Crawford factors in Michigan

1987The Crawford factors, which have often been repeated by this Court, are as follows: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that [there is] danger that the jury will consider the defendant a "bad man” or infer that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime, and therefore create prejudice which outweighs the probative value on the issue of credibility?), and (3) the ef

1987The Crawford factors, which have often been repeated by this Court, are as follows: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that [there is] danger that the jury will consider the defendant a "bad man” or infer that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime, and therefore create prejudice which outweighs the probative value on the issue of credibility?), and (3) the ef

1980It is not necessary to a decision in this case to determine whether the record must reflect the trial court’s balancing of the Crawford factors, but at a minimum the record must affirmatively show that the trial court was aware of those factors and did consider them, People v Joyner, 93 Mich App 554 ; 287 NW2d 286 (1979), People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196, 204 ; 282 NW2d 280 (1979) (D.

1980It is not necessary to a decision in this case to determine whether the record must reflect the trial court’s balancing of the Crawford factors, but at a minimum the record must affirmatively show that the trial court was aware of those factors and did consider them, People v Joyner, 93 Mich App 554 ; 287 NW2d 286 (1979), People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196, 204 ; 282 NW2d 280 (1979) (D.

1982People v Love, 91 Mich App 495 ; 283 NW2d 781 (1979), People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196 ; 282 NW2d 280 (1979), People v Wakeford, 94 Mich App 249 ; 288 NW2d 381 (1979).

1982People v Love, 91 Mich App 495 ; 283 NW2d 781 (1979), People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196 ; 282 NW2d 280 (1979), People v Wakeford, 94 Mich App 249 ; 288 NW2d 381 (1979).

1981People v Bennett, 85 Mich App 68, 72 ; 270 NW2d 709 (1978) , lv den 405 Mich 835 (1979), People v Featherstone, 93 Mich App 541, 544 ; 286 NW2d 907 (1979) .

1981People v Bennett, 85 Mich App 68, 72 ; 270 NW2d 709 (1978) , lv den 405 Mich 835 (1979), People v Featherstone, 93 Mich App 541, 544 ; 286 NW2d 907 (1979) .

1981People v Bennett, 85 Mich App 68, 72 ; 270 NW2d 709 (1978) , lv den 405 Mich 835 (1979), People v Featherstone, 93 Mich App 541, 544 ; 286 NW2d 907 (1979) .

1981People v Bennett, 85 Mich App 68, 72 ; 270 NW2d 709 (1978) , lv den 405 Mich 835 (1979), People v Featherstone, 93 Mich App 541, 544 ; 286 NW2d 907 (1979) .

2020McGonegal v McGonegal, 46 Mich 66, 67 ; 8 NW 724 (1881). -9- On this record, we are unable to determine what occurred, and the trial court’s rejection of Crawford’s motion for being void is unhelpful.

2020McGonegal v McGonegal, 46 Mich 66, 67 ; 8 NW 724 (1881). -9- On this record, we are unable to determine what occurred, and the trial court’s rejection of Crawford’s motion for being void is unhelpful.

2009Most importantly, see Davis, 547 US at 828-829 , in which the United States Supreme Court indicated that once the defendant stopped attacking the victim and “drove away from the premises,” “the emergency appears to have ended.” The Court said nothing at all that would remotely suggest that whether the victim was in need of medical attention was in any way relevant to whether there was an “ongoing emergency.” Instead, the Court said that once the criminal event was over, i.e., the defendant had stopped assaulting the victim and left the premises, the “ongoing emergency” was over at least for pu

2009Most importantly, see Davis, 547 US at 828-829 , in which the United States Supreme Court indicated that once the defendant stopped attacking the victim and “drove away from the premises,” “the emergency appears to have ended.” The Court said nothing at all that would remotely suggest that whether the victim was in need of medical attention was in any way relevant to whether there was an “ongoing emergency.” Instead, the Court said that once the criminal event was over, i.e., the defendant had stopped assaulting the victim and left the premises, the “ongoing emergency” was over at least for pu

2005Clearly, and regardless of whether the results in the above cases would satisfy the new Crawford standard, Woodford’s testimony would not pass constitutional muster under pre-Crawford standards. 13 See n 12. 14 See Powell, supra; Griffith, supra. 15 Because this standard imposes the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the claimed error did not affect the outcome, the harmless error standard is “more requiring” on the prosecutor than the Carines standard.

