Richard rule in California

2025Horton San Diego Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 668, 685 [same].) Although co-trustees referred to section 17211 in their opposition to Richard’s motion for attorney fees, their opposition was untimely and was not considered by the court.

2022(Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259 (Dudley).) Our authority to consider alternative reasons for affirmance is particularly significant in this case because Richard’s motion to the probate court contained nine separately headed theories he claimed independently supported dismissal of Tukes’s claims.

2022The court granted the motion (i) as to all three of Tukes’s counts based on one of those theories, i.e., “res judicata” (which the probate court interpreted as embracing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion and found issue preclusion dispositive and claim preclusion inapplicable); and (ii) as to the third count based on a separate theory, i.e., the incompatibility of contract and quantum meruit counts where the quantum meruit count fails to deny the existence of the contract alleged in support of the contract count (see Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1389 (Kle

2022This was a correct application of the rule stated in Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at page 1389 .

2021(See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363 [“[a]ppellate counsel for the party purporting to join some or all of the claims raised by another are obligated to thoughtfully assess whether such joinder is proper as to the specific claims and, if necessary, to provide particularized argument in support of his or her client’s ability to seek relief on that ground”].) The People, however, address this argument in the context of Richard’s imposed fines and fees and note the trial court orally imposed on Richard the exact fines and fees as Chantell, and Richard’s minute order

2014The special jury instruction stated: “In a contract action, the damages recoverable by an aggrieved party are those proximately caused by the breach.” As this court has stated, “A party is not entitled to have the jury instructed in any particular fashion or phraseology, and may not 25 complain if the court correctly gives the substance of the applicable law. [Citation.]” (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 553 (Thompson Pacific).) The record reflects that the trial court instructed the jurors as follows with respect to breach of contract: “To

2014Code § 354; In re D.P., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 905.) Here, in a close case in which the court’s improper application of the presumption plainly tilted the balance in favor of the Department, we simply cannot deem the error harmless. 9 In light of our reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding as to Richard, we need not review at this time Richard’s challenge to portions of the disposition order requiring him to participate in sexual abuse therapy for perpetrators and parenting classes.

2008At that time, the statute of limitations on their claims was one year, but, because they were minors, was extended until their 19th birthdays. (§§ 340, 352; Dutra v. Eagleson (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 216, 222 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 ] *479 (Dutra).) In Dutra , we set forth the lengthy legislative history of section 340.1, which was eventually amended to encompass claims against not just the perpetrator, but persons or entities that employed or supervised the perpetrator. ( 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 222 .) In general, section 340.1 now provides that the limitations period for actions to recover damages

2008At that time, the statute of limitations on their claims was one year, but, because they were minors, was extended until their 19th birthdays. (§§ 340, 352; Dutra v. Eagleson (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 216, 222 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 ] *479 (Dutra).) In Dutra , we set forth the lengthy legislative history of section 340.1, which was eventually amended to encompass claims against not just the perpetrator, but persons or entities that employed or supervised the perpetrator. ( 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 222 .) In general, section 340.1 now provides that the limitations period for actions to recover damages

2008(In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 383 ].) Richard’s brief did not raise the waiver argument.

2008(In re Marriage of Hinman (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 988, 1002 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 383 ].) Richard’s brief did not raise the waiver argument.

2008In doing so, the plaintiff cannot rely on the mere allegations or denial of his pleadings, “but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists . . . .” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A triable issue of material fact exists “if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. [Fn. omitted.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) DISCUSSION Gil and Ric

2008In doing so, the plaintiff cannot rely on the mere allegations or denial of his pleadings, “but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists . . . .” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A triable issue of material fact exists “if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. [Fn. omitted.]” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) DISCUSSION Gil and Ric

