47 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
A.E. v. Christeangreen2 sentences2006Independent of the dictates of section 78-3a-312, the A.E. court stated that "the dispositional review hearing should not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing because (1) it places an unfair burden on [the parent], (2) the separate hearings focus the juvenile court on different issues of fact and law, and (3) each involves different burdens of proof." A.E., 938 P.2d at 816 . ¶ 30 With regard to the unfair burden on parents, the court stated that combining the permanency hearing with the termination trial inherently places the parent "at a disadvantage." Id. 2006Independent of the dictates of section 78-3a-312, the A.E. court stated that "the dispositional review hearing should not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing because (1) it places an unfair burden on [the parent], (2) the separate hearings focus the juvenile court on different issues of fact and law, and (3) each involves different burdens of proof." A.E., 938 P.2d at 816 . ¶ 30 With regard to the unfair burden on parents, the court stated that combining the permanency hearing with the termination trial inherently places the parent "at a disadvantage." Id. | 4 | 6 |
In Interest of Jngreen2 sentences2006Both plans warned J.N. that failure to comply could result in "negative consequences, including termination of his parental rights." Id. ¶ 37 Four months into the second six-month plan, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. 2006See id. at 411-15 (Billings, J., dissenting). ¶ 40 Both the majority opinion and the dissent addressed, at least in dicta, the shift in focus between the permanency hearing and the termination trial, and the potential for a parent's improvement between the two proceedings. | 4 | 4 |
State in Interest of K.M.green2 sentences2011See In re K.M., 965 P.2d at 582 . 2011See In re K.M., 965 P.2d at 582 . | 3 | 3 |
State ex rel. S.K. v. C.K.green2 sentences2019At the permanency hearing a juvenile court has two options: either (1) order that the child be returned to his or her parent, or (2) terminate reunification services and develop a permanency plan for the child if the court “finds that returning the child to the parent poses a substantial risk to the child’s well-being.” In re S.K., 1999 UT App 261 , ¶ 12 n.5, 987 P.2d 616 (quotation simplified). 2019At the permanency hearing a juvenile court has two options: either (1) order that the child be returned to his or her parent, or (2) terminate reunification services and develop a permanency plan for the child if the court "finds that returning the child to the parent poses a substantial risk to the child's well-being." *118 In re S.K. , 1999 UT App 261 , ¶ 12 n.5, 987 P.2d 616 (quotation simplified). | 2 | 5 |
State Ex Rel. Skgreen2 sentences2019At the permanency hearing a juvenile court has two options: either (1) order that the child be returned to his or her parent, or (2) terminate reunification services and develop a permanency plan for the child if the court “finds that returning the child to the parent poses a substantial risk to the child’s well-being.” In re S.K., 1999 UT App 261 , ¶ 12 n.5, 987 P.2d 616 (quotation simplified). 2019At the permanency hearing a juvenile court has two options: either (1) order that the child be returned to his or her parent, or (2) terminate reunification services and develop a permanency plan for the child if the court "finds that returning the child to the parent poses a substantial risk to the child's well-being." *118 In re S.K. , 1999 UT App 261 , ¶ 12 n.5, 987 P.2d 616 (quotation simplified). | 2 | 5 |
State in Interest of NRgreen2 sentences2012The court may determine that: (i) efforts to reunify a minor with the minor’s family are not reasonable or appropriate, based on the individual circumstances; and (ii) reunification services should not be provided.” (emphasis added)); id. § 78A‐6‐314(7) (“Nothing in this section may be construed to: (a) entitle any parent to reunification services for any specified period of time; [or] (b) limit a court’s ability to terminate reunification services at any time prior to a permanency hearing . . . .”); In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (“Reunification services are a gratuity pro 2011The court may determine that: (i) efforts to reunify a minor with the minor's family are not reasonable or appropriate, based on the individual cirenmstances; and (i) reunification services should not be provided." (emphasis added)); id. § 78A-6-314(7) ("Nothing in this section may be construed to: (a) entitle any parent to reunification services for any specified period of time; [or] (b) limit a court's ability to terminate reunification services at any time prior to a permanency hearing...."); In re N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("Reunification services are a gratuity provided t | 2 | 4 |
In re K.J.green2 sentences2018See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-304(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). 20170812-CA and 20170814-CA 10 2018 UT App 216 In re K.J. reunification services, a permanency hearing must be held within thirty days. 2018See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-304(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). 20170812-CA and 20170814-CA 10 2018 UT App 216 In re K.J. reunification services, a permanency hearing must be held within thirty days. | 2 | 2 |
State in Interest of Afgreen2 sentences2012See In re A.F., 2007 UT 69 , ¶¶ 6‐7 (discussing instances when a permanency hearing results in a final order and concluding that “[t]he order terminating reunification services and changing the permanency goal left the Child’s status unchanged and unresolved and therefore was not a final determination of the Mother’s rights or the Child’s status”). 20090484‐CA 14 ¶28 Moreover, under the unique circumstances of this case, the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights is the only final order following the Children’s return to DCFS’s custody from which Father could appeal. 2011See In re A.F., 2007 UT 69, 116-7 , 167 P.3d 1070 (discussing instances when a permanency hearing results in a final order and concluding that "[the order terminating reunification services and changing the per-maneney goal left the Child's status unchanged and unresolved and therefore was not a final determination of the Mother's rights or the Child's status"). 128 Moreover, under the unique cireum-stances of this case, the juvenile court's termination of Father's parental rights is the only final order following the Children's return to DCFS's custody from which Father could appeal. | 2 | 2 |
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfieldgreen2 sentences2008Furthermore, "Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large number of Indian children adopted by nonI-ndians." Id. at 48-49 . ¶47 Unlike the dispositional hearing, which must be held within approximately ninety days after a child's removal, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-309, -311(2), the permanency hearing can be held as late as "12 months after the original removal of the minor," id. § 78A-6-314(1)(a). 2008See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49 -50 n.24. | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Adoption of Hallowaygreen2 sentences2008See generally In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 967 (Utah 1986) ("There certainly is nothing in the ICWA or its legislative history to suggest that state law controls if, in application, its subtleties bring it into conflict with the ICWA . . . ."). 2008See generally In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 967 (Utah 1986) ("There certainly is nothing in the ICWA or its legislative history to suggest that state law controls if, in application, its subtleties bring it into conflict with the ICWA...."). | 2 | 2 |
State in Interest of MLgreen2 sentences2006In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 561 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). 2006In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 561 (Utah Ct.App.1998). | 2 | 2 |
Meyer v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences2006"The United States Constitution guarantees that th[e] parental liberty interest cannot be disturbed without due process of law." In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 ; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). 2006"The United States Constitution guarantees that th[e] parental liberty interest cannot be disturbed without due process of law." In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39, ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 ; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 , 43 S.Ct. 625 , 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). | 2 | 2 |
In Interest of Afgreen2 sentences2006See In re A.F., 2006 UT App 200, ¶ 17 , 552 Utah Adv. 2006See In re A.F., 2006 UT App 200, ¶ 17 , 552 Utah Adv. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dunngreen2 sentences2003Father failed to preserve this issue before the juvenile court but nevertheless urges us to address his argument under the "plain error" doctrine. *1166 [T]o establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, [Father] must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the [juvenile] court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Father.] [12] State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). ¶ 29 Utah C 2003Although Father alleges that failure to hold a permanency hearing violated his due process rights, he cites only the "plain error" test as enunciated in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993), and does not otherwise argue that the reasonable doubt standard applies to his due process argument. | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Vargasgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Monson v. Carvergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hart v. Salt Lake County Commissiongreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re State in Interest of Jpgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Newman v. Behrensgreen | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. J.H.green2 sentences2019Evidence for the Placement ¶25 "The Utah Code provides that if the juvenile court orders reunification services for a parent, a permanency hearing shall be held at the expiration of those services ...." In re J.H. , 2006 UT App 205 , ¶ 7, 138 P.3d 70 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(16) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). 2019Evidence for the Placement ¶25 "The Utah Code provides that if the juvenile court orders reunification services for a parent, a permanency hearing shall be held at the expiration of those services ...." In re J.H. , 2006 UT App 205 , ¶ 7, 138 P.3d 70 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(16) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). | 1 | 4 |
In Re Foxgreen2 sentences2007J.H., 2006 UT App 205, ¶ 5 , 138 P.3d 70 ("Whether the juvenile court's actions met the statutory requirements for a permanency hearing is a question of law that we review for correctness."). [5] See, e.g., In re Fox, 2004 UT 20, ¶ 5 , 89 P.3d 127 ("This court generally reviews interpretations of rules for correctness. . . ."). [6] State ex rel. 2007J.H., 2006 UT App 205, ¶ 5 , 138 P.3d 70 ("Whether the juvenile court's actions met the statutory requirements for a permanency hearing is a question of law that we review for correctness."). [5] See, e.g., In re Fox, 2004 UT 20, ¶ 5 , 89 P.3d 127 ("This court generally reviews interpretations of rules for correctness. . . ."). [6] State ex rel. | 1 | 2 |
| In re K.J. (A.J. v. T.M. and L.M.)green | 1 | 1 |
| Shriver v. Benchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Adoption of THgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Adoption of M.T.S.green | 1 | 1 |
| Desiree F. v. Daniel F.green | 1 | 1 |
| State in Interest of JJTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacE v. Webbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re JPgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gutierrez v. Medleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
K.F. v. State (In re S.F. and C.F.)
