permanency hearing in Texas

2011It is undisputed that the trial court did not conduct a status hearing within sixty days of the temporary order, an initial permanency hearing within 180 days of the temporary order, or subsequent permanency hearings within 120 days of the most recent permanency hearings. [52] As we stated in T.T.F. , In a slightly different context, this court held in In re E.D.L. , 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied), that although family code section 262.201(a) requires a trial court to conduct a full adversary hearing within fourteen days of the date a governmental entity takes pos

2011It is undisputed that the trial court did not conduct a status hearing within sixty days of the temporary order, an initial permanency hearing within 180 days of the temporary order, or subsequent permanency hearings within 120 days of the most recent permanency hearings.52 As we stated in T.T.F., In a slightly different context, this court held in In re E.D.L., 105 S.W.3d 679, 688 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied), that although family code section 262.201(a) requires a trial court to conduct a full adversary hearing within fourteen days of the date a governmental entity takes possessi

2011Sch. at Houston v. Than , 901 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. 1995) (citing Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593, 603 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , 2700–01 (1972)).

2011Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. 1995) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , 2700–01 (1972)).

2011But Mother did not seek mandamus relief or otherwise complain to the trial court in a timely manner about its failure to conduct the hearings. [53] See In re N.V.D. , 102 S.W.3d 268 , 269–70 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (acknowledging trial court’s failure to timely conduct a subsequent permanency hearing, noting that parent did not seek mandamus and that trial court conducted subsequent permanency hearing as soon as delay was brought to its attention, and holding that error was harmless because parent did not demonstrate that error probably caused rendition of an improper judgment).

2011But Mother did not seek mandamus relief or otherwise complain to the trial court in a timely manner about its failure to conduct the hearings.53 See In re N.V.D., 102 S.W.3d 268 , 269–70 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (acknowledging trial court’s failure to timely conduct a subsequent permanency hearing, noting that parent did not seek mandamus and that trial court conducted subsequent permanency hearing as soon as delay was brought to its attention, and holding that error was harmless because parent did not demonstrate that error probably caused rendition of an improper judgment).

2025App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195, 200 ; see also In re A.J., No. 02-11- 00442-CV, 2012 WL 171262 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 19, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“[B]ecause the permanency hearing order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)). /a/ Dana Womack Dana Womack Justice Delivered: October 9, 2025 2

2024See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001) (holding that, generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory orders authorized by statute); In re S.E.M., No. 12-05- 00008-CV, 2005 WL 612839 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 16, 2005, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal of order entered after an initial permanency hearing for want of jurisdiction because order was not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order).

2003Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order stating that “the suit shall be dismissed on dates set by an amended scheduling order which date is not later than 180 days following the date this temporary order is rendered.” Id.

2003In re Bishop, 8 S.W.3d 412, 419 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, orig. proceeding).

2002See Olivares v. State, 693 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism'd).

2002See Olivares v. State, 693 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism’d).

2002See Vickery v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline , 5 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (general presumption of validity applies to judgments of courts of general jurisdiction).

2002See Vickery v. Comm=n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (general presumption of validity applies to judgments of courts of general jurisdiction).

2026See In re C.W., No. 05-25-00991-CV, 2025 WL 3722810 , at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (holding adult mother generally appeared through her own actions and those of her counsel when she appeared by Zoom at a permanency hearing and her counsel actively participated in trial without challenging personal jurisdiction); In re M.D.M., 579 S.W.3d 744, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (holding counsel’s actions at trial were sufficient to enter adult father’s general appearance and constituted waiver of complaint that Department had violated his due-p

2024C; Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. 2006) (emphasizing that “judges are advocates only for the law”)). 4 While the trial court refers to the December 1, 2023 hearing as a “permanency and placement hearing,” placement considerations are included in the trial court’s review during the permanency hearing.

2024See id. (“June 20 2005, [the mother] enrolled the child for school, although school did not actually start until August 2005.”).

2023Three of these four hearings occurred before an attorney was appointed to represent Appellant, and it is unknown from the record whether he was even present. -5- Concurring Opinion 04-22-00651-CV Required Participation in Services “The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

2022When analyzing whether a right of enforcement exists within a statute, courts implore a “rule of strict construction to statutory enforcement schemes and imply causes of action only when the drafters’ intent is clearly expressed from the language as written.” Abbott v. G.G.E, 463 S.W.3d 633, 651 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. denied) (citing Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 567 (Tex. 2004)).

2022See In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00226-CV, 2022 WL 1751013 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 1, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); see Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (“Contempt of court is broadly defined as disobedience to or disrespect of a court by acting in opposition to its authority.”). -4- 04-22-00294-CV The Capias order was issued following relator’s failure to appear at a permanency hearing held in accordance with the Texas Family Code.

2022The problems in scheduling jury trials during the Covid-19 pandemic were complicated by the fact that two of the children involved in the case were involved in home studies being conducted in another state, studies that had reportedly resulted in their own delays. 9Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). 10Id. at 242. 9 Mother and Father suggest the trial court abused its discretion in failing to focus on the needs of their children during the permanency hearing when it decided to grant the extension and focused instead on the needs of the court.

2022See Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske, 438 S.W.3d 39, 52 (Tex. 2014).

2022When analyzing whether a right of enforcement exists within a statute, courts implore a “rule of strict construction to statutory enforcement schemes and imply causes of action only when the drafters’ intent is clearly expressed from the language as written.” Abbott v. G.G.E, 463 S.W.3d 633, 651 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. denied) (citing Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 567 (Tex. 2004)).

2021See In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d 411 , 417 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.), disapproved of on other grounds, In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 , 267 & n.39 (Tex. 2002).

2021See In re P.R., 994 S.W.2d 411 , 417 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.), disapproved of on other grounds, In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 , 267 & n.39 (Tex. 2002).

2018A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an extension of the dismissal date under the abuse of discretion standard.” In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied)); In re C.A.L.B., No. 04-17-00250-CV, 2017 WL 4272351 , at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 27, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2018A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an extension of the dismissal date under the abuse of discretion standard.” In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied)); In re C.A.L.B., No. 04-17-00250-CV, 2017 WL 4272351 , at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 27, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2015See Jasek, 348 S.W.3d at 535 (“[N]othing in section 102.003(a) requires that a parent or other conservator have ‘voluntarily relinquished permanent care, control, and possession.’”) (emphasis added).

2014See Dennis v. Haden, 867 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied) (refusal to impose sanctions will be set aside only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion); see also Koslow’s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700 , 703–04 (Tex. 1990) (trial court has discretion to impose sanctions for party’s failure to comply with Rule 166 pretrial order). 1 We note that the original petition as to J.R.W. was filed in March 2013 but that the cases were subsequently consolidated and followed the settings from the February orders. 2 Relevant to the mother’s first issue is the following provision fr