Crawford claim in Connecticut

2021In State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403 , 660 A.2d 337 (1995), we explained that ‘‘satisfie[d]’’ is the appropriate term to describe the state’s meeting such obligation under § 54-193 (b) and that ‘‘[o]nly § 54-193 (c) specifically concerns the tolling of the statute of limitations.’’ Id., 413 n.8. 7 Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and Crawford had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the warrant was not served with due diligence, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Crawford’s motion to dismiss.

2021In State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403 , 660 A.2d 337 (1995), we explained that ‘‘satisfie[d]’’ is the appropriate term to describe the state’s meeting such obligation under § 54-193 (b) and that ‘‘[o]nly § 54-193 (c) specifically concerns the tolling of the statute of limitations.’’ Id., 413 n.8. 7 Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and Crawford had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the warrant was not served with due diligence, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Crawford’s motion to dismiss.

2025Do you think that the record would have been sufficient for [the Appellate Court to review] a Crawford claim pursuant to [State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)]? ‘‘[Stevenson]: . . .

2025Do you think that the record would have been sufficient for [the Appellate Court to review] a Crawford claim pursuant to [State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015)]? ‘‘[Stevenson]: . . .

2019See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 772 F.3d 1161 , 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2014) (court determined that there was Crawford violation when postal inspector testified that postal supervisor provided inspector with tracking number and mailing information on package, which was used to prove that it was same package that defendant had mailed earlier that day, when supervisor would have understood that purpose of inquiry was investigative and supervisor’s statement reported past event); United States v. Bustamante, 687 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2012) (court determined that there was Crawford viola- tion

2019See, e.g., United States v. Brooks , 772 F.3d 1161 , 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2014) (court determined that there was Crawford violation when postal inspector testified that postal supervisor provided inspector with tracking number and mailing information on package, which was used to prove that it was same package that defendant had mailed earlier that day, when supervisor would have understood that purpose of inquiry was investigative and supervisor's statement reported past event); United States v. Bustamante , 687 F.3d 1190 , 1194 (9th Cir. 2012) (court determined that there was Crawford violation

2025The second habeas court concluded that it ‘‘was rea- sonable under the circumstances of this case for Steven- son to not seek Golding review of a Crawford claim, a type of review still not approved by the Supreme Court.’’ In reaching that conclusion, the court failed to recognize that, in State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 167 , Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction 874 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 , 126 S. Ct. 2981 , 165 L.

2025The second habeas court concluded that it ‘‘was rea- sonable under the circumstances of this case for Steven- son to not seek Golding review of a Crawford claim, a type of review still not approved by the Supreme Court.’’ In reaching that conclusion, the court failed to recognize that, in State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 167 , Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction 874 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 , 126 S. Ct. 2981 , 165 L.

2025The second habeas court concluded that it ‘‘was rea- sonable under the circumstances of this case for Steven- son to not seek Golding review of a Crawford claim, a type of review still not approved by the Supreme Court.’’ In reaching that conclusion, the court failed to recognize that, in State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 167 , Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction 874 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 , 126 S. Ct. 2981 , 165 L.

2025The second habeas court concluded that it ‘‘was rea- sonable under the circumstances of this case for Steven- son to not seek Golding review of a Crawford claim, a type of review still not approved by the Supreme Court.’’ In reaching that conclusion, the court failed to recognize that, in State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 167 , Page 30 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 32 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction 874 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 , 126 S. Ct. 2981 , 165 L.

2025This court concluded that B did not render ineffective assistance by not raising the Crawford claim as to S because, although S should have known that she could have raised the unpreserved Crawford claim on direct appeal in light of State v. Greene ( 274 Conn. 134 ), which had adjudicated an unpre- served Crawford claim several months before S filed her appellate brief, the habeas court properly concluded that any improper admission of M’s statements constituted harmless error, as M’s statements were unnecessary and cumulative of other independent evidence of the petitioner’s guilt, and, becau

2025This court concluded that B did not render ineffective assistance by not raising the Crawford claim as to S because, although S should have known that she could have raised the unpreserved Crawford claim on direct appeal in light of State v. Greene ( 274 Conn. 134 ), which had adjudicated an unpre- served Crawford claim several months before S filed her appellate brief, the habeas court properly concluded that any improper admission of M’s statements constituted harmless error, as M’s statements were unnecessary and cumulative of other independent evidence of the petitioner’s guilt, and, becau

2025B did not render ineffective assistance by failing to claim that R had per- formed deficiently in making a tactical decision at trial not to assert that the state violated the petitioner’s right to counsel under Massiah v. United States ( 377 U.S. 201 ) by using M to elicit incriminating statements about the petitioner, as it was M who had initiated contact with the state, and the 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction state never asked M to collect information about the petitioner or promised or offered M any benefit for doing so.

2025B did not render ineffective assistance by failing to claim that R had per- formed deficiently in making a tactical decision at trial not to assert that the state violated the petitioner’s right to counsel under Massiah v. United States ( 377 U.S. 201 ) by using M to elicit incriminating statements about the petitioner, as it was M who had initiated contact with the state, and the 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3 Santaniello v. Commissioner of Correction state never asked M to collect information about the petitioner or promised or offered M any benefit for doing so.