1985Under this analysis, “a lessor may refuse consent only where he has a good faith reasonable objection to the assignment or sublease, even in the absence of a provision prohibiting the unreasonable or arbitrary withholding of consent . . . .” (Cohen v. Ratinoff (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 321, 330 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 84 ]; see also Schweiso v. Williams (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 883 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) 1 The Cohen court provided examples of a “good faith reasonable objection [to the lease:] inability to fulfill terms of the lease, financial irresponsibility or instability, suitability of premises for inte

1985Under this analysis, “a lessor may refuse consent only where he has a good faith reasonable objection to the assignment or sublease, even in the absence of a provision prohibiting the unreasonable or arbitrary withholding of consent . . . .” (Cohen v. Ratinoff (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 321, 330 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 84 ]; see also Schweiso v. Williams (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 883 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) 1 The Cohen court provided examples of a “good faith reasonable objection [to the lease:] inability to fulfill terms of the lease, financial irresponsibility or instability, suitability of premises for inte

1985Under this analysis, “a lessor may refuse consent only where he has a good faith reasonable objection to the assignment or sublease, even in the absence of a provision prohibiting the unreasonable or arbitrary withholding of consent . . . .” (Cohen v. Ratinoff (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 321, 330 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 84 ]; see also Schweiso v. Williams (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 883 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) 1 The Cohen court provided examples of a “good faith reasonable objection [to the lease:] inability to fulfill terms of the lease, financial irresponsibility or instability, suitability of premises for inte

1985Under this analysis, “a lessor may refuse consent only where he has a good faith reasonable objection to the assignment or sublease, even in the absence of a provision prohibiting the unreasonable or arbitrary withholding of consent . . . .” (Cohen v. Ratinoff (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 321, 330 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 84 ]; see also Schweiso v. Williams (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 883 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) 1 The Cohen court provided examples of a “good faith reasonable objection [to the lease:] inability to fulfill terms of the lease, financial irresponsibility or instability, suitability of premises for inte

1985(Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc. (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 289, 299 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 263 ].) Two recent Court of Appeal cases have rejected the Richard rule, however, in view of the notion that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every commercial lease (and virtually every contract, for that matter).

1985(Richard v. Degen & Brody, Inc. (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 289, 299 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 263 ].) Two recent Court of Appeal cases have rejected the Richard rule, however, in view of the notion that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every commercial lease (and virtually every contract, for that matter).

1979Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 113 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 461 ]; Henderson v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 583, 596 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 478 ], and cases there cited.) For these reasons, that the controversy was first brought to court in California, that Texas has not taken appropriate steps to assume jurisdiction, that the bulk of the evidence on the key issue is found in California, and that the financial disparity of the parties favors the conduct of the litigation in California, we conclude that the Los Angeles Superior Court correctly rejected Richard’s motion to dismiss or sta

1979Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 113 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 461 ]; Henderson v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 583, 596 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 478 ], and cases there cited.) For these reasons, that the controversy was first brought to court in California, that Texas has not taken appropriate steps to assume jurisdiction, that the bulk of the evidence on the key issue is found in California, and that the financial disparity of the parties favors the conduct of the litigation in California, we conclude that the Los Angeles Superior Court correctly rejected Richard’s motion to dismiss or sta

1979Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 113 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 461 ]; Henderson v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 583, 596 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 478 ], and cases there cited.) For these reasons, that the controversy was first brought to court in California, that Texas has not taken appropriate steps to assume jurisdiction, that the bulk of the evidence on the key issue is found in California, and that the financial disparity of the parties favors the conduct of the litigation in California, we conclude that the Los Angeles Superior Court correctly rejected Richard’s motion to dismiss or sta

1979Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 113 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 461 ]; Henderson v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 583, 596 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 478 ], and cases there cited.) For these reasons, that the controversy was first brought to court in California, that Texas has not taken appropriate steps to assume jurisdiction, that the bulk of the evidence on the key issue is found in California, and that the financial disparity of the parties favors the conduct of the litigation in California, we conclude that the Los Angeles Superior Court correctly rejected Richard’s motion to dismiss or sta