green
2 sentences2018"This provision clearly contemplates the possibility that if a termination trial is held prior to a permanency hearing and the parent's rights are terminated, then the parent may never receive a permanency hearing." In re S.F. , 2012 UT App 10 , ¶ 53, 268 P.3d 831 . ¶23 The State concedes that this process is "the norm" and that, "[i]n child welfare proceedings initiated by the State, it is more typical that the proceedings begin with a petition pursuant to Utah Code [section] 78A-6-304" seeking adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency. 2018“This provision clearly contemplates the possibility that if a termination trial is held prior to a permanency hearing and the parent’s rights are terminated, then the parent may never receive a permanency hearing.” In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10 , ¶ 53, 268 P.3d 831 . ¶23 The State concedes that this process is “the norm” and that, “[i]n child welfare proceedings initiated by the State, it is more typical that the proceedings begin with a petition pursuant to Utah Code [section] 78A-6-304” seeking adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
K.F. v. State
green
2 sentences2018"This provision clearly contemplates the possibility that if a termination trial is held prior to a permanency hearing and the parent's rights are terminated, then the parent may never receive a permanency hearing." In re S.F. , 2012 UT App 10 , ¶ 53, 268 P.3d 831 . ¶23 The State concedes that this process is "the norm" and that, "[i]n child welfare proceedings initiated by the State, it is more typical that the proceedings begin with a petition pursuant to Utah Code [section] 78A-6-304" seeking adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency. 2018“This provision clearly contemplates the possibility that if a termination trial is held prior to a permanency hearing and the parent’s rights are terminated, then the parent may never receive a permanency hearing.” In re S.F., 2012 UT App 10 , ¶ 53, 268 P.3d 831 . ¶23 The State concedes that this process is “the norm” and that, “[i]n child welfare proceedings initiated by the State, it is more typical that the proceedings begin with a petition pursuant to Utah Code [section] 78A-6-304” seeking adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2018Once the State filed its abuse and neglect petition, the parents contend they then "had a due process right to an adjudication of the abuse, neglect, and/or dependency petition ..., and to a dispositional hearing [thirty] days later." They assert that "[t]he dispositional statute clearly contemplates that there will be a hearing to determine whether reunification services are appropriate, and if not, then the case proceeds to a permanency hearing, where a petition to terminate parental rights could be filed." 3 In other words, the parents contend that, once the State filed its abuse and neglec 2018Once the State filed its abuse and neglect petition, the parents contend they then "had a due process right to an adjudication of the abuse, neglect, and/or dependency petition ..., and to a dispositional hearing [thirty] days later." They assert that "[t]he dispositional statute clearly contemplates that there will be a hearing to determine whether reunification services are appropriate, and if not, then the case proceeds to a permanency hearing, where a petition to terminate parental rights could be filed." 3 In other words, the parents contend that, once the State filed its abuse and neglec | 3 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Moa
green
2 sentences2017By stipulating that reunification efforts could be terminated, Father invited the very error he now claims that the juvenile court committed. “[W]here a party makes an affirmative representation encouraging the court to proceed without further consideration of an issue, an appellate court need not consider the party’s ob jection to that aetíon on appeal.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 27 , 282 P.3d 985 . 2017By stipulating that reunification efforts could be terminated, Father invited the very error he now claims that the juvenile court committed. “[W]here a party makes an affirmative representation encouraging the court to proceed without further consideration of an issue, an appellate court need not consider the party’s ob jection to that aetíon on appeal.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 27 , 282 P.3d 985 . | 3 | 2017–2017 |
In re G.C.