2005Clearly, and regardless of whether the results in the above cases would satisfy the new Crawford standard, Woodford’s testimony would not pass constitutional muster under pre-Crawford standards. 13 See n 12. 14 See Powell, supra; Griffith, supra. 15 Because this standard imposes the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the claimed error did not affect the outcome, the harmless error standard is “more requiring” on the prosecutor than the Carines standard.

2005Clearly, and regardless of whether the results in the above cases would satisfy the new Crawford standard, Woodford’s testimony would not pass constitutional muster under pre-Crawford standards. 13 See n 12. 14 See Powell, supra; Griffith, supra. 15 Because this standard imposes the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the claimed error did not affect the outcome, the harmless error standard is “more requiring” on the prosecutor than the Carines standard.

2005Clearly, and regardless of whether the results in the above cases would satisfy the new Crawford standard, Woodford’s testimony would not pass constitutional muster under pre-Crawford standards. 13 See n 12. 14 See Powell, supra; Griffith, supra. 15 Because this standard imposes the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the claimed error did not affect the outcome, the harmless error standard is “more requiring” on the prosecutor than the Carines standard.

1982People v Love, 91 Mich App 495 ; 283 NW2d 781 (1979), People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196 ; 282 NW2d 280 (1979), People v Wakeford, 94 Mich App 249 ; 288 NW2d 381 (1979).

1982People v Love, 91 Mich App 495 ; 283 NW2d 781 (1979), People v Roberson, 90 Mich App 196 ; 282 NW2d 280 (1979), People v Wakeford, 94 Mich App 249 ; 288 NW2d 381 (1979).

1982In People v Girard, 96 Mich App 594 ; 293 NW2d 639 (1980), involving a different problem with the jury instructions on insanity, we declined to apply the Crawford analysis, supra, and reversed despite the lack of an objection.

1982In People v Girard, 96 Mich App 594 ; 293 NW2d 639 (1980), involving a different problem with the jury instructions on insanity, we declined to apply the Crawford analysis, supra, and reversed despite the lack of an objection.

1982In the instant case under Roberson, supra, the *165 trial court committed no error as it recognized and exercised its discretion, while under Dyson, supra, the trial court would have committed error as there was no discussion of the Crawford factors unless such error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

1982In the instant case under Roberson, supra, the *165 trial court committed no error as it recognized and exercised its discretion, while under Dyson, supra, the trial court would have committed error as there was no discussion of the Crawford factors unless such error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

1981People v Bennett, 85 Mich App 68, 72 ; 270 NW2d 709 (1978) , lv den 405 Mich 835 (1979), People v Featherstone, 93 Mich App 541, 544 ; 286 NW2d 907 , (1979), People v Henry, 101 Mich App 585 ; 300 NW2d 639 (1980).

1981People v Bennett, 85 Mich App 68, 72 ; 270 NW2d 709 (1978) , lv den 405 Mich 835 (1979), People v Featherstone, 93 Mich App 541, 544 ; 286 NW2d 907 , (1979), People v Henry, 101 Mich App 585 ; 300 NW2d 639 (1980).

1980See, People v Farrar, [ 36 Mich App 294 ; 193 NW2d 363 (1971)], People v McCartney, [ 60 Mich App 620 ; 231 NW2d 472 (1975)].” The record in this case leaves no doubt that the trial judge was aware that he had discretion to either admit or deny the admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction; also, he was not unaware of the Crawford criteria because defense counsel had argued for exclusion on the basis of the Crawford factors.

1980See, People v Farrar, [ 36 Mich App 294 ; 193 NW2d 363 (1971)], People v McCartney, [ 60 Mich App 620 ; 231 NW2d 472 (1975)].” The record in this case leaves no doubt that the trial judge was aware that he had discretion to either admit or deny the admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction; also, he was not unaware of the Crawford criteria because defense counsel had argued for exclusion on the basis of the Crawford factors.