compelling reason standard in Michigan

2000Justice Griffin subsequently elaborated on the compelling reason standard in People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 32 ; 475 NW2d 684 (1991): We believe that [a] compelling reason for an independent state construction might be found if there were significant textual differences between parallel provisions of the state and federal constitutions, and, particularly, if history provided reason to believe that those who framed and adopted the state provision had a different purpose in mind.

2000Justice Griffin subsequently elaborated on the compelling reason standard in People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 32 ; 475 NW2d 684 (1991): We believe that [a] compelling reason for an independent state construction might be found if there were significant textual differences between parallel provisions of the state and federal constitutions, and, particularly, if history provided reason to believe that those who framed and adopted the state provision had a different purpose in mind.

1995In each instance, what is required of this Court is a searching examination to discover what law `the people have made.' People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 485 ; 19 NW 155 (1884)." The Sitz Court further stated: Today we clarify that the compelling reason test must be interpreted in the context of our observation that the [antiexclusionary-rule] proviso [of Const 1963, art 1, § 11] should not be read as "an interdiction" of the first two clauses, under which this Court "created a body of state constitutional search and seizure law and adopted an exclusionary rule, all before either was subject to

1995In each instance, what is required of this Court is a searching examination to discover what law 'the people have made.’ People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 485 ; 19 NW 155 (1884).” The Sitz Court further stated: Today we clarify that the compelling reason test must be interpreted in the context of our observation that the [antiexclusionary-rule] proviso [of Const 1963, art 1, § 11] should not be read as "an interdiction” of the first two clauses, under which this Court "created a body of state constitutional search and seizure law and addpted an exclusionary rule, all before either was subject to

1991Although a number of appellate decisions have referred to the compelling reason standard, little in the way of guidance has been provided concerning its contours and meaning. 39 Surely, the beginning of consideration must be the axiomatic statement of this Court in Holland v Garden City Clerk, 299 Mich 465, 470 ; 300 NW 777 (1941): "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that we determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it.” See also Burdick v Secretary of State, 373 Mich 578, 584 ; 130 NW2d 380 (1964).

1991Although a number of appellate decisions have referred to the compelling reason standard, little in the way of guidance has been provided concerning its contours and meaning. 39 Surely, the beginning of consideration must be the axiomatic statement of this Court in Holland v Garden City Clerk, 299 Mich 465, 470 ; 300 NW 777 (1941): "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that we determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it.” See also Burdick v Secretary of State, 373 Mich 578, 584 ; 130 NW2d 380 (1964).

1991Although a number of appellate decisions have referred to the compelling reason standard, little in the way of guidance has been provided concerning its contours and meaning. 39 Surely, the beginning of consideration must be the axiomatic statement of this Court in Holland v Garden City Clerk, 299 Mich 465, 470 ; 300 NW 777 (1941): "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that we determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it.” See also Burdick v Secretary of State, 373 Mich 578, 584 ; 130 NW2d 380 (1964).

1991Although a number of appellate decisions have referred to the compelling reason standard, little in the way of guidance has been provided concerning its contours and meaning. 39 Surely, the beginning of consideration must be the axiomatic statement of this Court in Holland v Garden City Clerk, 299 Mich 465, 470 ; 300 NW 777 (1941): "It is a fundamental principle of constitutional construction that we determine the intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the people adopting it.” See also Burdick v Secretary of State, 373 Mich 578, 584 ; 130 NW2d 380 (1964).

2016This Court later explained that [i]n a nutshell, Milbourn’s “principle of proportionality” requires a sentence “to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636 . [People v Masroor, ___ Mich -2- App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No 322280, issued November 24, 2015), slip op, p 7.]1 This Court in Steanhouse set forth the following procedure that should be followed when reviewing a defendant’s departure sentence: Given that Lockridge overturned the substantial and compelling reason standard, Lockridge, ___ Mich at ___; s

2016Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 48 .

2004It is the duty of courts, when attention is seasonably called to a violation of a constitutional right, in obtaining evidence in criminal prosecutions, to vindicate the protection afforded individuals by the Constitution, and to suppress such evidence. [ Id. ] The compelling reason test "should not be understood as establishing a conclusive *499 presumption artificially linking state constitutional interpretation to federal law." Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 443 Mich. 744, 758 , 506 N.W.2d 209 (1993).

2004It is the duty of courts, when attention is seasonably called to a violation of a constitutional right, in obtaining evidence in criminal prosecutions, to vindicate the protection afforded individuals by the Constitution, and to suppress such evidence. [Id.] The compelling reason test “should not be understood as establishing a conclusive presumption artificially linking state constitutional interpretation to federal law.” Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 758 ; 506 NW2d 209 (1993).

2004It is the duty of courts, when attention is seasonably called to a violation of a constitutional right, in obtaining evidence in criminal prosecutions, to vindicate the protection afforded individuals by the Constitution, and to suppress such evidence. [Id.] The compelling reason test “should not be understood as establishing a conclusive presumption artificially linking state constitutional interpretation to federal law.” Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 443 Mich 744, 758 ; 506 NW2d 209 (1993).

2000See, e.g., People v Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109, 118-119 ; 587 NW2d 1 (1998); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 326 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).

2000See, e.g., People v Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109, 118-119 ; 587 NW2d 1 (1998); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 326 ; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).

2000Compare, for example, Justice Boyle’s ferocious dissent in People v Bender, 452 Mich 594 ; 551 NW2d 71 (1996), with Justice Cavanagh’s reasoning for the majority in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 27-29 ; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).

2000Compare, for example, Justice Boyle’s ferocious dissent in People v Bender, 452 Mich 594 ; 551 NW2d 71 (1996), with Justice Cavanagh’s reasoning for the majority in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 27-29 ; 485 NW2d 866 (1992).

1995In each instance, what is required of this Court is a searching examination to discover what law 'the people have made.’ People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 485 ; 19 NW 155 (1884).” The Sitz Court further stated: Today we clarify that the compelling reason test must be interpreted in the context of our observation that the [antiexclusionary-rule] proviso [of Const 1963, art 1, § 11] should not be read as "an interdiction” of the first two clauses, under which this Court "created a body of state constitutional search and seizure law and addpted an exclusionary rule, all before either was subject to

1995In each instance, what is required of this Court is a searching examination to discover what law 'the people have made.’ People v Harding, 53 Mich 481, 485 ; 19 NW 155 (1884).” The Sitz Court further stated: Today we clarify that the compelling reason test must be interpreted in the context of our observation that the [antiexclusionary-rule] proviso [of Const 1963, art 1, § 11] should not be read as "an interdiction” of the first two clauses, under which this Court "created a body of state constitutional search and seizure law and addpted an exclusionary rule, all before either was subject to

1995Id. at 337 . *86 While cases imposing a substantial and compelling reason standard of review where state action impinges on fundamental rights demonstrate the imposing burden such a standard represents, of more apt analogy to the present case is the less restrictive "rational basis" test applied to equal protection claims against state action that implicates no fundamental right or suspect classification.