green
2 sentences2025Given these circumstances, the findings at Sister’s permanency hearing do not change the operative facts relevant to Child’s permanence, which 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 7 2025 UT App 182 In re G.C. was necessarily litigated within his own permanency timeline. 2025Given these circumstances, the findings at Sister’s permanency hearing do not change the operative facts relevant to Child’s permanence, which 20240512-CA and 20240524-CA 7 2025 UT App 182 In re G.C. was necessarily litigated within his own permanency timeline. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
In re H.H....
green
2 sentences2024First of all, Father had refused “to obtain a mental health evaluation,” despite the fact that DCFS caseworkers had set up appointments for Father to receive the evaluation and had “encourage[d] him to complete” it “prior to the permanency hearing as it would show his efforts in the reunification process.” In addition, the court found that Father had failed to “participate in meaningful family therapy.” And most significantly, it found that Father had failed in his overarching task of providing “an emotionally safe or stable home to which the children may be returned.” The court specifically n 2024First of all, Father had refused “to obtain a mental health evaluation,” despite the fact that DCFS caseworkers had set up appointments for Father to receive the evaluation and had “encourage[d] him to complete” it “prior to the permanency hearing as it would show his efforts in the reunification process.” In addition, the court found that Father had failed to “participate in meaningful family therapy.” And most significantly, it found that Father had failed in his overarching task of providing “an emotionally safe or stable home to which the children may be returned.” The court specifically n | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State Ex Rel. Er
green
2 sentences2019The judge in this case not only heard Grandmother's testimony at the permanency hearing, which provided the court with an opportunity for "a thoughtful, experience-based evaluation" of Grandmother, see In re Z.D. , 2006 UT 54 , ¶ 49, 147 P.3d 401 , but had also worked with Grandmother for more than a year, giving the court an extended "opportunity to judge [Grandmother's] credibility firsthand," see In re E.R. , 2001 UT App 66 , ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680 . 2019The judge in this case not only heard Grandmother's testimony at the permanency hearing, which provided the court with an opportunity for "a thoughtful, experience-based evaluation" of Grandmother, see In re Z.D. , 2006 UT 54 , ¶ 49, 147 P.3d 401 , but had also worked with Grandmother for more than a year, giving the court an extended "opportunity to judge [Grandmother's] credibility firsthand," see In re E.R. , 2001 UT App 66 , ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. Lm
green
2 sentences2019"Once a court has determined that a child has been abused or neglected, that court is given broad discretion in determining the child's permanent placement." In re L.M. , 2001 UT App 314 , ¶ 19, 37 P.3d 1188 . 2019"Once a court has determined that a child has been abused or neglected, that court is given broad discretion in determining the child's permanent placement." In re L.M. , 2001 UT App 314 , ¶ 19, 37 P.3d 1188 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. Zd
green
2 sentences2019The judge in this case not only heard Grandmother's testimony at the permanency hearing, which provided the court with an opportunity for "a thoughtful, experience-based evaluation" of Grandmother, see In re Z.D. , 2006 UT 54 , ¶ 49, 147 P.3d 401 , but had also worked with Grandmother for more than a year, giving the court an extended "opportunity to judge [Grandmother's] credibility firsthand," see In re E.R. , 2001 UT App 66 , ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680 . 2019The judge in this case not only heard Grandmother's testimony at the permanency hearing, which provided the court with an opportunity for "a thoughtful, experience-based evaluation" of Grandmother, see In re Z.D. , 2006 UT 54 , ¶ 49, 147 P.3d 401 , but had also worked with Grandmother for more than a year, giving the court an extended "opportunity to judge [Grandmother's] credibility firsthand," see In re E.R. , 2001 UT App 66 , ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680 . | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State Ex Rel. Br
green
2 sentences2019"When a foundation for the court's decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence." In re B.R. , 2007 UT 82 , ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 . ¶27 Here, Mother contends that the evidence presented at the permanency hearing was not sufficient for the juvenile court to establish that Grandmother was an appropriate permanent placement; specifically, she argues that Grandmother's testimony alone did not establish proof by a preponderance of the evidence that guardianship with Grandmother was in Children's best interests. 2019"When a foundation for the court's decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of the evidence." In re B.R. , 2007 UT 82 , ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 . ¶27 Here, Mother contends that the evidence presented at the permanency hearing was not sufficient for the juvenile court to establish that Grandmother was an appropriate permanent placement; specifically, she argues that Grandmother's testimony alone did not establish proof by a preponderance of the evidence that guardianship with Grandmother was in Children's best interests. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2007"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a question of law that is . . . reviewed for correctness." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 6 , 122 P.3d 615 . ¶ 11 Mother also raises issues that her due process rights were violated because she was not provided adequate notice as to the purpose of the disposition hearing, that the juvenile court erred when it refused to hold a permanency hearing prior to terminating the court's jurisdiction, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's permanency order. 2007"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a question of law that is . . . reviewed for correctness." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 6 , 122 P.3d 615 . ¶ 11 Mother also raises issues that her due process rights were violated because she was not provided adequate notice as to the purpose of the disposition hearing, that the juvenile court erred when it refused to hold a permanency hearing prior to terminating the court's jurisdiction, and that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's permanency order. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State ex rel. S.H. v. State
green
2 sentences2006When, as here, a parent has no notice that termination of parental rights will be at issue, a permanency hearing ought not result in findings that can be used against the parent to establish grounds for the termination of his or her rights at a later termination *250 trial. [21] ¶ 79 Even to the extent that the two hearings might have some practical overlap of evidence, a parent is entitled to be informed "that a particular issue is being considered by a court." In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 (quotations and citation omitted). 2006When, as here, a parent has no notice that termination of parental rights will be at issue, a permanency hearing ought not result in findings that can be used against the parent to establish grounds for the termination of his or her rights at a later termi nation trial. 21 ¶ 79 Even to the extent that the two hearings might have some practical overlap of evidence, a parent is entitled to be informed “that a particular issue is being considered by a court.” In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 (quotations and citation omitted). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
In Re AH
green
2 sentences2006When, as here, a parent has no notice that termination of parental rights will be at issue, a permanency hearing ought not result in findings that can be used against the parent to establish grounds for the termination of his or her rights at a later termination *250 trial. [21] ¶ 79 Even to the extent that the two hearings might have some practical overlap of evidence, a parent is entitled to be informed "that a particular issue is being considered by a court." In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 (quotations and citation omitted). 2006When, as here, a parent has no notice that termination of parental rights will be at issue, a permanency hearing ought not result in findings that can be used against the parent to establish grounds for the termination of his or her rights at a later termi nation trial. 21 ¶ 79 Even to the extent that the two hearings might have some practical overlap of evidence, a parent is entitled to be informed “that a particular issue is being considered by a court.” In re A.H., 2004 UT App 39 at ¶ 11 , 86 P.3d 745 (quotations and citation omitted). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State Ex Rel. Fc III
green
2 sentences2006III, 2003 UT App 397 , ¶ 2 n. 1, 81 P.3d 790 ("Although A.E. once stood for the proposition that a permanency hearing (previously called a dispositional review hearing) could not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing, it has since been superseded by statute." (citation omitted)). 2006III, 2003 UT App 397 , ¶ 2 n. 1, 81 P.3d 790 ("Although A.E. once stood for the proposition that a permanency hearing (previously called a dispositional review hearing) could not be combined with a termination of parental rights hearing, it has since been superseded by statute." (citation omitted)). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| State Ex Rel. Gb green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Litherland green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| In re M.M. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Rushton green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In re D.R. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In re A.R.F... green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re A.T... neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In re C.S... neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In re N.M. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re C.J. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re Z.J. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re L.A. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re E.M.J. neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| L.G. v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In re H.E. (S.K. v. State) neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Gerbich v. Numed Inc. green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State Ex Rel. Wa green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State Ex Rel. Mw green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.