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17 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Callicott v. Callicottgreen2 sentences2006Cf. Callicott, 364 S.W.2d at 456-57 (trial court refused to let father make a bill of exception by having child testify). 2006But if a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to permit a child to testify in a custody proceeding, see Callicott, 364 S.W.2d at 457-58 , it only follows that a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to compel a child’s attendance to testify at a custody proceeding when the obvious effect of that refusal is to exclude the child as a witness. . | 3 | 3 |
Monsanto Co. v. Davisgreen2 sentences2006In a written order and without stating any grounds, the trial court denied Richard’s motion the day after its filing — and without Valerie having filed a response. 2 A trial court has no discretion to refuse to order a child’s compelled attendance when that refusal has the obvious effect of excluding a presumptively competent child witness from testifying in a modification proceeding. 3 In the absence of notice to Richard that the trial court would require him to subpoena Valerie to bring the children to the hearing, there was no legal basis for the trial court’s refusal to grant Richard’s mot 2006In a written order and without stating any grounds, the trial court denied Richard's motion the day after its filingand without Valerie having filed a response. [2] A trial court has no discretion to refuse to order a child's compelled attendance when that refusal has the obvious effect of excluding a presumptively competent child witness from testifying in a modification proceeding. [3] In the absence of notice to Richard that the trial court would require him to subpoena Valerie to bring the children to the hearing, there was no legal basis for the trial court's refusal to grant Richard's m | 3 | 3 |
Loftin v. Leegreen2 sentences2012See id. 2012See id. | 2 | 2 |
Fambro v. Fambrogreen2 sentences2006See Fambro v. Fambro, 635 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); T.A.B. v. W.L.B., 598 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso), writ ref'd n.r.e., 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.1980) (per curiam). [5] This contention apparently relates back to Richard's claim that Valerie does not provide him timely or adequate notice of the children's activities, etc. [6] This is how Richard characterizes the motion in his brief. 2006See Fambro v. Fambro , 635 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ); T.A.B. v. W.L.B. , 598 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. App.—El Paso), writ ref’d n.r.e. , 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam). [5] This contention apparently relates back to Richard’s claim that Valerie does not provide him timely or adequate notice of the children’s activities, etc. [6] This is how Richard characterizes the motion in his brief. | 2 | 2 |
Tab v. Wlbgreen2 sentences2006See Fambro v. Fambro, 635 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); T.A.B. v. W.L.B., 598 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso), writ ref'd n.r.e., 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.1980) (per curiam). [5] This contention apparently relates back to Richard's claim that Valerie does not provide him timely or adequate notice of the children's activities, etc. [6] This is how Richard characterizes the motion in his brief. 2006See Fambro v. Fambro , 635 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ); T.A.B. v. W.L.B. , 598 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. App.—El Paso), writ ref’d n.r.e. , 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam). [5] This contention apparently relates back to Richard’s claim that Valerie does not provide him timely or adequate notice of the children’s activities, etc. [6] This is how Richard characterizes the motion in his brief. | 2 | 2 |
Chon Tri v. J.T.T.green1 sentence2019First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tex. 2017); Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.green1 sentence2019See Cerberus Capital Mgmt., 164 S.W.3d at 382 . | 1 | 1 |
First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parkergreen1 sentence2019First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tex. 2017); Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Firstmerit Bank, N.A.green1 sentence2014App. P. 33.1; In re L.M.M., 247 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (holding that mother could not raise new argument against enforcement of MSA for first time on appeal). 24 See In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 753-54 (“Once the trial court concludes that the arbitration agreement encompasses the claims, and that the party opposing arbitration has failed to prove its defenses, the trial court has no discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings.”). 11 | 1 | 1 |
In Re LMMgreen1 sentence2014App. P. 33.1; In re L.M.M., 247 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (holding that mother could not raise new argument against enforcement of MSA for first time on appeal). 24 See In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 753-54 (“Once the trial court concludes that the arbitration agreement encompasses the claims, and that the party opposing arbitration has failed to prove its defenses, the trial court has no discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings.”). 11 | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Leegreen1 sentence2009See Alavi, 2007 WL 274565 , at *3; Lee v. Lee , 47 S.W.3d 767, 780-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Longaker v. Evans, 32 S.W.3d 725 , 733 n.2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. withdrawn). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2006Cf. Thompson, 380 S.W.2d at 639 . 2006Cf. Thompson, 380 S.W.2d at 639 . | 3 | 2006–2006 |
T. A. B. v. W. L. B.
neutral
2 sentences2006See Fambro v. Fambro, 635 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ); T.A.B. v. W.L.B., 598 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso), writ ref'd n.r.e., 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.1980) (per curiam). [5] This contention apparently relates back to Richard's claim that Valerie does not provide him timely or adequate notice of the children's activities, etc. [6] This is how Richard characterizes the motion in his brief. 2006See Fambro v. Fambro , 635 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ); T.A.B. v. W.L.B. , 598 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. App.—El Paso), writ ref’d n.r.e. , 606 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam). [5] This contention apparently relates back to Richard’s claim that Valerie does not provide him timely or adequate notice of the children’s activities, etc. [6] This is how Richard characterizes the motion in his brief. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.
green
1 sentence2015Specifically, as Richard correctly acknowledges, in appealing an adverse finding on an issue where he had the burden of proof, he “must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” [Appellant’s Brief at p. 6 (emphasis supplied), citing Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690 ] In Sterner, the Texas Supreme Court refers to this as the second of “two hurdles” that a party “must surmount” when appealing an adverse finding on an issue where he had the burden of proof. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Kasschau
green
2 sentences2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d 305 (1999) that only Richard's claim for attorney's fees survived the nonsuit. 2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d 305 (1999) that only Richard's claim for attorney's fees survived the nonsuit. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Whatley v. Walker
green
1 sentence2013And Carolyn’s citation to Whatley v. Walker, 302 S.W.3d at 314 , does not support her 8 argument regarding this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
2 sentences2012Richard’s challenge under the federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause also claims that section 152.201(a) violates his fundamental right concerning "the care, custody, and control of [J.S.D.]” under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). 2012Richard’s challenge under the federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause also claims that section 152.201(a) violates his fundamental right concerning "the care, custody, and control of [J.S.D.]” under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Longaker v. Evans
green
1 sentence2009See Alavi, 2007 WL 274565 , at *3; Lee v. Lee , 47 S.W.3d 767, 780-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Longaker v. Evans, 32 S.W.3d 725 , 733 n.2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. withdrawn). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Berry v. Berry
green
1 sentence2008Of the retirement account, the trial court said: "As far as the retirement goes, for those of us who were fortunate enough to go to law school after *841 Berry v. Berry, [ 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.1983)], we had it pounded into us quite heavily.” From this comment we can draw no conclusion. 5 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Iley v. Hughes
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Montoya v. John Peter Smith Hospital
green
1 sentence1991To support its claim, UTMB relies on Montoya v. John Peter Smith Hospital, 760 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1988, writ denied). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.