prima facie Batson claim in Pennsylvania

2018Rather, our Supreme Court has continually recognized that a moving party must preserve a “full and complete record of the asserted Batson violation, as it would otherwise be impossible to conduct meaningful appellate review of the motivations of prosecutors in individual cases without such a record.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 403 , 861 A.2d 898, 909 (2004) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Fletcher v. Pennsylvania, 547 U.S. 1041 , 126 S.Ct. 1617 , 164 L.Ed.2d 336 (2006).

2018Rather, our Supreme Court has continually recognized that a moving party must preserve a “full and complete record of the asserted Batson violation, as it would otherwise be impossible to conduct meaningful appellate review of the motivations of prosecutors in individual cases without such a record.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 580 Pa. 403 , 861 A.2d 898, 909 (2004) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Fletcher v. Pennsylvania, 547 U.S. 1041 , 126 S.Ct. 1617 , 164 L.Ed.2d 336 (2006).

2014See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d a number of individuals violation of Batson appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008).

2014See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa.Super.2008) (stating, “the striking of a number of individuals belonging to some cognizable minority group ... is not dispositive that a violation of Batson has occurred[ ]”), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 774 , 958 A.2d 1047 (2008).

2016See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1 , 79 A.3d 595, 620-21 (2013) (holding that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike thirteen out of nineteen African-American venirepersons, but only four out of twenty-four non-African-American venirepersons, was inadequate to establish prima facie case of discrimination); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1144 (2009) (holding that striking more African-Americans than Caucasians, in and of itself, does not equate to purposeful discrimination).

2016See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1 , 79 A.3d 595, 620-21 (2013) (holding that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike thirteen out of nineteen African-American venirepersons, but only four out of twenty-four non-African-American venirepersons, was inadequate to establish prima facie case of discrimination); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1144 (2009) (holding that striking more African-Americans than Caucasians, in and of itself, does not equate to purposeful discrimination).

2018However, “where,” as here, “no Batson challenge -4- J-S64013-17 was raised during the voir dire process, a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Batson’s burden-shifting formula, but instead, bears the burden in the first instance and throughout of establishing actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id., at 476 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018If a defendant establishes a prima facie Batson claim, “the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror(s) at issue.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 475 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

2016Brief for Johnson at 77 (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (explaining that a “defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred”)).

2016Brief for Johnson at 77 (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 , 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (explaining that a “defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred”)).

2016See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1 , 79 A.3d 595, 620-21 (2013) (holding that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike thirteen out of nineteen African-American venirepersons, but only four out of twenty-four non-African-American venirepersons, was inadequate to establish prima facie case of discrimination); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1144 (2009) (holding that striking more African-Americans than Caucasians, in and of itself, does not equate to purposeful discrimination).

2016See Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1 , 79 A.3d 595, 620-21 (2013) (holding that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike thirteen out of nineteen African-American venirepersons, but only four out of twenty-four non-African-American venirepersons, was inadequate to establish prima facie case of discrimination); Commonwealth v. Ligons, 601 Pa. 103 , 971 A.2d 1125, 1144 (2009) (holding that striking more African-Americans than Caucasians, in and of itself, does not equate to purposeful discrimination).

2016Brief for Johnson at 77 (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (explaining that a “defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence [J-43-2015] - 35 sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred”)).

2014See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating, “the striking of a number of individuals belonging to some cognizable minority group… is not dispositive that a violation of Batson has occurred[]”), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 2008).

2014See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa.Super.2008) (stating, “the striking of a number of individuals belonging to some cognizable minority group ... is not dispositive that a violation of Batson has occurred[ ]”), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 774 , 958 A.2d 1047 (2008).

2004See Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492 , 513 n. 12, 862 A.2d 74 , 86 n. 12, 2004 WL 2363725 (2004) (footnote attributed to this author only). 1 My position aligns with that of the majority in relation to the application of the Spence requirements to Appellant’s situation solely because he has not undertaken to challenge them in this appeal. 2 .

2004See Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492 , 513 n. 12, 862 A.2d 74 , 86 n. 12, 2004 WL 2363725 (2004) (footnote attributed to this author only). 1 My position aligns with that of the majority in relation to the application of the Spence requirements to Appellant’s situation solely because he has not undertaken to challenge them in this appeal. 2 .

2001See Clark, 551 Pa. 258 , 710 A.2d 31, 41 (1998)(finding that trial counsel was not ineffective where the record did not establish a prima facie Batson claim.) .

2001See Clark, 551 Pa. 258 , 710 A.2d 31, 41 (1998)(finding that trial counsel was not ineffective where the record did not establish a prima facie Batson claim.) .