16 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Almanza v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Leija , 2009 WL 331897 , at *3 (citing Hess , 224 S.W.3d at 515 ); Vargas , 271 S.W.3d at 341 . 2009See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Leija, 2009 WL 331897 , at *3 (citing Hess, 224 S.W.3d at 515 ); Vargas, 271 S.W.3d at 341 . | 2 | 2 |
Pace Corporation v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2022“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955)). “[T]he material terms of a contract are determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). “[T]he agreement’s terms must also be sufficiently definite to ‘enable a court to understand the parties’ obligations,’” “and to give ‘ 2022“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955)). “[T]he material terms of a contract are determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). “[T]he agreement’s terms must also be sufficiently definite to ‘enable a court to understand the parties’ obligations,’” “and to give ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C.green1 sentence2022“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955)). “[T]he material terms of a contract are determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). “[T]he agreement’s terms must also be sufficiently definite to ‘enable a court to understand the parties’ obligations,’” “and to give ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Anthony L. McCalla and Cheryl A. McCalla v. Baker's Campground, Inc. Kelli Graves and Kourtnie Gravesgreen2 sentences2022“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955)). “[T]he material terms of a contract are determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). “[T]he agreement’s terms must also be sufficiently definite to ‘enable a court to understand the parties’ obligations,’” “and to give ‘ 2022“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’” Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955)). “[T]he material terms of a contract are determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCalla v. Baker’s Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). “[T]he agreement’s terms must also be sufficiently definite to ