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17 California opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIVgreen2 sentences2007(Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) 11 The Harris court further held that, in evaluating the viability of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim based upon a category not enumerated in the statute or identified in a prior appellate decision, one of the questions in the three-part test is whether the new claim “is based on a classification that involves personal.characteristics.” ( Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) Since Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 , held that the Act prohibited arbitrary discrimination on the basis of one’s occupation, we need not engage in the three-part Harris test tha 2001Exchange, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1465; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 521 .) The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance—a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 , and reaffirmed in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 1155 . | 1 | 4 |
Sunrise Country Club Assn. v. Proudgreen1 sentence2026Insufficient allegations of discriminatory intent The Unruh Civil Rights Act mandates that all persons “are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Through its enactment, “the Legislature intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. [Citation.]” 10 (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 .) To state an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, “a plaintiff must allege the defendant is a business establi | 1 | 1 |
Gatto v. County of Sonomagreen1 sentence2022(See Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 769 [reversing judgment for the plaintiff — to the extent judgment was based on the Unruh Civil Rights Act — on the ground he was not a member of any relevant protected class, and discussing the potential applicability of the Act to a county fair].) Other Courts of Appeal have considered the issue of public-entity defendants and suggested the Act would not apply to them, but, here too, none ruled on the issue definitively. | 1 | 1 |
Presta v. Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Boardgreen2 sentences2006A dispute over jury instructions prompted the federal district court judge to write a short opinion slated for publication in the Federal Supplement over whether an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim requires a plaintiff to prove “that the defendant harbored discriminatory intent.” (See Presta, supra, 16 F.Supp.2d at p. 1135 .) In rejecting defendant jury instructions which would have told the jury that plaintiff had to show the “ ‘discrimination was unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidious’ ” (Presta, supra, 16 F.Supp.2d at p. 1136 ), the court reasoned that the federal ADA (specifically title II, 42 2006In Presta the facts were extremely simple: On numerous occasions the plaintiff, a person of severely limited mobility, was not given sufficient time to board and disembark an Amtrak train, and in fact was treated “rudely when she asked for assistance.” (Presta, supra, 16 F.Supp.2d at p. 1135 .) The plaintiff brought an ADA action in federal court, and appended to it an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation claim as well as to a Disabled Persons Act claim under section 54. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Fair Employment & Housing Commissiongreen2 sentences2004We therefore do not address the possibility of such a complaint filed directly with the court without prior administrative action.” (Wilson, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224, fn. 7 , italics added.) In contrast, the present case does not involve a question of jurisdiction between two administrative agencies, plaintiff’s claim does not allege discriminatory conduct, and Proposition 103 expressly authorizes this suit: Under section 1861.10, subdivision (a), “[a]ny person may . . . enforce any provision of this article,” including section 1861.02, subdivision (c), which prohibits an insurer from 2004In holding that the commissioner had jurisdiction, the court pointed out that, under Proposition 103, the commissioner is vested with authority to determine “whether a rate is . . . unfairly discriminatory.” (Wilson, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222 , quoting § 1861.05, subd. (a).) The court also commented: “[Plaintiff] did not file a complaint in superior court seeking damages or other relief for an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation. | 1 | 1 |
Larson v. State Personnel Boardgreen2 sentences1996(Cf. Larson v. State Personnel Bd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 265, 273-274 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ].) The FEHC’s jurisdiction of Unruh Civil Rights Act claims is controlled by statute, and in the abstract the statutory analysis is straightforward: The Government Code declares an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation to be an “unlawful practice.” (Gov. 1996(Cf. Larson v. State Personnel Bd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 265, 273-274 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ].) The FEHC’s jurisdiction of Unruh Civil Rights Act claims is controlled by statute, and in the abstract the statutory analysis is straightforward: The Government Code declares an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation to be an “unlawful practice.” (Gov. | 1 | 1 |
Sullivan v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege 1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege | 1 | 1 |
Blackburn v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege 1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Mitzelgreen2 sentences1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege 1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege | 1 | 1 |
Schonfeld v. City of Vallejored2 sentences1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege 1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege | 1 | 1 |
Burgdorf v. Fundergreen2 sentences1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege 1995Further, unless an immunity otherwise provides, the governmental tort immunities apply to intentional tortious conduct. ( Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720 [ 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 , 527 P.2d 865 ]; Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 665, 673 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 323 ]; Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 401, 419 [ 123 Cal. Rptr. 669 ]; Blackburn v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 175, 177-178 [ 116 Cal. Rptr. 622 ]; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 448-449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) The causes of action at issue in this case allege | 1 | 1 |
| Shell Oil Co. v. Richtergreen | 1 | 1 |
Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mutual Water Co.green2 sentences1992Thus, a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted. ( Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal. App.2d 164, 168 [ 125 P.2d 930 ].) Accordingly, where the complaint fails to state a cause of action an order granting a preliminary injunction must be reversed. ( Watson v. Santa Carmenita etc. Co. (1943) 58 Cal. App.2d 709, 719 [ 137 P.2d 757 ].) (3) An appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed to try the case on the merits. ( Gray v. Bybee, supra, 60 Cal. App.2d at p. 571 .) If the court can try the case 1992Thus, a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be granted. ( Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal. App.2d 164, 168 [ 125 P.2d 930 ].) Accordingly, where the complaint fails to state a cause of action an order granting a preliminary injunction must be reversed. ( Watson v. Santa Carmenita etc. Co. (1943) 58 Cal. App.2d 709, 719 [ 137 P.2d 757 ].) (3) An appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed to try the case on the merits. ( Gray v. Bybee, supra, 60 Cal. App.2d at p. 571 .) If the court can try the case | 1 | 1 |
