Villarreal motion in Texas

2025Cf. Carroll v. State, 68 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial court’s threat to look less favorably on defendant if she elected not to testify during punishment hearing “improperly coerced appellant into testifying”); Henderson v. State, 13 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (trial court’s “incorrect and misleading” statement that defendant had to answer prosecutor’s questions if he wanted to testify compelled defendant to testify on State’s behalf).

2025Cf. Carroll v. State, 68 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (trial court’s threat to look less favorably on defendant if she elected not to testify during punishment hearing “improperly coerced appellant into testifying”); Henderson v. State, 13 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (trial court’s “incorrect and misleading” statement that defendant had to answer prosecutor’s questions if he wanted to testify compelled defendant to testify on State’s behalf).

2022See Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161 .

2022For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of Villarreal’s motion for continuance was not made “unreasonably or in an arbitrary manner without reference to any guiding rules and principles.” See id.

2019Further, the trial court’s order was not just a simple instruction prohibiting Villarreal from discussing his testimony with his attorney; rather, it was an ambiguous order where Villarreal’s defense counsel, prior to advising Villarreal on his defensive strategy, was left to question whether the matter to be discussed was “something that is going to be considered to be conferring with [Villarreal] on the witness stand while the jury is there or not.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Werner, 214 A.2d 276, 278 (Pa. Super.

2018Aside from Dean Holley’s declaration stating that the remedy “fit the facts,” nothing in the record explains why the university imposed the remedy that it did.30 Accordingly, we conclude that the appellees did not conclusively demonstrate that the decision to implement the “class-wide remedy” was an exercise of professional judgment entitled to judicial deference in the context of a constitutional challenge.31 We therefore sustain Villarreal’s issue challenging the dismissal of his substantive due-course-of-law claim. 29 See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 , 106 S. Ct. at 513 ; see also Miranda, 133 S.

2018Aside from Dean Holley’s declaration stating that the remedy “fit the facts,” nothing in the record explains why the university imposed the remedy that it did.30 Accordingly, we conclude that the appellees did not conclusively demonstrate that the decision to implement the “class-wide remedy” was an exercise of professional judgment entitled to judicial deference in the context of a constitutional challenge.31 We therefore sustain Villarreal’s issue challenging the dismissal of his substantive due-course-of-law claim. 29 See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 , 106 S. Ct. at 513 ; see also Miranda, 133 S.

2017See Scoresby, 346 S.W.3d at 549, 557 .

2017See Posey v. State, 763 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (explaining that “[t]rial counsel simply complied with his client’s wishes and cannot be held accountable for appellant’s decisions”); see also Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining in appeal of habeas case asserting ineffective assistance of counsel that defendant “is presumed to be the master of his own defense”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hernandez v. Thaler, 463 Fed.

2017See Posey v. State, 763 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (explaining that “[t]rial counsel simply complied with his client’s wishes and cannot be held accountable for appellant’s decisions”); see also Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining in appeal of habeas case asserting ineffective assistance of counsel that defendant “is presumed to be the master of his own defense”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hernandez v. Thaler, 463 Fed.

2017See Posey v. State, 763 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (explaining that “[t]rial counsel simply complied with his client’s wishes and cannot be held accountable for appellant’s decisions”); see also Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining in appeal of habeas case asserting ineffective assistance of counsel that defendant “is presumed to be the master of his own defense”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hernandez v. Thaler, 463 Fed.

2016See Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 282 (Tex. Crim.

2016See id.

2015See Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138 , 146-47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). - 11 - 04-13-00553-CR Although Garcia testified that Moy threatened him with a wooden planter, he also testified that Villarreal had already helped him up when Villarreal turned and fired at Moy.

2015See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594 .

2015See Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 781 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d); Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138 , 146-47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). - 11 - 04-13-00553-CR Although Garcia testified that Moy threatened him with a wooden planter, he also testified that Villarreal had already helped him up when Villarreal turned and fired at Moy.

2010See Murchison v. State , 93 S.W.3d 239, 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that Blue does not apply where the trial court's comments do not amount to a predetermination of the defendant's guilt and a defendant must still object to preserve the issue for appeal); see also Anderson v. State , No. 13-03-00493-CR, 2004 WL 3211567 , at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 1, 2004, no pet.) (memo. op., not designated for publication) (same).

2009See Young v. Villegas, 231 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (holding that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal based on Health and Safety Code section 312.007(a)); Phillips, 187 S.W.3d at 673-75 (holding that section 51.014(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal based on Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.106(f) even when the underlying motion sought dismissal instead of summary judgment).

2009See Young v. Villegas, 231 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (holding that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal based on Health and Safety Code section 312.007(a)); Phillips, 187 S.W.3d at 673-75 (holding that section 51.014(a) authorizes an interlocutory appeal based on Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.106(f) even when the underlying motion sought dismissal instead of summary judgment).

1998Another panel of this court denied Villarreal’s motion to file the reporter’s record late since he had not filed a timely motion for extension of time, citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Management, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex.1994).

1993See Washington v. State, 822 S.W.2d 110, 118 (Tex.App. — Waco 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).

1993This court analyzed the law on improper jury argument and resulting error in Washington v. State, 822 S.W.2d 110, 117-121 (Tex.App. — Waco 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993).