Cook motion in California

2025Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of her Franklin/Cook motion. 1 All further references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 2 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). 3 Defendant also has a pending appeal in case No. F088355.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479 , 487 [although Hardin II foreclosed one of multiple challenges to the defendant’s exclusion from early parole consideration under § 3051, another survived and entitled him to a Franklin hearing]; People v. Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 [“Any offender that brings a Cook motion must establish his entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing in his moving papers (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 ), which is how Sands raised the equal protection issue”].) Before us, Vu provides potential claims regarding eligibility, which h

2018Relying on Fenenbock , the Cook defendants argued that the trial court violated their right to notice and due process by instructing the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, they could convict the defendants of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm. ( Cook , supra , at p. 913, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 .) The Cook court rejected this contention, holding that "the trial court may look to the overt acts pleaded in a charge of conspiracy to determine whether the charged offense includes the lesser i

2018Relying on Fenenbock, the Cook defendants argued that the trial court violated their right to notice and due process 16 by instructing the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, they could convict the defendants of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm. ( Cook, supra, at p. 913 .) The Cook court rejected this contention, holding that “the trial court may look to the overt acts pleaded in a charge of conspiracy to determine whether the charged offense includes the lesser included offense.

2026To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must “demonstrate (1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, but for counsel’s failings, defendant would have obtained a more favorable result.” (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468 , 540–541; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 .) We need not assess the merits of Cook’s claim of ineffective ass

2025Cook also admitted two prior serious felony convictions and strikes under the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1).) The trial court denied Cook’s motion to dismiss the prior strike allegations pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 42 years to life in state prison: 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law for robbery, plus 10 years for the personal firearm use enhancement; five years for a prior serious felony 3 enhancement; two years for the on bail enhancement; six

2025Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of her Franklin/Cook motion. 1 All further references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 2 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook). 3 Defendant also has a pending appeal in case No. F088355.

2024Relevant Law As the People point out, generally, “[f]or a defendant still in actual or constructive custody, a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court is the preferred method by which to challenge circumstances or actions declared unconstitutional after the defendant’s conviction became final.” (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339 .) But Ralls is appealing from a denial of a Franklin/Cook motion he brought under section 1203.01, which by its own terms permits the post- judgment filing of statements by the parties and the court for transmission to the California Depar

2024(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) We therefore reject defendant’s equal protection claim and conclude that the trial court properly denied his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing.4 DISPOSITION The order denying defendant’s Franklin/Cook motion is affirmed. /s/ MESIWALA, J.

2024(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) We therefore reject defendant’s equal protection claim and conclude that the trial court properly denied his motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing.4 DISPOSITION The order denying defendant’s Franklin/Cook motion is affirmed. /s/ MESIWALA, J.

2023These are “‘the harshest penalties available under our penal system and are reserved for crimes of the most heinous nature.’” (Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 (quoting Williams I, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436).) Because isolating offenders from the public is an “indisputably legitimate penological goal[]” (see In re Grant (1976) 18 Cal.3d 1, 12 ), the 9 Legislature may well have determined that LWOP is an appropriate way to punish such crimes when committed by young adult offenders who are further along in their development process than juveniles, and that a Franklin/Cook hearing is

2021(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 .) Any offender that brings a Cook motion must establish his entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing in his moving papers (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459 ), which is how Sands raised the equal protection issue.

1994Involuntary manslaughter requires neither.” ( 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 955 , fn. omitted.) We respectfully suggest that Cook’s analysis has been effectively superseded as authority by the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 116 , 722 P.2d 890 ] and by the Second District’s subsequent opinion in People v. Brown (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1296 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], In Equarte the pertinent issue was whether assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.

1994Involuntary manslaughter requires neither.” ( 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 955 , fn. omitted.) We respectfully suggest that Cook’s analysis has been effectively superseded as authority by the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 116 , 722 P.2d 890 ] and by the Second District’s subsequent opinion in People v. Brown (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1296 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], In Equarte the pertinent issue was whether assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.

1994Involuntary manslaughter requires neither.” ( 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 955 , fn. omitted.) We respectfully suggest that Cook’s analysis has been effectively superseded as authority by the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 116 , 722 P.2d 890 ] and by the Second District’s subsequent opinion in People v. Brown (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1296 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], In Equarte the pertinent issue was whether assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.

1994Involuntary manslaughter requires neither.” ( 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 955 , fn. omitted.) We respectfully suggest that Cook’s analysis has been effectively superseded as authority by the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 116 , 722 P.2d 890 ] and by the Second District’s subsequent opinion in People v. Brown (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1296 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], In Equarte the pertinent issue was whether assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.

1994Involuntary manslaughter requires neither.” ( 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 955 , fn. omitted.) We respectfully suggest that Cook’s analysis has been effectively superseded as authority by the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Equarte (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456 [ 229 Cal.Rptr. 116 , 722 P.2d 890 ] and by the Second District’s subsequent opinion in People v. Brown (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1296 [ 247 Cal.Rptr. 683 ], In Equarte the pertinent issue was whether assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.

1986(See Brock, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 655-656; Friend, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 578 .) In each case, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had transgressed these guidelines and usurped the factfinding function of a deliberating jury.

1986(See Brock, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 655-656; Friend, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 578 .) In each case, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had transgressed these guidelines and usurped the factfinding function of a deliberating jury.

1980The court held that the omission of this information from the affidavit did not provide a basis for attacking the affidavit or the warrant (id., at p. 93), but that the fact of the confirmatory search could be asserted in the subsequent suppression hearing as grounds for urging that “the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant [was] inadmissible under general constitutional principles.” (Id., at p. 94.) The court then proceeded to overrule Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 455 , 487 P.2d 1023 ], which held that the “magistrate’s independent decision to issue the warra

1980The court held that the omission of this information from the affidavit did not provide a basis for attacking the affidavit or the warrant (id., at p. 93), but that the fact of the confirmatory search could be asserted in the subsequent suppression hearing as grounds for urging that “the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant [was] inadmissible under general constitutional principles.” (Id., at p. 94.) The court then proceeded to overrule Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 455 , 487 P.2d 1023 ], which held that the “magistrate’s independent decision to issue the warra

1980It would contravene the principle of reasonable accuracy, under which mistakes occurring despite the exercise of due care are not punished, however crucial. ( Theodor, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 97-101; Cook, 22 Cal.3d at p. 82 .) And because it would not leave a sterner sanction for deliberate attempts to mislead the magistrate (see discussion, post ), the police would have nothing to lose by sliding from mere carelessness into recklessness and treachery. (6b), (9) When an abuse of that gravity appears — when affiant intentionally omits any fact for the purpose of deceiving the magistrate or recklessly