Gray v. Bybeegreen2 sentences1992Because the Unruh Civil Rights Act claim was her only basis for a preliminary injunction, Ms. MaJor's appeal from denial of an injunction is now moot. (2) A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits. ( Gray v. Bybee (1943) 60 Cal. App.2d 564, 571 [ 141 P.2d 32 ].) It is not, in itself, a cause of action. 1992Because the Unruh Civil Rights Act claim was her only basis for a preliminary injunction, Ms. MaJor's appeal from denial of an injunction is now moot. (2) A preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits. ( Gray v. Bybee (1943) 60 Cal. App.2d 564, 571 [ 141 P.2d 32 ].) It is not, in itself, a cause of action. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club
green
2 sentences2026Insufficient allegations of discriminatory intent The Unruh Civil Rights Act mandates that all persons “are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Through its enactment, “the Legislature intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. [Citation.]” 10 (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 .) To state an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, “a plaintiff must allege the defendant is a business establi 2023To state a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege the defendant is a business establishment that intentionally discriminates against and/or denies plaintiff full and equal treatment of a service, advantage, or accommodation based on plaintiff’s protected status. (§§ 51, subd. (b), 51.5; Candelore, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1144-1146; Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim is based on an [Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990] violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentiona | 3 | 2007–2026 |
Angelucci v. Century Supper Club
green
2 sentences2019It is for the Legislature, too, to consider whether limitations on the current statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken enforcement of the Act or place unwarranted barriers in the *1032 way of those persons who suffer discrimination and whose interests were intended to be served by the Act." ( Id. at p. 179, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 , 158 P.3d 718 .) We also discussed equitable defenses and constitutional limitations on statutory penalties as important safeguards. ( Id. at pp. 179-180, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 , 158 P.3d 718 .) Under the rule proposed here, an individual bringing an Unruh Civ 2019It is for the Legislature, too, to consider whether limitations on the current statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken enforcement of the Act or place unwarranted barriers in the *1032 way of those persons who suffer discrimination and whose interests were intended to be served by the Act." ( Id. at p. 179, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 , 158 P.3d 718 .) We also discussed equitable defenses and constitutional limitations on statutory penalties as important safeguards. ( Id. at pp. 179-180, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 , 158 P.3d 718 .) Under the rule proposed here, an individual bringing an Unruh Civ | 2 | 2016–2019 |
In Re Cox
green
2 sentences2001Exchange, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1465, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 ; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc., supra, 231 Cal. App.3d at p. 521 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 556 .) The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance—a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 , 90 Cal.Rptr. 24 , 474 P.2d 993 , and reaffirmed in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 . 2001Exchange, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1465; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 521 .) The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance—a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 , and reaffirmed in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 1155 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Exchange, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1465, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 ; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc., supra, 231 Cal. App.3d at p. 521 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 556 .) The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance—a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 , 90 Cal.Rptr. 24 , 474 P.2d 993 , and reaffirmed in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 . 2001Exchange, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1465; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 521 .) The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance—a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 , and reaffirmed in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 1155 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Liapes v. Facebook, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026Insufficient allegations of discriminatory intent The Unruh Civil Rights Act mandates that all persons “are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) Through its enactment, “the Legislature intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. [Citation.]” 10 (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 840 .) To state an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim, “a plaintiff must allege the defendant is a business establi | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Candelore v. Tinder, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023To state a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege the defendant is a business establishment that intentionally discriminates against and/or denies plaintiff full and equal treatment of a service, advantage, or accommodation based on plaintiff’s protected status. (§§ 51, subd. (b), 51.5; Candelore, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1144-1146; Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim is based on an [Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990] violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentiona | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Martinez v. Cot'n Wash, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023To state a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff must allege the defendant is a business establishment that intentionally discriminates against and/or denies plaintiff full and equal treatment of a service, advantage, or accommodation based on plaintiff’s protected status. (§§ 51, subd. (b), 51.5; Candelore, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1144-1146; Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026 , 1036 [“Unless an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim is based on an [Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990] violation,” a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination].) Intentiona | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Semler v. General Electric Capital Corp.
