Crawford rule in California

2026(People v. Rangel (2016) 51 PEOPLE v. BANKSTON Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215 (Rangel); see ibid. [“in a case tried before Crawford [was decided], a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial”].) We therefore turn to the merits.

2026(People v. Rangel (2016) 51 PEOPLE v. BANKSTON Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215 (Rangel); see ibid. [“in a case tried before Crawford [was decided], a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial”].) We therefore turn to the merits.

2024Code, § 1360, subd. (a)(1)–(a)(3)(A).) However, a statement admitted under section 1360 is still subject to the rule of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 : “[R]egardless of whether or not the statement falls within a state-law hearsay exception or bears indicia of reliability,” if the “hearsay statement is ‘testimonial,’ the [C]onfrontation [C]lause bars the prosecution from using it against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is available to testify at trial, or the defendant had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (People v. Sisavath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1

2024Code, § 1360, subd. (a)(1)–(a)(3)(A).) However, a statement admitted under section 1360 is still subject to the rule of Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 : “[R]egardless of whether or not the statement falls within a state-law hearsay exception or bears indicia of reliability,” if the “hearsay statement is ‘testimonial,’ the [C]onfrontation [C]lause bars the prosecution from using it against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is available to testify at trial, or the defendant had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (People v. Sisavath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1

2025Legal Principles “‘Crawford held that, in general, admission of “testimonial” statements of a witness who was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897 , 1021, quoting People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1214 .) “‘Throughout its evolution of the Crawford doctrine, the high court has offered various formulations of what makes a statement testimonial but has yet to provide a definition of

2025Legal Principles “‘Crawford held that, in general, admission of “testimonial” statements of a witness who was not subject to cross-examination at trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’” (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897 , 1021, quoting People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1214 .) “‘Throughout its evolution of the Crawford doctrine, the high court has offered various formulations of what makes a statement testimonial but has yet to provide a definition of

2020(See Whorton, supra, 549 U.S. 406 .) Applying Teague, the Court believed that the Crawford rule, which curtailed the use of “testimonial” hearsay, was not one “ ‘ “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 420.) Contrasting the Crawford rule with the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 , the Court explained: “The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the factfinding process is far less direct and profound.” (Whorton, at p. 419, italics added.) It

2020(See Whorton, supra, 549 U.S. 406 .) Applying Teague, the Court believed that the Crawford rule, which curtailed the use of “testimonial” hearsay, was not one “ ‘ “without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 420.) Contrasting the Crawford rule with the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 , the Court explained: “The Crawford rule is much more limited in scope, and the relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the factfinding process is far less direct and profound.” (Whorton, at p. 419, italics added.) It

2019(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215 [concluding that “in a case 17 PEOPLE v. RHOADES Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. tried before Crawford, a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial”]; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288, fn. 8 [“[B]ecause defendant’s counsel could not have anticipated Crawford’s sweeping changes to federal confrontation clause case law, he did not forfeit this claim by failing to object to the admission of [the] statements on federal constitutional grounds.”].) We further agree with b

2019(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215 [concluding that “in a case 17 PEOPLE v. RHOADES Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. tried before Crawford, a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial”]; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288, fn. 8 [“[B]ecause defendant’s counsel could not have anticipated Crawford’s sweeping changes to federal confrontation clause case law, he did not forfeit this claim by failing to object to the admission of [the] statements on federal constitutional grounds.”].) We further agree with b

2022(See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 652 [finding alleged Crawford error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman in light of other overwhelming circumstantial evidence]; People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 153 , 196–197 [finding Crawford error harmless where other evidence overwhelmingly proved facts at issue].) The victim’s body was found in a small bedroom in defendant’s parents’ house where defendant stayed.

2020The admission of conviction records, for example, may have violated the confrontation clause to the extent they were offered to prove anything other than the fact of each conviction. ( Garcia, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 171-172 [under Kirby v. United States (1899) 174 U.S. 47 , “records of convictions used to prove facts other than the fact of conviction itself are testimonial”].) But even assuming federal constitutional error was involved, we find any Crawford error that occurred in this trial harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ) in light of the wealth of

2024(See Cage, at p. 981 [“the confrontation clause is concerned solely with hearsay statements that are testimonial”], citing Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 , 823–825.) Inter alia, the colorful and informal remarks between the two suspects shouted through the interview room walls are not sufficiently formal to meet that prong of the Crawford test.

