Hamilton motion in California

2013At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard and denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss his prior strike convictions (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1966) 13 Cal.4th 497 ; Pen.

2013At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard and denied Hamilton’s motion to dismiss his prior strike convictions (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1966) 13 Cal.4th 497 ; Pen.

2025(People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1211, fn. 14 (McKee); Legg v. Department of Justice (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 504 , 511.) Rational basis analysis thus applies to Hamilton’s challenge to the sex offender registration laws.

2025Before trial, the court denied Hamilton’s motion for new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 .

2025The purpose of the RJA is “to swiftly and effectively address racial bias as soon as practical upon a defendant learning of an alleged violation.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 , 815.) We acknowledge it provides remedies upon proof of a violation, including the modification of a sentence.

2018(Khan v. Shim (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 49, 55 .) “Thus, it is a discretionary trial court decision on the propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, but a determination of the 5 legal basis for an attorney fee award is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.” (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142 .) Here, the record is silent as to the trial court’s rationale for denying Hamilton’s motion for attorney fees.

2018(Khan v. Shim (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 49, 55 .) “Thus, it is a discretionary trial court decision on the propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, but a determination of the 5 legal basis for an attorney fee award is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.” (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142 .) Here, the record is silent as to the trial court’s rationale for denying Hamilton’s motion for attorney fees.

2013As support for its interpretation, Evanston relies on Safeco Surplus Lines Co. v. Employers’ Reinsurance Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1403 (Safeco) and Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474 (Bonzer).

2013(Ibid.; Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 421 .) We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Hamilton’s claim letters were correctly addressed to SEC at the Tourney Road address because Hamilton was entitled to rely on SEC’s then address of record listed with the California Secretary of State and on SEC’s own website.

2013As support for its interpretation, Evanston relies on Safeco Surplus Lines Co. v. Employers’ Reinsurance Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1403 (Safeco) and Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474 (Bonzer).

2009Oral Arguments Regarding Hamilton's Motion At the hearing on Hamilton's motion, which the court referred to as the " Hanif motion," Howell's counsel argued that unlike the plaintiff in Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298 , Howell disputed the amount that her health care insurer "paid" to the medical providers and objected that Hamilton's presentation of evidence of what Howell's insurer paid to those providers violated the collateral source rule.

2009Oral Arguments Regarding Hamilton's Motion At the hearing on Hamilton's motion, which the court referred to as the " Hanif motion," Howell's counsel argued that unlike the plaintiff in Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298 , Howell disputed the amount that her health care insurer "paid" to the medical providers and objected that Hamilton's presentation of evidence of what Howell's insurer paid to those providers violated the collateral source rule.

2009Counsel also asserted that under Hanif and Nishihama , Howell was entitled to recover for her past medical expenses the amount paid or incurred; that, under Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West (2005) 35 Cal.4th 595 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 569 , 109 P.3d 69 ] ( Parnell ), the amount incurred is the total amount of debt the patient incurs when she is treated by her medical providers; and, under the contracts between the private health insurer and the medical providers; what the insurer "pays" the medical providers includes both cash payments and any other consideration given in the form of "in-kind

2009Counsel also asserted that under Hanif and Nishihama , Howell was entitled to recover for her past medical expenses the amount paid or incurred; that, under Parnell v. Adventist Health System/West (2005) 35 Cal.4th 595 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 569 , 109 P.3d 69 ] ( Parnell ), the amount incurred is the total amount of debt the patient incurs when she is treated by her medical providers; and, under the contracts between the private health insurer and the medical providers; what the insurer "pays" the medical providers includes both cash payments and any other consideration given in the form of "in-kind

1999The court simply relied on California’s ‘expanded acceptance’ of gambling itself as indicating enforcement of the English judgment was not against public policy. [Citation.]” (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1828 , italics omitted.) The court in Metropolitan acknowledged that “California’s historical public policy against gambling has been substantially eroded” by the proliferation of pari-mutuel horse racing, draw poker clubs, charitable bingo games, the California State Lottery, and other forms of gambling.

1999The court simply relied on California’s ‘expanded acceptance’ of gambling itself as indicating enforcement of the English judgment was not against public policy. [Citation.]” (Metropolitan, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1828 , italics omitted.) The court in Metropolitan acknowledged that “California’s historical public policy against gambling has been substantially eroded” by the proliferation of pari-mutuel horse racing, draw poker clubs, charitable bingo games, the California State Lottery, and other forms of gambling.

1994The defendant asserted that the jury should have been instructed pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement on a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. 113 , and the subsequent definition of viability adopted by the Court of Appeal in Colautti v. Franklin, supra, 439 U.S. at page 388 [58 L.Ed.2d at pages 604-605], that a fetus is not viable under our murder statute unless “ ‘there is a reasonable likelihood of [its] sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1171 .) We deter

1994The defendant asserted that the jury should have been instructed pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement on a woman's constitutional right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. 113 , and the subsequent definition of viability adopted by the Court of Appeal in Colautti v. Franklin, supra, 439 U.S. at page 388 [58 L.Ed.2d at pages 604-605], that a fetus is not viable under our murder statute unless "`there is a reasonable likelihood of [its] sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.'" ( Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1171 .) We determ

1994A fetus is deemed viable when it is possible for it to survive the trauma of birth, although with artificial medical aid.’ ” (Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1171 , italics added.) On appeal, the Hamilton defendant contended that the trial court’s instruction was contradictory and misled the jury into believing it could find him guilty of murdering a nonviable fetus.

1994A fetus is deemed viable when it is possible for it to survive the trauma of birth, although with artificial medical aid.'" ( Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1171 , italics added.) On appeal, the Hamilton defendant contended that the trial court's instruction was contradictory and misled the jury into believing it could find him guilty of murdering a nonviable fetus.

1993(Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 135 ; Knodel v. Knodel, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 765, fn. 15 ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 120 N.E. at p. 202 .) We therefore reaffirm the commitment of the California courts to the Hamilton rule: “The owner of a gambling house who honors a check for the purpose of providing a prospective customer with funds with which to gamble and who then participates in the transaction thus promoted by his act cannot recover on the check.” (Hamilton v. Abadjian, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 52 .) If a licensed owner of a Nevada casino wishes to recover on a che

1993(Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 135 ; Knodel v. Knodel, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 765, fn. 15 ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 120 N.E. at p. 202 .) We therefore reaffirm the commitment of the California courts to the Hamilton rule: “The owner of a gambling house who honors a check for the purpose of providing a prospective customer with funds with which to gamble and who then participates in the transaction thus promoted by his act cannot recover on the check.” (Hamilton v. Abadjian, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 52 .) If a licensed owner of a Nevada casino wishes to recover on a che

1993This distinction between gambling itself and gambling on credit was elucidated in King International Corp. v. Voloshin (1976) 33 Conn. Supp. 166 [ 366 A.2d 1172 ], The defendant in that case stopped payment on a check given in exchange for chips at a licensed casino in Aruba, and the casino’s owner sued in Connecticut to enforce the debt.

1993This distinction between gambling itself and gambling on credit was elucidated in King International Corp. v. Voloshin (1976) 33 Conn. Supp. 166 [ 366 A.2d 1172 ], The defendant in that case stopped payment on a check given in exchange for chips at a licensed casino in Aruba, and the casino’s owner sued in Connecticut to enforce the debt.

1993(Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 135 ; Knodel v. Knodel, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 765, fn. 15 ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 120 N.E. at p. 202 .) We therefore reaffirm the commitment of the California courts to the Hamilton rule: “The owner of a gambling house who honors a check for the purpose of providing a prospective customer with funds with which to gamble and who then participates in the transaction thus promoted by his act cannot recover on the check.” (Hamilton v. Abadjian, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 52 .) If a licensed owner of a Nevada casino wishes to recover on a che

1993(Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 135 ; Knodel v. Knodel, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 765, fn. 15 ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 120 N.E. at p. 202 .) We therefore reaffirm the commitment of the California courts to the Hamilton rule: “The owner of a gambling house who honors a check for the purpose of providing a prospective customer with funds with which to gamble and who then participates in the transaction thus promoted by his act cannot recover on the check.” (Hamilton v. Abadjian, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 52 .) If a licensed owner of a Nevada casino wishes to recover on a che

1987(See Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corporations, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 330, 336 .) In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellant’s bootstrapping argument that his separate guaranty and security agreement helps satisfy the Hamilton test.

1987(See Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corporations, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 330, 336 .) In reaching this conclusion, we reject appellant’s bootstrapping argument that his separate guaranty and security agreement helps satisfy the Hamilton test.

1962The controlling rules on an appeal from an order granting a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict are set out in Yarrow v. State of California, 53 Cal.2d 427 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 348 P.2d 687 ], at pages 434-435, as follows: “In considering the sufficiency of the evidence on the hearing of a motion for new trial it is the exclusive province of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the probative force of testimony and to weigh the evidence, and it may draw reasonable inferences therefrom opposed to those drawn by the tri

1962The controlling rules on an appeal from an order granting a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict are set out in Yarrow v. State of California, 53 Cal.2d 427 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 137 , 348 P.2d 687 ], at pages 434-435, as follows: “In considering the sufficiency of the evidence on the hearing of a motion for new trial it is the exclusive province of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the probative force of testimony and to weigh the evidence, and it may draw reasonable inferences therefrom opposed to those drawn by the tri