green
1 sentence2023(Semler v. General Electric Capital Corp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1404 .) But our conclusions apply equally to the Unruh Civil Rights Act and section 51.5 claims. 8 not forfeited this argument. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Regents of University v. Superior Court
yellow
1 sentence2023(Regents, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 558 .) Facebook qualifies as a business establishment. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Major v. Miraverde Homeowners Assn.
green
1 sentence2022(Id. at p. 623.) On appeal from the order denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeal held that “[b]ecause 5 the Unruh Civil Rights Act claim was her only basis for a preliminary injunction, [the plaintiff’s] appeal from denial of an injunction is now moot.” (MaJor, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 623 .) The court reasoned that “[a] preliminary injunction is an interim remedy designed to maintain the status quo pending a decision on the merits,” but is not “in itself, a cause of action.” (Ibid.) “Thus, a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief may be grant | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Mackey v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.
green
1 sentence2022(See Mackey v. Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640 [reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of the state university on an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim by Black athletes].) In another case, the court did not extend the Act to public entities, but it briefly indicated approval of a potential rationale for doing so. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB
green
1 sentence2021And Agindotan has not articulated why the same facts would support an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim notwithstanding the litigation privilege.6 6 We note the Hagberg court did not resolve “whether proof that a business establishment has called for police assistance (or has a policy of calling for police assistance) based on racial or ethnic prejudice could give rise to liability under the Unruh Civil Rights Act notwithstanding the provisions of section 47(b).” (Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 376 .) Because Agindotan fails substantively to brief the viability of this claim, we do not reach it. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Long v. Valentino
green
1 sentence2007(Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) 11 The Harris court further held that, in evaluating the viability of an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim based upon a category not enumerated in the statute or identified in a prior appellate decision, one of the questions in the three-part test is whether the new claim “is based on a classification that involves personal.characteristics.” ( Koebke, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 841 .) Since Long, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1287 , held that the Act prohibited arbitrary discrimination on the basis of one’s occupation, we need not engage in the three-part Harris test tha | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Vernon Crowder Stephanie Good v. Yukio Kitagawa, Chairman, Board of Agriculture, State of Hawaii Calvin Lum
green
1 sentence2006A dispute over jury instructions prompted the federal district court judge to write a short opinion slated for publication in the Federal Supplement over whether an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim requires a plaintiff to prove “that the defendant harbored discriminatory intent.” (See Presta, supra, 16 F.Supp.2d at p. 1135 .) In rejecting defendant jury instructions which would have told the jury that plaintiff had to show the “ ‘discrimination was unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidious’ ” (Presta, supra, 16 F.Supp.2d at p. 1136 ), the court reasoned that the federal ADA (specifically title II, 42 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2001Exchange, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1462-1465, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 ; Gayer v. Polk Gulch, Inc., supra, 231 Cal. App.3d at p. 521 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 556 .) The Hessians attempt to stake out an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim here by characterizing their exclusion from the bar as discrimination based on unconventional appearance—a nonenumerated classification recognized in In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 217-218 , 90 Cal.Rptr. 24 , 474 P.2d 993 , and reaffirmed in Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155 , 278 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 805 P.2d 873 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson
green
2 sentences1996(See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 640 P.2d 115 , 30 A.L.R.4th 1161 ].) Wilson did not file a complaint in superior court seeking damages or other relief for an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation. 1996(See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 640 P.2d 115 , 30 A.L.R.4th 1161 ].) Wilson did not file a complaint in superior court seeking damages or other relief for an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
cluster 677330
green
2 sentences1995Diet. (1971) p. 2113; The Random House Diet, of the English Language (unabridged ed. 1966) p. 1324 [a sidewalk generally is defined as a walk along the side of a road or street].) defendants’ reliance on Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck (2d Cir. 1994) 34 F.3d 130 is misplaced because that opinion “was withdrawn from the bound volume pending a rehearing en banc poll.” ( 34 F.3d 131 -147.) We will not consider defendants’ vague allusion to an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation (Civ. 1995Dict. (1971) p. 2113; The Random House Dict. of the English Language (unabridged ed. 1966) p. 1324 [a sidewalk generally is defined as a walk along the side of a road or street].) [3] Defendants' reliance on Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck (2d Cir.1994) 34 F.3d 130 is misplaced because that opinion "was withdrawn from the bound volume pending a rehearing en banc poll." ( 34 F.3d 131 -147.) [4] We will not consider defendants' vague allusion to an Unruh Civil Rights Act violation (Civ. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.