guarantee immunity in New Jersey

2014In these situations, there must be "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ 116 N.J. at 429 -30 (quoting W.

2005Therefore, "there must be `an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.'" Id. at 429-30 , 561 A .2d 1122 (citation omitted).

2020In such "special circumstances," "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress . . . serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem.

2020In such "special circumstances," "an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress . . . serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem.

2011Such an approach, in sum, would destroy “the balance that our cases, strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties,” by making it impossible for officials “reasonably [to] anticipate when them conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” Davis, supra, [468 U.S.] at 195[, 104 S.Ct. at 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 150 (1984).] [Id. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 530 .] The Court in Saucier reiterated, with approval, the necessity for a particularized analysis. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2

2011Such an approach, in sum, would destroy “the balance that our cases, strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of their duties,” by making it impossible for officials “reasonably [to] anticipate when them conduct may give rise to liability for damages.” Davis, supra, [468 U.S.] at 195[, 104 S.Ct. at 3019 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 150 (1984).] [Id. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 530 .] The Court in Saucier reiterated, with approval, the necessity for a particularized analysis. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2

2005The Supreme Court held that a duty of care arises when a defendant should have foreseen "`fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally constituted.'" *466 Id. at 429 , 561 A .2d 1122 (quoting Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 76 , 222 A. 2d 513 (1966)).

2005The Supreme Court held that a duty of care arises when a defendant should have foreseen "`fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally constituted.'" *466 Id. at 429 , 561 A .2d 1122 (quoting Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 76 , 222 A. 2d 513 (1966)).

2011In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ Id. at 429-30, 561 A. 2d 1122 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 365 , 544 A. 2d 857 (1988)).] If foreseeability of injury to a party is established, the court must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. see Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 485 [ 524 A. 2d 366 ] (1987) ("Whereas the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm are objectively determinable, the propriety of imposing a duty of care is not."); Kelly v. Gwin

2011In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ Id. at 429-30, 561 A. 2d 1122 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 365 , 544 A. 2d 857 (1988)).] If foreseeability of injury to a party is established, the court must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. see Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 485 [ 524 A. 2d 366 ] (1987) ("Whereas the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm are objectively determinable, the propriety of imposing a duty of care is not."); Kelly v. Gwin

2011In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ Id. at 429-30, 561 A. 2d 1122 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 365 , 544 A. 2d 857 (1988)).] If foreseeability of injury to a party is established, the court must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. see Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 485 [ 524 A. 2d 366 ] (1987) ("Whereas the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm are objectively determinable, the propriety of imposing a duty of care is not."); Kelly v. Gwin

2011In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ Id. at 429-30, 561 A. 2d 1122 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 365 , 544 A. 2d 857 (1988)).] If foreseeability of injury to a party is established, the court must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. see Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 485 [ 524 A. 2d 366 ] (1987) ("Whereas the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm are objectively determinable, the propriety of imposing a duty of care is not."); Kelly v. Gwin

2011In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ Id. at 429-30, 561 A. 2d 1122 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 365 , 544 A. 2d 857 (1988)).] If foreseeability of injury to a party is established, the court must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. see Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 485 [ 524 A. 2d 366 ] (1987) ("Whereas the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm are objectively determinable, the propriety of imposing a duty of care is not."); Kelly v. Gwin

2011In emotional distress cases, there has been "a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim." [ Id. at 429-30, 561 A. 2d 1122 (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 365 , 544 A. 2d 857 (1988)).] If foreseeability of injury to a party is established, the court must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. see Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 485 [ 524 A. 2d 366 ] (1987) ("Whereas the magnitude and likelihood of potential harm are objectively determinable, the propriety of imposing a duty of care is not."); Kelly v. Gwin

1989In emotional distress cases, there has been “a constant concern about the genuineness of the claim.” The progression has been from denying recovery unless the emotional distress is accompanied by physical impact, Eyrich for Eyrich v. Dam, 193 N.J.Super. 244, 252 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 97 N.J. 583 (1984), to permitting recovery if the emotional distress results in physical injury, Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 569 (1965).

1986E.g., Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90 (Sup.Ct. 1936).

1981They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states. [ 444 U.S. at 294 , 100 S.Ct. at 565 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 499 .] The Supreme Court focused upon one of the prime elements frequently invoked to vindicate jurisdiction, that of foreseeability.

1981They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective states. [ 444 U.S. at 294 , 100 S.Ct. at 565 , 62 L.Ed. 2d at 499 .] The Supreme Court focused upon one of the prime elements frequently invoked to vindicate jurisdiction, that of foreseeability.

1977Thus, the court is satisfied that if there is a common-law right to abate a nuisance, which unquestionably there is, and if that right is coupled with a guarantee of a hearing at some stage for the alleged victim, then certainly, in the context of this litigation, the concern by the city officials resulting in the abrupt closedown on December 9, 1976 more than satisfies that test, as set down in Gissen and Ajamian, supra .

1976The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise *554 out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to undue. [ 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. at 159 .] It is important, however, to pause momentarily at this point to note the caveat in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283 (1958): * * * But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrict

1976The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise *554 out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to undue. [ 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. at 159 .] It is important, however, to pause momentarily at this point to note the caveat in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 , 78 S.Ct. 1228 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283 (1958): * * * But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrict