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16 California opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hamptongreen2 sentences2016The court rejected Sheppard Mullin's suggestion that it could drop South Tahoe as a client and remain counsel for J-M in the Qui Tam Action, citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017 , 1037, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ( American Airlines v. Sheppard Mullin ): "A lawyer may not avoid the automatic disqualification rule applicable to concurrent representation of conflicting interests by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client." The parties suggested bifurcating South Tahoe from the Qui Tam Action, with separate counsel for J-M 2016The court rejected Sheppard Mullin's suggestion that it could drop South Tahoe as a client and remain counsel for J-M in the Qui Tam Action, citing American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017 , 1037, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 685 ( American Airlines v. Sheppard Mullin ): "A lawyer may not avoid the automatic disqualification rule applicable to concurrent representation of conflicting interests by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client." The parties suggested bifurcating South Tahoe from the Qui Tam Action, with separate counsel for J-M | 3 | 4 |
Flatt v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011(Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284.) According to Flatt , the reason for the automatic disqualification rule is evident based on the following: “A client who learns that his or her lawyer is also representing a litigation adversary, even with respect to a matter wholly unrelated to the one for which counsel was retained, cannot long be expected to sustain the level of confidence and trust in counsel that is one of the foundations of the professional relationship. 2010In cases where an attorney concurrently represents two clients with conflicting interests, the automatic-disqualification rule applies. ( Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 284 .) With these principles in mind, we must first determine whether Hampton and designers had standing to disqualify Graham. 3. | 2 | 3 |
White v. Experian Information Solutionsgreen2 sentences2016Cal. 2014) 993 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1167 (White)), the district court applied a balancing test instead of the automatic disqualification rule, and denied the disqualification motion (id. at pp. 1167-1168). 2016(Ibid.) Finding the asserted conflict did “not seriously threaten the policy concerns underlying the duty of loyalty” (White v. Experian Information Solutions (C.D.Cal. 2014) 993 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1167 (White)), the district court applied a balancing test instead of the automatic disqualification rule, and denied the disqualification motion (id. at pp. 1167-1168). | 2 | 2 |
City & County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc.green2 sentences2018(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23-24 ;3 Frazier v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 23, 30 .)4 The Supreme Court had since held, in the context of disqualifying a City Attorney’s office when the City Attorney had a conflict, that: “Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole on the rationale ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ [Citation.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4t 2018(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23-24 ;3 Frazier v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 23, 30 .)4 The Supreme Court had since held, in the context of disqualifying a City Attorney’s office when the City Attorney had a conflict, that: “Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole on the rationale ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ [Citation.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4t | 1 | 2 |
County of Los Angeles v. United States District Court for the Central District of Californiagreen1 sentence2010Individual attorneys today can work for a law firm and not even know, let alone have contact with, members of the same firm working in a different department of the same firm across the hall or a different branch across the globe.”]; In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 586 [“In the era of large, multioffice law firms and increased attention to the business aspects of the practice of law, we must consider the ability of attorneys ... to change employment for personal reasons or from necessity.”]; In re County of Los Angeles, supra, 223 F.3d at p. 997 [“The changing re | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp.green1 sentence2010Accordingly, the automatic disqualification rule is being questioned even in the private practice context.”]; Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336 [“Large law firms ... are becoming ever larger, opening branch offices nationwide or internationally, and merging with other large firms. | 1 | 1 |
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Insurancegreen2 sentences1994Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1059 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [discussing at p. 1057 whether “the automatic disqualification rule applicable to concurrent representation may be avoided by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client . . . .”]; Kelly v. Greason (1968) 23 N.Y.2d 368 [ 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 , 244 N.E.2d 456 ] [“[W]ith rare and conditional exceptions, the lawyer may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship . . . .”]; Developme 1994Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1059 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [discussing at p. 1057 whether “the automatic disqualification rule applicable to concurrent representation may be avoided by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client . . . .”]; Kelly v. Greason (1968) 23 N.Y.2d 368 [ 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 , 244 N.E.2d 456 ] [“[W]ith rare and conditional exceptions, the lawyer may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship . . . .”]; Developme | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirk v. First American Title Insurance
green
2 sentences2018(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23-24 ;3 Frazier v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 23, 30 .)4 The Supreme Court had since held, in the context of disqualifying a City Attorney’s office when the City Attorney had a conflict, that: “Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole on the rationale ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ [Citation.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4t 2018Cohen was also briefly involved (3.5 billable hours) with another First American matter, separate from but with issues related to, the class actions. ( Kirk , supra , 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 788-789, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 .) This was a city attorney case that stated the automatic disqualification rule without further analysis, and held vicarious qualification of the office was not required. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Meza v. H. Muehlstein & Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Muehlstein & Co., Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 969 , had also discussed the issue. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2018(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23-24 ;3 Frazier v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 23, 30 .)4 The Supreme Court had since held, in the context of disqualifying a City Attorney’s office when the City Attorney had a conflict, that: “Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole on the rationale ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ [Citation.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4t | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Frazier v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2018(City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23-24 ;3 Frazier v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 23, 30 .)4 The Supreme Court had since held, in the context of disqualifying a City Attorney’s office when the City Attorney had a conflict, that: “Normally, an attorney’s conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole on the rationale ‘that attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other’s, and their clients’, confidential information.’ [Citation.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4t | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Robert Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions
green
1 sentence2016(Radcliffe, supra, 818 F.3d at p. 547 .) The court reasoned the “policy justifications ... for the automatic disqualification rule are not fully transfer-rable to class action cases,” but instead “envisioned simultaneous conflicts of interest as they generally occurred in individual litigant suits rather than in class actions.” (Id. at p. 544.) The Radcliffe court stated that the policy considerations underlying the automatic disqualification rule do not “fit[] the circumstances of the lawyer who represents a class of plaintiffs whose interests may in some ways be adverse to each other, but al | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Neal v. Health Net, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Turning to whether disqualification was nonetheless appropriate, even if not mandatory, the Neal court noted that cases “discuss[ing] the issue of whether an attorney should be disqualified after being exposed to an adverse party’s confidential information ... have consistently concluded that mere exposure to confidential information of the opposing party does not require disqualification.” (Neal, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 841 .) The court then discussed several ways in which Traylor’s disqualification was an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Castro v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences2007This case illustrates why an automatic disqualification rule is unsound: none of "violations" of the "safeguards" referred to in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 154 , bears any demonstrable relation to the attorneys or the parties involved in this case. 2007This case illustrates why an automatic disqualification rule is unsound: none of "violations" of the "safeguards" referred to in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432 , 284 Cal.Rptr. 154 , bears any demonstrable relation to the attorneys or the parties involved in this case. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Younger v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2006In Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 892 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 34 ], the Court of Appeal disqualified an entire district attorney’s office because of an appearance of impropriety created by the fact that a newly appointed supervising district attorney had once been a member of the firm representing the defendant. 2006In Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 892 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 34 ], the Court of Appeal disqualified an entire district attorney’s office because of an appearance of impropriety created by the fact that a newly appointed supervising district attorney had once been a member of the firm representing the defendant. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In re Kelly
green
2 sentences1994Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1059 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [discussing at p. 1057 whether “the automatic disqualification rule applicable to concurrent representation may be avoided by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client . . . .”]; Kelly v. Greason (1968) 23 N.Y.2d 368 [ 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 , 244 N.E.2d 456 ] [“[W]ith rare and conditional exceptions, the lawyer may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship . . . .”]; Developme 1994Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1059 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 ] [discussing at p. 1057 whether “the automatic disqualification rule applicable to concurrent representation may be avoided by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client . . . .”]; Kelly v. Greason (1968) 23 N.Y.2d 368 [ 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 , 244 N.E.2d 456 ] [“[W]ith rare and conditional exceptions, the lawyer may not place himself in a position where a conflicting interest may, even inadvertently, affect, or give the appearance of affecting, the obligations of the professional relationship . . . .”]; Developme | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ex Parte Amsouth Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence1992Ass’n, Inc. v. Carey Canada, supra, 749 F.Supp. at p. 261 ; Ex Parte AmSouth Bank, N.A., supra, 589 So.2d at p. 722 .) Truck finally contends that the automatic disqualification rule is harsh when applied to large law firms organized into specialty practice groups *1060 representing institutional clients where such situations may arise “inadvertently.” Two observations seem appropriate: (1) there was nothing inadvertent when the firm agreed to represent Truck while representing FFIC; (2) to the extent this argument implies or suggests that the duty of loyalty owed a client of a large law firm | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Carey Canada, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992Ass’n, Inc. v. Carey Canada, supra, 749 F.Supp. at p. 261 ; Ex Parte AmSouth Bank, N.A., supra, 589 So.2d at p. 722 .) Truck finally contends that the automatic disqualification rule is harsh when applied to large law firms organized into specialty practice groups *1060 representing institutional clients where such situations may arise “inadvertently.” Two observations seem appropriate: (1) there was nothing inadvertent when the firm agreed to represent Truck while representing FFIC; (2) to the extent this argument implies or suggests that the duty of loyalty owed a client of a large law firm | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.