opportunity to rebut presumption in New York

2013Furthermore, the trial court, upon finding that the plaintiff failed to timely file and provide the defendant with an expert’s report (see 22 NYCRR 202.16 [g]; CPLR 3101 [d]; Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26 [2012]), improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiffs expert from testifying at trial on the issue of the value of the property.

2013Furthermore, the trial court, upon finding that the plaintiff failed to timely file and provide the defendant with an expert’s report (see 22 NYCRR 202.16 [g]; CPLR 3101 [d]; Rivers v Birnbaum, 102 AD3d 26 [2012]), improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiffs expert from testifying at trial on the issue of the value of the property.

2019Petitioner was entitled to an informal hearing on the issue so that she could have an opportunity to rebut this presumption ( see id. ).

2006Inasmuch as the accusatory instrument, as noted prior hereto, contains factual allegations sufficient to establish reasonable cause that defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), the People are entitled to an opportunity to rebut the presumption, set forth in section 1195 (2) (c), at trial (People v Blair, 98 NY2d 722 [2002]).

2001If the evidence, considered most favorably to the defendant, reasonably supports a defense of justification, the trial court must give such an instruction to the jury (People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144-145 ), even if the request comes after summations and the court’s initial charge (CPL 300.10 [5]; People v Khan, 68 NY2d 921 ).

2001If the evidence, considered most favorably to the defendant, reasonably supports a defense of justification, the trial court must give such an instruction to the jury (People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 144-145 ), even if the request comes after summations and the court’s initial charge (CPL 300.10 [5]; People v Khan, 68 NY2d 921 ).

2000Respondent would then have the opportunity to rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence that it was not afforded a reasonable number of attempts to repair the alleged defects, or that the nonresidential defects which still remained following a reasonable number of attempts to repair did not “substantially impair [the] value” of the motor home (General Business Law § 198-a [c] [3] [i]; Matter of Walker [General Motors Corp.], 159 Misc 2d 651, 652 ).

1997Attorney Gen. of N. Y. v Moody, 511 US 1084 ), in this case the respondent never took advantage of that opportunity.

1997Although a respondent parent must be given the opportunity to rebut the presumption that the application of the child support guidelines results in the correct amount of child support to be awarded (see, 42 USC § 667 [b] [2]; Matter of Rose v Moody, 83 NY2d 65 , cert denied sub nom.

1989If any defendants succeed in rebutting this presumption, the liability shares of the remaining defendants who could not prove their actual market share are inflated, so that the plaintiff received a 100% recovery (id., at 605-606). 1 The market shares of defendants is a question of fact in each case, and the relevant market can be a particular pharmacy, or county, or State, or even the country, depending upon the circumstances the case presents (George v Parke-Davis, 107 Wash 2d 584, 733 P2d 507 ).

1977Even if the proof shows that the plaintiff and a man are living together, the wife should be given an opportunity to rebut the presumption which arises under such circumstances by affirmative proof (Stern v Stern, 88 Misc 2d 860 ).

1976(Cleveland Bd of Educ. v LaFleur; 414 US 632 ; Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 ; Vlandis v Kline, 412 US 441 .) It is true that LL-1 does operate on at least two presumptions which are not necessarily true in fact, to wit: (1) that all city employees earning over $25,000 occupy policymaking positions, and (2) that disclosure of each item of financial information called for by LL-1 serves to prevent conflicts of interests or the appearance thereof regardless of the nature of a particular employee’s official responsibilities.

1976(Cleveland Bd of Educ. v LaFleur; 414 US 632 ; Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 ; Vlandis v Kline, 412 US 441 .) It is true that LL-1 does operate on at least two presumptions which are not necessarily true in fact, to wit: (1) that all city employees earning over $25,000 occupy policymaking positions, and (2) that disclosure of each item of financial information called for by LL-1 serves to prevent conflicts of interests or the appearance thereof regardless of the nature of a particular employee’s official responsibilities.

1976(Cleveland Bd of Educ. v LaFleur; 414 US 632 ; Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 ; Vlandis v Kline, 412 US 441 .) It is true that LL-1 does operate on at least two presumptions which are not necessarily true in fact, to wit: (1) that all city employees earning over $25,000 occupy policymaking positions, and (2) that disclosure of each item of financial information called for by LL-1 serves to prevent conflicts of interests or the appearance thereof regardless of the nature of a particular employee’s official responsibilities.