and long-term foster care. “ ‘If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.] ‘Once the 50 court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show [a compelling reason to determine] that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions

2020At a permanency hearing, under section 366.26, subdivision (b), the court must select the dependent child’s permanent plan from a number of statutory alternatives, including adoption, TCA, guardianship and long-term foster care. “ ‘If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.] ‘Once the 50 court determines the child is likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show [a compelling reason to determine] that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions

2016It states in relevant part: “Any motion to terminate court-ordered reunification services prior to the hearing set pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 366.21 [the permanency hearing, which is to be held no later than 12 months after the child enters foster care] for a child described by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) [a child three years of age or older] . . . shall be made pursuant to the requirements set forth in subdivision (c) of Sechon 388.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) It further states that such a motion “shall not be required” for the court to terminate services prior to the permanen

2016It states in relevant part: “Any motion to terminate court-ordered reunification services prior to the hearing set pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 366.21 [the permanency hearing, which is to be held no later than 12 months after the child enters foster care] for a child described by subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) [a child three years of age or older] . . . shall be made pursuant to the requirements set forth in subdivision (c) of Sechon 388.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) It further states that such a motion “shall not be required” for the court to terminate services prior to the permanen

2014The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) Prior to the permanency hearing, there are periodic status reviews as ordered by the court, but not less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing [the six-month review hearing], the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his 26 or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a

2014The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) Prior to the permanency hearing, there are periodic status reviews as ordered by the court, but not less frequently than every six months. (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “At the review hearing held six months after the initial dispositional hearing [the six-month review hearing], the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a pr

1995In particular, we note that the Legislature has set an outer limit of 12 months, or under some circumstances 18 months, “for the court to determine whether the child is to be returned to the parents or permanently placed elsewhere.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1776 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 ].) The court must conduct a review hearing six months after the initial dispositional hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); § 366, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1460.) Unless the child is then returned to the custody of the parents or the case referred to a permanency hearing, the court will set a

1995In particular, we note that the Legislature has set an outer limit of 12 months, or under some circumstances 18 months, “for the court to determine whether the child is to be returned to the parents or permanently placed elsewhere.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1776 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 ].) The court must conduct a review hearing six months after the initial dispositional hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); § 366, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1460.) Unless the child is then returned to the custody of the parents or the case referred to a permanency hearing, the court will set a

2017The court stated, ―The limited duration of this taking is relevant to the issue of what compensation is just, and not to the issue of whether a taking has occurred.‖ (Id. at p. 1583.) 34 sanctioned by the district court and therefore not unlawful—rather than a permanent physical occupation or an easement of some kind.‖ (Id. at p. 1355.) Boise Cascade acknowledged Hendler, but stated the decision had been ―widely misunderstood and criticized as abrogating the permanency requirement established by the Supreme Court in Loretto.‖ (Boise Cascade, supra, 296 F.3d at p. 1356 .) Boise Cascade pointed

2017It reasoned, "[t]he government's incursion into Boise's property is more in the nature of a temporary trespass-though, obviously, sanctioned by the district court and therefore not unlawful-rather than a permanent physical occupation or an easement of some kind." ( Id. at p. 1355.) *270 Boise Cascade acknowledged Hendler , but stated the decision had been "widely misunderstood and criticized as abrogating the permanency requirement established by the Supreme Court in Loretto ." ( Boise Cascade , supra , 296 F.3d at p. 1356 . ) Boise Cascade pointed out Hendler's discussion of the permanency re

2023(See In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1065 [“the permanency hearing report indicated a few foster parents were considering adoption”]; see also In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 1234 [“this is not a case in which the children had any previous relationship with a family interested in adopting them”].) This is not a case where the juvenile court relied solely on the availability of alternative adoptive placements to support its finding of adoptability.

2023The social service agency’s report for a permanency hearing must include “a statement from the child concerning placement and the [recommended] adoption or guardianship . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (g)(1)(E); see §§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(E), 366.22, subd. (c)(1)(E).) In addition, appointed counsel for a dependent minor who is four years of age or older must interview the child, determine the child’s wishes, and report those wishes to the juvenile court. (§ 317, subd. (e)(2); In re N.O. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 935, fn. 12 .) “At all proceedings under section 366.26, the court must consider the wi

2023(In re Amelia S., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1061 .) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding there was no evidence of the required “ ‘high probability’ ” of adoption of the 10 children—who suffered from various developmental, emotional, and physical problems—where the permanency hearing report merely “indicated a few foster parents were considering adoption.” (Id. at pp. 1063, 1065.) Here, the section 366.26 hearing has not yet taken place, and father’s parental rights have not been terminated. 8 yet conducted its assessment or made its recommendation, and the court has not yet determined wh

2023(See In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1065 [“the permanency hearing report indicated a few foster parents were considering adoption”]; see also In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218 , 1234 [“this is not a case in which the children had any previous relationship with a family interested in adopting them”].) This is not a case where the juvenile court relied solely on the availability of alternative adoptive placements to support its finding of adoptability.

2022(Id. at p. 1151.) Essentially, a “ ‘challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’ ” (Jesse W., at p. 355.) Where parental rights have been terminated, the waiver rule “prevent[s] a sabotage of the process and preserv[es] the legislative scheme of restricting appeals of final-stage termination orders.” (In re Janee J. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 207 .) Here, mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights, not the order terminating her reunification services and setting a pe

2015The now paramount interests of the child in a stable, secure, long-term, continuous home environment and the associated interest of the state in reasonable expedition and finality, which have overcome the parent’s interests in maintaining the family relationship, would be no less subject to subversion by a habeas petition than they would be by a direct appeal.” (Id. at p. 1163; see In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 534 [“a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with jurisdiction and disposition orders . . . may not be raised by a habeas corpus petition filed in conne

2020(See Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 846-847 ; Jessica A. v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 636, 645 .)” 10 The social worker also reported that, in April 2020, Mother objected to the Child receiving a planned haircut and stated she would e-mail Xavier Becerra to inform him of “all the corruptions and felonies that the social workers have committed.” She also stated she would “have an investigation open” on Father because “he has been the one who has been hallucinating and assaulting her in the past.” In its addendum report no. 2 in June 2020, SSA changed its recommend

2015(See Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 846 [in determining likelihood of reunification, juvenile court was required to consider only time remaining until potential 12-month review, even if less than six months].) 10 evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, the court may schedule a hearing pursuant to [s]ection 366.26 within 120 days.

2006Code, § 8730; In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 ].) Caretakers should not be advised they will lose their opportunity to provide a permanent home for the children in their care if they are unwilling (or unable) to adopt at the time of the permanency hearing.

2006Code, § 8730; In re Sarah S. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 274, 285 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 ].) Caretakers should not be advised they will lose their opportunity to provide a permanent home for the children in their care if they are unwilling (or unable) to adopt at the time of the permanency hearing.

2006(Rule 14(a); Estate of Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728-729 [ 230 P. 445 ]; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119-1120 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 109 ].) I Terri argues the juvenile court erred when it did not renew the evidentiary finding required by 25 United States Code section 1912 (f) at the permanency hearing.

2006(Rule 14(a); Estate of Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728-729 [ 230 P. 445 ]; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119-1120 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 109 ].) I Terri argues the juvenile court erred when it did not renew the evidentiary finding required by 25 United States Code section 1912 (f) at the permanency hearing.

2006(Rule 14(a); Estate of Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728-729 [ 230 P. 445 ]; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119-1120 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 109 ].) I Terri argues the juvenile court erred when it did not renew the evidentiary finding required by 25 United States Code section 1912 (f) at the permanency hearing.

2006(Rule 14(a); Estate of Randall (1924) 194 Cal. 725, 728-729 [ 230 P. 445 ]; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119-1120 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 109 ].) I Terri argues the juvenile court erred when it did not renew the evidentiary finding required by 25 United States Code section 1912 (f) at the permanency hearing.

2005Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ], fn. omitted.) There was clear and convincing evidence Gregory would be adopted within a reasonable time, despite the fact his maternal grandmother and maternal aunt had not completed the necessary prerequisites to adoption as of the time of the permanency hearing.

2005Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ], fn. omitted.) There was clear and convincing evidence Gregory would be adopted within a reasonable time, despite the fact his maternal grandmother and maternal aunt had not completed the necessary prerequisites to adoption as of the time of the permanency hearing.

2003“At the permanency hearing the court must select one of the statutorily prescribed options.” (In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, 804 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ].) Thus long-term plans of long-term foster care and legal guardianship established in dependency proceedings cannot coexist.

2003“At the permanency hearing the court must select one of the statutorily prescribed options.” (In re Tamneisha S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 798, 804 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 259 ].) Thus long-term plans of long-term foster care and legal guardianship established in dependency proceedings cannot coexist.