2024(See Cage, at p. 981 [“the confrontation clause is concerned solely with hearsay statements that are testimonial”], citing Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 , 823–825.) Inter alia, the colorful and informal remarks between the two suspects shouted through the interview room walls are not sufficiently formal to meet that prong of the Crawford test.

2015Defendant argues that he should still be excused from the objection requirement because some of Crawford’s progeny postdated the trial, including Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 [ 174 L.Ed.2d 314 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 ], the first high court opinion involving forensic testing.

2015Defendant argues that he should still be excused from the objection requirement because some of Crawford’s progeny postdated the trial, including Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305 [ 174 L.Ed.2d 314 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 ], the first high court opinion involving forensic testing.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691 [failure to raise objection based on confrontation clause forfeited claim on appeal].) However, Crawford was decided while the penalty phase jury was deliberating in defendant’s case.27 We have previously concluded “that in a case tried before Crawford, a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by 27 Crawford was decided on March 8, 2004.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691 [failure to raise objection based on confrontation clause forfeited claim on appeal].) However, Crawford was decided while the penalty phase jury was deliberating in defendant’s case.27 We have previously concluded “that in a case tried before Crawford, a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by 27 Crawford was decided on March 8, 2004.

2024(People v. Rincon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 738, 754 .) “‘Whether a challenged statement is hearsay is always the threshold question’ in analysis of a Crawford claim.” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102 , 162.) If the statement is hearsay but subject to an exception, courts must additionally determine whether the hearsay is “testimonial.” (See Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 , 823–829; People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 981 .) “Testimonial statements are those made primarily to memorialize facts relating to past criminal activity, which could be used like trial testimony.” (People

2024(People v. Rincon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 738, 754 .) “‘Whether a challenged statement is hearsay is always the threshold question’ in analysis of a Crawford claim.” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102 , 162.) If the statement is hearsay but subject to an exception, courts must additionally determine whether the hearsay is “testimonial.” (See Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813 , 823–829; People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 981 .) “Testimonial statements are those made primarily to memorialize facts relating to past criminal activity, which could be used like trial testimony.” (People

2018As the court explained ... [citation], '[b]ecause Crawford "was a dramatic departure *922 from prior confrontation clause case law," a defendant's failure to raise a Crawford claim in a pre- Crawford trial "is excusable because defense counsel could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this change in the law." ' [Citations.] While Sanchez might not have been as dramatic a departure from prior law as Crawford , it certainly worked a significant change." ( Jeffrey G. , supra , 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 507-508, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ; see also People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260 , 263, 2

2018As the court explained ... [citation], '[b]ecause Crawford "was a dramatic departure *922 from prior confrontation clause case law," a defendant's failure to raise a Crawford claim in a pre- Crawford trial "is excusable because defense counsel could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this change in the law." ' [Citations.] While Sanchez might not have been as dramatic a departure from prior law as Crawford , it certainly worked a significant change." ( Jeffrey G. , supra , 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 507-508, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ; see also People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260 , 263, 2

2017As the court explained in People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113 , 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363 , 391, footnote 3, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 328 , 349 P.3d 1028 , "[b]ecause Crawford 'was a dramatic departure from prior confrontation clause case law,' a defendant's failure to raise a Crawford claim in a pre- Crawford trial 'is excusable because defense counsel could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this change in the law.' " ( Banks , at p. 1167, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ; see similarly People v. Harri

2017As the court explained in People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113 , 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363 , 391, footnote 3, 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 328 , 349 P.3d 1028 , "[b]ecause Crawford 'was a dramatic departure from prior confrontation clause case law,' a defendant's failure to raise a Crawford claim in a pre- Crawford trial 'is excusable because defense counsel could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate this change in the law.' " ( Banks , at p. 1167, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ; see similarly People v. Harri

2026(People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 602 ; see People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1215 .) Because Barrera’s trial occurred several years before Crawford was decided, he has not forfeited the claim.

