Woods claim in California

2001(See Yee v. Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd., supra, 62 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1414-1415, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 227 [10 percent return on equity in 1994 considered fair by both parties].) [4] Moreover, as explained above, one measure of whether a regulated enterprise is allowed to operate successfully is whether it continues to attract necessary capital. ( Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 .) We note that in 1993, during the period that the Gallands were subject to supposedly confiscatory rent ceilings, they were able to obtain a $3 million refinancing loan on the

2001(See Yee v. Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd., supra, 62 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1414-1415, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 227 [10 percent return on equity in 1994 considered fair by both parties].) [4] Moreover, as explained above, one measure of whether a regulated enterprise is allowed to operate successfully is whether it continues to attract necessary capital. ( Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 .) We note that in 1993, during the period that the Gallands were subject to supposedly confiscatory rent ceilings, they were able to obtain a $3 million refinancing loan on the

2025(Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379, 384 ; see Smyth v. Berman (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 183, 196 [sham pleading doctrine prevented plaintiffs from making factually inconsistent allegations in amended complaints].) Here, Mack’s motion expressly stated that the unnotarized and unrecorded quitclaim deed for the Palmdale property—the sole documentary evidence for Woods’s claim to the property in her original petition—was omitted from her amended petition.

2023(Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281 , 1295–1296; People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 .) We cannot evaluate Woods’s claim of insufficient evidence without reviewing the trial transcripts the court relied on as the basis for its ruling, as expressly permitted by section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

2023(Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281 , 1295–1296; People v. Akins (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 .) We cannot evaluate Woods’s claim of insufficient evidence without reviewing the trial transcripts the court relied on as the basis for its ruling, as expressly permitted by section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).

2021Woods’s evidence—her own declaration and that of a coworker—tends to support her contention that her statements to Elk were true, but does not “‘“defeat[] that submitted by the plaintiff[s] as a matter of law.”’” ( Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, 325-326 .) 10 Regan stated in his declaration: “I do not drink alcohol during working hours.” His declaration questioned the notion that Woods could have smelled alcohol on his breath: “Given my work location [in northern California] and Ms. Woods’[s] work location [in southern California] and our respective positions in the Union, Ms. Woods would hav

2021Woods’s evidence—her own declaration and that of a coworker—tends to support her contention that her statements to Elk were true, but does not “‘“defeat[] that submitted by the plaintiff[s] as a matter of law.”’” ( Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, 325-326 .) 10 Regan stated in his declaration: “I do not drink alcohol during working hours.” His declaration questioned the notion that Woods could have smelled alcohol on his breath: “Given my work location [in northern California] and Ms. Woods’[s] work location [in southern California] and our respective positions in the Union, Ms. Woods would hav

2021(Woods, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1091 [“the amendment to subdivision (h) of . . . section 5 12022.53 . . . will take effect before the judgment in this case is final”]; Alexander, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 345 [“the Woods defendant’s case was on direct appeal [citation]–i.e., his conviction was not yet final”].) Moreover, the Penal Code itself undermines Neufeld’s argument, declaring that “[n]o part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.” (§ 3.) The Supreme Court’s guidance about section 3 and specifically in the context of Estrada are no more helpful for Neufeld: “We have de

2021Woods exercised his rights under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 and represented himself at trial.

2020But the Woods defendant’s case was on direct appeal (id. at p. 1082)— i.e., his conviction was not yet final (Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 405 ).

2016Merits We reject Woods's claim of instructional error, which is based on his contention that the court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 334─under which the jury, before considering Walker's testimony, was required to decide whether he was an accomplice to Barnes's murder─and by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte under CALCRIM No. 335─under which the court would have directed a finding that Walker was an accomplice to the murder─because (Woods asserts) Walker was an accomplice "as a matter of law." As already discussed, whether a witness is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 is a

2016Merits We reject Woods's claim of instructional error, which is based on his contention that the court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 334─under which the jury, before considering Walker's testimony, was required to decide whether he was an accomplice to Barnes's murder─and by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte under CALCRIM No. 335─under which the court would have directed a finding that Walker was an accomplice to the murder─because (Woods asserts) Walker was an accomplice "as a matter of law." As already discussed, whether a witness is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 is a

