Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 California opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Jasmine D.red2 sentences2020(Compare, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.) [substantial evidence]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 , 530- 531 [substantial evidence review as to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and abuse of discretion review as to whether that 4 relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 .) The “practical differences” between these standards are not significant. 2014In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Although the “practical differences” among these various standards of review “are | 4 | 4 |
In Re Autumn H.green2 sentences2020(Compare, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.) [substantial evidence]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 , 530- 531 [substantial evidence review as to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and abuse of discretion review as to whether that 4 relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 .) The “practical differences” between these standards are not significant. 2014In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Although the “practical differences” among these various standards of review “are | 4 | 4 |
Santa Clara County Department of Family & Children's Services v. Patricia J.green2 sentences2014In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Although the “practical differences” among these various standards of review “are 2014(Compare, e.g., In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) The “practical differences” among these various standards of revi | 3 | 3 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Kimberly G.green2 sentences2020(Compare, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.) [substantial evidence]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 , 530- 531 [substantial evidence review as to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and abuse of discretion review as to whether that 4 relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 .) The “practical differences” between these standards are not significant. 2014In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 [applying substantial evidence standard]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [applying abuse of discretion standard]; In re K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [applying substantial evidence standard of review to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and applying abuse of discretion to standard to whether that relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; accord, In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 .) Although the “practical differences” among these various standards of review “are | 2 | 4 |
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen2 sentences2007(Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 257-258 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 294-295 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 ].) The Attorney General contends that if counsel should have been appointed for defendant, reversal is not required. 2007(Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 257-258 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 294-295 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 ].) The Attorney General contends that if counsel should have been appointed for defendant, reversal is not required. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boninred2 sentences2007(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 ].) “The compelling reason for the rule of prejudice per se is that no realistic measure of prejudice resulting from counsel’s' nonparticipation can be made when, because of the very absence thereof, the record fails to reflect what different direction the proceedings might have taken and what different results might have obtained.” (In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 256 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 170 , 520 P.2d 986 ], disapproved- on another- point in People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 2007(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 ].) “The compelling reason for the rule of prejudice per se is that no realistic measure of prejudice resulting from counsel’s' nonparticipation can be made when, because of the very absence thereof, the record fails to reflect what different direction the proceedings might have taken and what different results might have obtained.” (In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 256 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 170 , 520 P.2d 986 ], disapproved- on another- point in People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bigelowgreen2 sentences2007(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 ].) “The compelling reason for the rule of prejudice per se is that no realistic measure of prejudice resulting from counsel’s' nonparticipation can be made when, because of the very absence thereof, the record fails to reflect what different direction the proceedings might have taken and what different results might have obtained.” (In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 256 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 170 , 520 P.2d 986 ], disapproved- on another- point in People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 2007(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 ].) “The compelling reason for the rule of prejudice per se is that no realistic measure of prejudice resulting from counsel’s' nonparticipation can be made when, because of the very absence thereof, the record fails to reflect what different direction the proceedings might have taken and what different results might have obtained.” (In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 256 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 170 , 520 P.2d 986 ], disapproved- on another- point in People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 | 1 | 1 |
Callahan v. William F.green2 sentences2007(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 ].) “The compelling reason for the rule of prejudice per se is that no realistic measure of prejudice resulting from counsel’s' nonparticipation can be made when, because of the very absence thereof, the record fails to reflect what different direction the proceedings might have taken and what different results might have obtained.” (In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 256 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 170 , 520 P.2d 986 ], disapproved- on another- point in People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 2007(People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 744 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 328 , 691 P.2d 994 ].) “The compelling reason for the rule of prejudice per se is that no realistic measure of prejudice resulting from counsel’s' nonparticipation can be made when, because of the very absence thereof, the record fails to reflect what different direction the proceedings might have taken and what different results might have obtained.” (In re William F. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 249, 256 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 170 , 520 P.2d 986 ], disapproved- on another- point in People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 695, fn. 4 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 687 | 1 | 1 |
Shapiro v. Thompsonred2 sentences1995Thus, the durational residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel.” (Id. at p. 338 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 281-282].) The court emphasized the imposition of a “direct” burden on travel: “Obviously, durational residence laws single out the class of bona fide state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such travelers directly.” (Ibid.) It also took care to point out, as it had in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. 618, 638, fn. 21 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 617 ]), that a law 1995Thus, the durational residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel.” (Id. at p. 338 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 281-282].) The court emphasized the imposition of a “direct” burden on travel: “Obviously, durational residence laws single out the class of bona fide state and county residents who have recently exercised this constitutionally protected right, and penalize such travelers directly.” (Ibid.) It also took care to point out, as it had in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. 618, 638, fn. 21 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 617 ]), that a law | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Kaisergreen2 sentences1974(See People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 821 [ 178 P.2d 761 ]; see also Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471, 474-475 [ 89 L.Ed. 398, 401-402 , 65 S.Ct. 363 ].) “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 76 [ 86 L.Ed. 680, 702 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ].) The rule presuming prejudice particularly requires application in the instant case; it would be futile for us to attempt to measure prejudice on the basis of an arg 1974(See People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 821 [ 178 P.2d 761 ]; see also Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471, 474-475 [ 89 L.Ed. 398, 401-402 , 65 S.Ct. 363 ].) “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 76 [ 86 L.Ed. 680, 702 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ].) The rule presuming prejudice particularly requires application in the instant case; it would be futile for us to attempt to measure prejudice on the basis of an arg | 1 | 1 |
Glasser v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1974(See People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 821 [ 178 P.2d 761 ]; see also Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471, 474-475 [ 89 L.Ed. 398, 401-402 , 65 S.Ct. 363 ].) “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 76 [ 86 L.Ed. 680, 702 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ].) The rule presuming prejudice particularly requires application in the instant case; it would be futile for us to attempt to measure prejudice on the basis of an arg 1974(See People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 821 [ 178 P.2d 761 ]; see also Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471, 474-475 [ 89 L.Ed. 398, 401-402 , 65 S.Ct. 363 ].) “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 76 [ 86 L.Ed. 680, 702 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ].) The rule presuming prejudice particularly requires application in the instant case; it would be futile for us to attempt to measure prejudice on the basis of an arg | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chessergreen2 sentences1974(See People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 821 [ 178 P.2d 761 ]; see also Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471, 474-475 [ 89 L.Ed. 398, 401-402 , 65 S.Ct. 363 ].) “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 76 [ 86 L.Ed. 680, 702 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ].) The rule presuming prejudice particularly requires application in the instant case; it would be futile for us to attempt to measure prejudice on the basis of an arg 1974(See People v. Chesser (1947) 29 Cal.2d 815, 821 [ 178 P.2d 761 ]; see also Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471, 474-475 [ 89 L.Ed. 398, 401-402 , 65 S.Ct. 363 ].) “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.” (Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 76 [ 86 L.Ed. 680, 702 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ].) The rule presuming prejudice particularly requires application in the instant case; it would be futile for us to attempt to measure prejudice on the basis of an arg | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orange County Social Services Agency v. M.C.
green
2 sentences2020(Compare, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.) [substantial evidence]; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [abuse of discretion]; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 , 530- 531 [substantial evidence review as to whether beneficial parent-child relationship exists and abuse of discretion review as to whether that 4 relationship provides a compelling reason to apply exception]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 .) The “practical differences” between these standards are not significant. 2014(In re Bailey J.[, supra,] 189 Cal.App.4th [at pp.], 1314-1315.) The Bailey J. court observed that the juvenile court’s decision whether an adoption exception applies involves two component determinations. ‘Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling 13 relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination.’ (Id. at p. 1314.) The second determination in the exception analysis is whether the exi | 2 | 2014–2020 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.