Murray standard in Pennsylvania

2020Consequently, since this matter does not fall into the narrow subset of cases involving police conduct which amounts to “willful misconduct” or “malfeasance,” the Melendez requirements are inapplicable.16 Harkening back to the Murray standard, we must now determine “(1) whether the decision to seek a warrant was prompted by what was seen during the initial entry; and, (2) whether the magistrate was informed at all of the information.” Brundidge, 620 A.2d at 1119 ; accord Murray, 487 U.S. at 542 (“The ultimate question . . . is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely inde

2020Consequently, since this matter does not fall into the narrow subset of cases involving police conduct which amounts to “willful misconduct” or “malfeasance,” the Melendez requirements are inapplicable.16 Harkening back to the Murray standard, we must now determine “(1) whether the decision to seek a warrant was prompted by what was seen during the initial entry; and, (2) whether the magistrate was informed at all of the information.” Brundidge, 620 A.2d at 1119 ; accord Murray, 487 U.S. at 542 (“The ultimate question . . . is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely inde

2012Later that same year, though, in Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 , 637 A.2d 251 (1993), our Court considered whether the Murray test governed the application of the independent source doctrine under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2012Later that same year, though, in Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 , 637 A.2d 251 (1993), our Court considered whether the Murray test governed the application of the independent source doctrine under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2020The reason for Melendez and Mason’s departures from the Murray standard was grounded in this Court’s different cost-benefits approach to the exclusionary rule and did not rely on labels like “willful misconduct” or “malfeasance.” Police misconduct was certainly a reason to require “true independence,” but the Majority mistakenly reads Henderson to announce that misconduct is the only condition triggering the higher Article I, Section 8 analytical framework. [J-83-2019] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 22 Henderson denounced the Melendez prophylactic per se rule of always requiring “true independence” by

2020The Henderson Court elected to apply the federal Murray standard, which we declared “strikes the appropriate balance between privacy and law enforcement.” Id. at 805 .

2016Regarding Murray’s challenge to the verification attached to the Complaint, the panel concluded as follows: [T]he verification’s omission of all material requirements of Rule 1024(c) not only is deficient, but approaches the level of deficiency identified in [Atlantic Credit & Finance v.] Giuliana[, 829 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. 2003),] as perhaps not even warranting an opportunity to amend the pleading to correct the error, based upon the fact that no effort whatsoever was made to satisfy Rule 1024(c).

2016Regarding Murray’s challenge to the verification attached to the Complaint, the panel concluded as follows: [T]he verification’s omission of all material requirements of Rule 1024(c) not only is deficient, but approaches the level of deficiency identified in [Atlantic Credit & Finance v.] Giuliana[, 829 A.2d 340 (Pa. Super. 2003),] as perhaps not even warranting an opportunity to amend the pleading to correct the error, based upon the fact that no effort whatsoever was made to satisfy Rule 1024(c).

2023“The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Id. (citation omitted). -5- As noted, Murray’s issue centers on appellate counsel’s actions after his judgment of sentence was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.

2022See Raven, supra at 1253 ; Perreault, supra at 558 .

2019In the instant matter, there is no dispute that BNY is the holder of the original note. -5- In that case, Murray challenged “the validity of the original verification of the [c]omplaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1024(c).” JP Morgan, 63 A.3d at 1269 .

2019See Rushing, 99 A.3d at 420-21 ; Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751 .

2018Our Court has recently confronted this exact question of waiver in another Risperdal case, *1249 Stange v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 179 A.3d 45 , 60-64, 2018 WL 316526 , at *11-*14 (Pa. Super. 2018). 7 In Stange , this Court determined that the Risperdal plaintiffs adequately preserved this issue, and addressed whether the law of Wisconsin-the plaintiff's home state in that case-should govern his punitive damages claim.

2018The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but ‘having stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.’ Farmer . . ., . . . 511 U.S. at 833 ; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago C[ty.] Dep[’t] of Soc[.] Serv[s.], 489 U.S. 189 , 199-200 . . . (1989) (‘When the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself

2018For these reasons, this Court overrules Respondents’ second Preliminary Objection with respect to Murray’s challenge to Hearing Examiner McKeown’s refusal to permit his witnesses to testify at the disciplinary hearing and sustains their second Preliminary Objection in all other respects. 14 Third Preliminary Objection Alleged Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Deliberate Indifference Respondents assert in their third Preliminary Objection that Murray failed to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment or deliberate indifference.14 This Court has explained: Although correctional institutions

2013In support of this proposition, the court cited Pa.R.C.P. 1141(a) and Newtown Village Partnership v. Kimmel, 424 Pa.Super. 53 , 621 A.2d 1036 (1993).

2013In support of this proposition, the court cited Pa.R.C.P. 1141(a) and Newtown Village Partnership v. Kimmel, 424 Pa.Super. 53 , 621 A.2d 1036 (1993).

2013A “real party in interest” is the person who has the power to discharge the claim upon which suit is brought and to control the prosecution of the action.” Clark v. Cambria County Bd. Of Assessment Appeals, 747 A.2d 1242 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 740 , 798 A.2d 1292 (2002).

1997Whitmyer, 668 A2d at 1116 ; see also, Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa.Super. 69, 75 , 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993) (En Banc) (Murray standard and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 standard are interchangeable, but “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect” is the “preferred ” standard so as to avoid any confusion which may be caused by using the term “probable cause” to describe police encounters with citizens which do not rise to the level of an arrest or a search), allocatur denied, 543 Pa. 729 , 673 A2d 335 (1996).