2025First, “the out-of-court statement must have been made with some degree of formality or solemnity.” [Citation.] Second, the primary purpose of the statement must “pertain[] in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603 , quoting People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569 , 581–582.) More specifically, the primary purpose test asks whether the statements at issue ‘are given in the course of an interrogation or other conversation whose “‘primary purpose … is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”’

2016(People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 275 [Crawford error 15 assessed to see whether it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1308 [error under hearsay rule assessed to see whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result].) The admission of evidence regarding the identities of Jose and “Junior” as well as Salvador Andrade’s gang affiliation are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because what matters to the charged offenses was defendant’s efforts to locate and persuade the victims of his crimes, not the real names or affiliations

2016(People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 275 [Crawford error 15 assessed to see whether it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1308 [error under hearsay rule assessed to see whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result].) The admission of evidence regarding the identities of Jose and “Junior” as well as Salvador Andrade’s gang affiliation are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because what matters to the charged offenses was defendant’s efforts to locate and persuade the victims of his crimes, not the real names or affiliations

2022Second, the statement is testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 619 .) In People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), our Supreme Court considered “the degree to which the Crawford rule limits an expert witness from relating case-specific hearsay content in explaining the basis for his opinion.” (Id. at p. 670.) Sanchez reasserted the historical distinction between case-specific hearsay and the general hearsay relied upon by experts to detail general knowledge in the expert’s field of expertise

2022Second, the statement is testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” (People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 619 .) In People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez), our Supreme Court considered “the degree to which the Crawford rule limits an expert witness from relating case-specific hearsay content in explaining the basis for his opinion.” (Id. at p. 670.) Sanchez reasserted the historical distinction between case-specific hearsay and the general hearsay relied upon by experts to detail general knowledge in the expert’s field of expertise

2020The Attorney General suggests we have held otherwise in People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182 and Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415 , where we reasoned that “[t]he same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ ” (Stevens, at p. 199; accord, Lewis, at p. 506.) But as with Bruton and Richardson, Stevens and Lewis have no application here: Both concerned the admission of a codefendant’s statement at a joint trial before a single jury.

2017We need not decide this question, however, since “Crawford addressed the introduction of testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant. [Gran’s] redacted statement contained no evidence against defendant. [Citation.] Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause. [Citations.] The same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 199 ; see U.S. v. Lung Fong Chen, supra, 393 F.3d at p. 150 .) Defendant disputes this conclusion.

2018(Rangel, at pp. 1215-1216, citing People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288, fn. 8 , & Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) The Rangel court concluded its discussion on the doctrine of forfeiture by emphasizing that “the relevant question is whether requiring . . . an objection ‘ “ ‘ “would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law.” ’ ” ’ ” (Rangel, at p. 1217, italics added.) It then added, “[b]ecause that standard is satisfied here, we conclude that defendant has not forfeited his Crawford claim.” (Rangel, at p. 1217, italics added.) Here,

2018(Rangel, at pp. 1215-1216, citing People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1288, fn. 8 , & Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) The Rangel court concluded its discussion on the doctrine of forfeiture by emphasizing that “the relevant question is whether requiring . . . an objection ‘ “ ‘ “would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law.” ’ ” ’ ” (Rangel, at p. 1217, italics added.) It then added, “[b]ecause that standard is satisfied here, we conclude that defendant has not forfeited his Crawford claim.” (Rangel, at p. 1217, italics added.) Here,

2018We further conclude that defendant has not met his burden in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel because he has not established that the failure to object to background hearsay was unreasonable, and, with respect to both the background hearsay and the case-specific testimonial hearsay that is the focus of his confrontation clause claim, he has failed to establish prejudice under the test in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] ( Strickland ).

2018We further conclude that defendant has not met his burden in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel because he has not established that the failure to object to background hearsay was unreasonable, and, with respect to both the background hearsay and the case-specific testimonial hearsay that is the focus of his confrontation clause claim, he has failed to establish prejudice under the test in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ] ( Strickland ).

2022(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 662 ; see People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636 , 672–673; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 711, fn. 25 .)” (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 790 .) “The high court has never suggested that the Crawford rule bars admission of a 8 Because we conclude there is no basis for any inference that defendant’s silence was based upon his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, we do not address defendant’s separate claim that the trial court erred in denying trial counsel’s request to modify the CALCRIM No. 357 instruction to include defendant’s exercise

2022(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 662 ; see People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636 , 672–673; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 711, fn. 25 .)” (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 790 .) “The high court has never suggested that the Crawford rule bars admission of a 8 Because we conclude there is no basis for any inference that defendant’s silence was based upon his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, we do not address defendant’s separate claim that the trial court erred in denying trial counsel’s request to modify the CALCRIM No. 357 instruction to include defendant’s exercise

2018"But because defendant's trial occurred before the decision in Crawford , he has not forfeited his Crawford challenge." ( People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 , 563, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 , 372 P.3d 811 , citing People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 , 1215, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 367 P.3d 649 [clarifying that "in a case tried before Crawford , a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial"].) The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused s

2018"But because defendant's trial occurred before the decision in Crawford , he has not forfeited his Crawford challenge." ( People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 , 563, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 , 372 P.3d 811 , citing People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 , 1215, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 367 P.3d 649 [clarifying that "in a case tried before Crawford , a defendant does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise a confrontation clause objection at trial"].) The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused s

2017We need not decide this question, however, since “Crawford addressed the introduction of testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant. [Gran’s] redacted statement contained no evidence against defendant. [Citation.] Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause. [Citations.] The same redaction that ‘prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 199 ; see U.S. v. Lung Fong Chen, supra, 393 F.3d at p. 150 .) Defendant disputes this conclusion.

2016(People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 199 [“The same redaction that ‘prevent[ed] Bruton error also . . . 23 prevent[ed] Crawford error.’”]; United States v. Chen (2d Cir. 2004) 393 F.3d 139, 150 .) Thus, the statements were not grounds for separate trials.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214 [ 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 324 P.3d 88 ] [defendant forfeited Crawford challenge in case tried before Crawford by failing to object on confrontation grounds, but Crawford challenge lacked merit in any event]; People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1065 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 570 , 301 P.3d 1177 ] [same]; People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 801, fn. 21 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 , 281 P.3d 1 ] [same]; Riccardi, at pp. 826-827, fn. 33 [same]; People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 264 P.3d 292 ] (Dement) [same]

2016(See, e.g., People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214 [ 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 324 P.3d 88 ] [defendant forfeited Crawford challenge in case tried before Crawford by failing to object on confrontation grounds, but Crawford challenge lacked merit in any event]; People v. Lopez (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1028, 1065 [ 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 570 , 301 P.3d 1177 ] [same]; People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 801, fn. 21 [ 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 84 , 281 P.3d 1 ] [same]; Riccardi, at pp. 826-827, fn. 33 [same]; People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 22-23 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 , 264 P.3d 292 ] (Dement) [same]

2007The Court of Appeal concluded that, because "[probation revocation proceedings are not `criminal prosecutions' to which the Sixth Amendment applies ..., Crawford's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment does not govern probation revocation proceedings." ( Id. at p. 1411, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 .) Noting, however, that "Sixth Amendment cases ... may provide helpful examples in determining the scope of the more limited right of confrontation held by probationers under the due process clause," the court addressed and rejected defendant's Crawford claim. ( Id. at p. 1412, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 .) "...

2007(Johnson, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at 1411.) Crawford’s analysis is, however, not irrelevant.

2021The confrontation clause of “the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of a witness’s ‘testimonial’ out-of-court statements offered for their truth unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 297 , citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 59–60 (Crawford).) “‘Throughout its evolution of the Crawford doctrine, the high court has offered various formulations of what makes a statement testimonial but has yet to provide a definition of that term of art upon which a majority of justices agree.’” ( Gom

2021The confrontation clause of “the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of a witness’s ‘testimonial’ out-of-court statements offered for their truth unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” (Gomez, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 297 , citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 59–60 (Crawford).) “‘Throughout its evolution of the Crawford doctrine, the high court has offered various formulations of what makes a statement testimonial but has yet to provide a definition of that term of art upon which a majority of justices agree.’” ( Gom

2025First, “the out-of-court statement must have been made with some degree of formality or solemnity.” [Citation.] Second, the primary purpose of the statement must “pertain[] in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603 , quoting People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569 , 581–582.) More specifically, the primary purpose test asks whether the statements at issue ‘are given in the course of an interrogation or other conversation whose “‘primary purpose … is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”’

2025First, “the out-of-court statement must have been made with some degree of formality or solemnity.” [Citation.] Second, the primary purpose of the statement must “pertain[] in some fashion to a criminal prosecution.” [Citations.]’ (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603 , quoting People v. Lopez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 569 , 581–582.) More specifically, the primary purpose test asks whether the statements at issue ‘are given in the course of an interrogation or other conversation whose “‘primary purpose … is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”’