prima facie Batson violation in Alabama

2006However, in Ex parte Thomas , 659 So.2d 3 , 7 (Ala. 1994), a case decided after Harris's direct appeals at the state level had been exhausted, but before the United States Supreme Court had disposed of her case on certiorari review, this Court held: "We disapprove the statement in Harrell [v. State , 571 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1990),] indicating that `[w]hen the evidence shows only that blacks were struck and that a greater percentage of blacks sat on the jury than sat on the lawfully established venire, an inference of discrimination has not been created,' 571 So.2d at 1271 , to the extent that it

2006However, in Ex parte Thomas , 659 So.2d 3 , 7 (Ala. 1994), a case decided after Harris's direct appeals at the state level had been exhausted, but before the United States Supreme Court had disposed of her case on certiorari review, this Court held: "We disapprove the statement in Harrell [v. State , 571 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1990),] indicating that `[w]hen the evidence shows only that blacks were struck and that a greater percentage of blacks sat on the jury than sat on the lawfully established venire, an inference of discrimination has not been created,' 571 So.2d at 1271 , to the extent that it

2005The Court *1092 disapproved this statement as it has been applied in these instances, because such applications prevent a defendant from using a factor indicating discrimination that was approved in both [ Ex parte] Branch [, 526 So.2d 609 (1987),] and Batson.

1999A defendant fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson and Ex parte Branch , 526 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1987), where the defendant fails to show any evidence of discrimination other than the number of African-American veniremembers who were struck.

2006However, in Ex parte Thomas , 659 So.2d 3 , 7 (Ala. 1994), a case decided after Harris's direct appeals at the state level had been exhausted, but before the United States Supreme Court had disposed of her case on certiorari review, this Court held: "We disapprove the statement in Harrell [v. State , 571 So.2d 1270 (Ala. 1990),] indicating that `[w]hen the evidence shows only that blacks were struck and that a greater percentage of blacks sat on the jury than sat on the lawfully established venire, an inference of discrimination has not been created,' 571 So.2d at 1271 , to the extent that it

1995In Ex parte Thomas , 659 So.2d 3 (Ala. 1994), that Court disapproved the statement in Harrell , as follows: "We disapprove the statement in Harrell II indicating that '[w]hen the evidence shows that only blacks were struck and that a greater percentage of blacks sat on the jury than sat on the lawfully established venire, an inference of discrimination has not been created,' 571 So.2d at 1271 , to the extent that it has been construed to preclude a finding of a prima facie Batson violation where the attorney engaged in a pattern of striking blacks from the venire.

1999The trial court determined that Powell failed to establish a prima facie Batson violation; therefore, it did not require the State to explain its reasons for its peremptory strikes of the African-American veniremembers. "`Merely showing that the challenged party struck one or more members of a particular race is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.'" Farrior v. State , 728 So.2d 691 , 699 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), quoting Edwards v. State , 628 So.2d 1021 , 1024 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); Moore v. State , 677 So.2d 828 , 829 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996).

1999The trial court determined that Powell failed to establish a prima facie Batson violation; therefore, it did not require the State to explain its reasons for its peremptory strikes of the African-American veniremembers. "`Merely showing that the challenged party struck one or more members of a particular race is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.'" Farrior v. State , 728 So.2d 691 , 699 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), quoting Edwards v. State , 628 So.2d 1021 , 1024 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); Moore v. State , 677 So.2d 828 , 829 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996).

1999The trial court determined that Powell failed to establish a prima facie Batson violation; therefore, it did not require the State to explain its reasons for its peremptory strikes of the African-American veniremembers. "`Merely showing that the challenged party struck one or more members of a particular race is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.'" Farrior v. State , 728 So.2d 691 , 699 (Ala.Cr.App. 1998), quoting Edwards v. State , 628 So.2d 1021 , 1024 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993); Moore v. State , 677 So.2d 828 , 829 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996).

1997In Batson , the Supreme Court held that, to rebut a prima facie Batson violation, the proponent of a strike (most often, the government), "must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation for exercising the [peremptory] challenges" Batson , 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 20, (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 , 258 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)), and that the reason must be "related to the particular case to be tried." 476 U.S. at 98 , 106 S.Ct. at 1724 .

1997In Batson , the Supreme Court held that, to rebut a prima facie Batson violation, the proponent of a strike (most often, the government), "must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation for exercising the [peremptory] challenges" Batson , 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 20, (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248 , 258 , 101 S.Ct. 1089 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)), and that the reason must be "related to the particular case to be tried." 476 U.S. at 98 , 106 S.Ct. at 1724 .

1997In Purkett , the Court held that the meaning of a "legitimate reason" under Batson is not necessarily a reason that makes sense, "but a reason that does not deny equal protection." 514 U.S. at 769 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 .

1997In Purkett , the Court held that the meaning of a "legitimate reason" under Batson is not necessarily a reason that makes sense, "but a reason that does not deny equal protection." 514 U.S. at 769 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 .