2025Our analysis is guided by well established principles. ‘‘[The Golding doctrine] permits a [petitioner] to prevail 9 Both the habeas court and the respondent rely on footnote 8 in State v. Johnson, supra, 345 Conn. 174 , in positing that the question of whether Golding applied to a Crawford claim was still uncertain.

2025Our analysis is guided by well established principles. ‘‘[The Golding doctrine] permits a [petitioner] to prevail 9 Both the habeas court and the respondent rely on footnote 8 in State v. Johnson, supra, 345 Conn. 174 , in positing that the question of whether Golding applied to a Crawford claim was still uncertain.

2017Defense counsel responded that Depina's statements were not admissible as dual inculpatory statements because they were not against Depina's penal interest and did not meet the second prong of Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). 2 In fact, defense counsel stated that "[t]his is not a Crawford issue." 3 The court determined that Depina's statements to Rasuk and Angelo were admissible as dual inculpatory statements, and that admission of th

2017Defense counsel responded that Depina's statements were not admissible as dual inculpatory statements because they were not against Depina's penal interest and did not meet the second prong of Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 , 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). 2 In fact, defense counsel stated that "[t]his is not a Crawford issue." 3 The court determined that Depina's statements to Rasuk and Angelo were admissible as dual inculpatory statements, and that admission of th

2015We conclude that the admission of the victim’s phone records into evidence did not implicate a sixth amend- ment right and, thus, the defendant’s claim fails under Golding. ‘‘Answering the threshold question in a Crawford analysis—whether the statements in question were tes- timonial in nature—also answers whether the defen- dant has met the burden presented under Golding’s second prong, which requires a claim of constitutional magnitude.’’ State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455, 469 , 59 A.3d 320 (2013), aff’d, 314 Conn. 410 , 102 A.3d 694 (2014). ‘‘In Crawford v. Washington, [supra, 541 U.S. 36

2015We conclude that the admission of the victim’s phone records into evidence did not implicate a sixth amend- ment right and, thus, the defendant’s claim fails under Golding. ‘‘Answering the threshold question in a Crawford analysis—whether the statements in question were tes- timonial in nature—also answers whether the defen- dant has met the burden presented under Golding’s second prong, which requires a claim of constitutional magnitude.’’ State v. Jones, 140 Conn. App. 455, 469 , 59 A.3d 320 (2013), aff’d, 314 Conn. 410 , 102 A.3d 694 (2014). ‘‘In Crawford v. Washington, [supra, 541 U.S. 36

2015Id., 621 .

2015Id., 621 .

2013See State v. Jennings, 125 Conn. App. 801, 813 , 9 A.3d 446 (2011) (“the alleged violation fails under the second prong of Golding and is not reviewable . . . because ... [it did not concern a] testimonial hearsay statement as defined in Crawford”); State v. Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 598-99 , 11 A.3d 1086 (2010) (concluding that defendant’s unpreserved Crawford claim failed to meet second prong of Golding because declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910 , 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).

2013See State v. Jennings, 125 Conn. App. 801, 813 , 9 A.3d 446 (2011) (“the alleged violation fails under the second prong of Golding and is not reviewable . . . because ... [it did not concern a] testimonial hearsay statement as defined in Crawford”); State v. Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 598-99 , 11 A.3d 1086 (2010) (concluding that defendant’s unpreserved Crawford claim failed to meet second prong of Golding because declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910 , 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).

2013See State v. Jennings, 125 Conn. App. 801, 813 , 9 A.3d 446 (2011) (“the alleged violation fails under the second prong of Golding and is not reviewable . . . because ... [it did not concern a] testimonial hearsay statement as defined in Crawford”); State v. Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 598-99 , 11 A.3d 1086 (2010) (concluding that defendant’s unpreserved Crawford claim failed to meet second prong of Golding because declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910 , 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).

2013See State v. Jennings, 125 Conn. App. 801, 813 , 9 A.3d 446 (2011) (“the alleged violation fails under the second prong of Golding and is not reviewable . . . because ... [it did not concern a] testimonial hearsay statement as defined in Crawford”); State v. Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 598-99 , 11 A.3d 1086 (2010) (concluding that defendant’s unpreserved Crawford claim failed to meet second prong of Golding because declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910 , 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).

2008Cf. State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 481 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007) (concluding that there was waiver wherein defense counsel expressly stated that he was satisfied with challenged jury instruction).

2008Cf. State v. Fabricatore, 281 Conn. 469, 481 , 915 A.2d 872 (2007) (concluding that there was waiver wherein defense counsel expressly stated that he was satisfied with challenged jury instruction).

2004In response, the court stated: “There’s a Crawford motion, right?,” a reference to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443 , 521 A.2d 1034 (1987).

2004In response, the court stated: “There’s a Crawford motion, right?,” a reference to our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443 , 521 A.2d 1034 (1987).

2004The defendant responded that he did not know if the court called the motion a “Crawford motion,” but that he was relying on Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. 647 , and State v. Cordova, supra, 38 Conn. Sup. 377 .

2004The defendant responded that he did not know if the court called the motion a “Crawford motion,” but that he was relying on Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. 647 , and State v. Cordova, supra, 38 Conn. Sup. 377 .

2004The defendant responded that he did not know if the court called the motion a “Crawford motion,” but that he was relying on Doggett v. United States, supra, 505 U.S. 647 , and State v. Cordova, supra, 38 Conn. Sup. 377 .