2016Merits We reject Woods's claim of instructional error, which is based on his contention that the court erred by giving CALCRIM No. 334─under which the jury, before considering Walker's testimony, was required to decide whether he was an accomplice to Barnes's murder─and by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte under CALCRIM No. 335─under which the court would have directed a finding that Walker was an accomplice to the murder─because (Woods asserts) Walker was an accomplice "as a matter of law." As already discussed, whether a witness is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 is a

2013(Lee, at p. 60; People v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1312 .) There was no evidence of legally adequate provocation in the instant case.

2013(Lee, at p. 60; People v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1312 .) There was no evidence of legally adequate provocation in the instant case.

2001(See Yee v. Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd., supra, 62 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1414-1415, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 227 [10 percent return on equity in 1994 considered fair by both parties].) [4] Moreover, as explained above, one measure of whether a regulated enterprise is allowed to operate successfully is whether it continues to attract necessary capital. ( Kavanau, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 772 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 941 P.2d 851 .) We note that in 1993, during the period that the Gallands were subject to supposedly confiscatory rent ceilings, they were able to obtain a $3 million refinancing loan on the

1996A holding that the time limit in section 23157, subdivision (g), is mandatory would undermine the Legislature’s overarching intention to “inhibit intoxicated persons from driving on the highways” (Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 77 ) and elevate procedure over substance to the detriment of the law-abiding users of this state’s roads (see Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 847 ).

1996A holding that the time limit in section 23157, subdivision (g), is mandatory would undermine the Legislature’s overarching intention to “inhibit intoxicated persons from driving on the highways” (Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 77 ) and elevate procedure over substance to the detriment of the law-abiding users of this state’s roads (see Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 847 ).

1996A holding that the time limit in section 23157, subdivision (g), is mandatory would undermine the Legislature’s overarching intention to “inhibit intoxicated persons from driving on the highways” (Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 77 ) and elevate procedure over substance to the detriment of the law-abiding users of this state’s roads (see Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 847 ).

1996A holding that the time limit in section 23157, subdivision (g), is mandatory would undermine the Legislature’s overarching intention to “inhibit intoxicated persons from driving on the highways” (Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 77 ) and elevate procedure over substance to the detriment of the law-abiding users of this state’s roads (see Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 847 ).

1989As we explained in part 1 of this discussion, Ronald E„ supra, 19 Cal.3d 315 , at pages 321-322, squarely holds that entitlement to assert a habeas corpus challenge to a minor’s initial wardship adjudication is waived by a long, unexplained acquiescence in the initial consequences of that adjudication.

1989Sumstine also points out that the In re Woods rule permitting an initial challenge to an enhancement prior by habeas corpus after conviction on the subsequent offense was replaced by People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 , at page 215 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ], which requires such challenges to be made before trial on the subsequent offense. 3.

1989Sumstine also points out that the In re Woods rule permitting an initial challenge to an enhancement prior by habeas corpus after conviction on the subsequent offense was replaced by People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204 , at page 215 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 457 , 430 P.2d 15 ], which requires such challenges to be made before trial on the subsequent offense. 3.

1945The suspension of gold mining operations created a condition beyond Moore's control, and constitutes a delay caused by operation of law, excusing performance by him. [1a] Since Moore has not appealed from the judgment and the Woods do not challenge the portion of it which requires him to bear all maintenance expenses incurred during such times as he is "unable to work" the mine "by reason of strikes, lockouts, governmental regulations or any other causes beyond [his] ... control," it follows that the obligations of the litigants must be determined in accordance with that construction of their

1945The suspension of gold mining operations created a condition beyond Moore's control, and constitutes a delay caused by operation of law, excusing performance by him. [1a] Since Moore has not appealed from the judgment and the Woods do not challenge the portion of it which requires him to bear all maintenance expenses incurred during such times as he is "unable to work" the mine "by reason of strikes, lockouts, governmental regulations or any other causes beyond [his] ... control," it follows that the obligations of the litigants must be determined in accordance with that construction of their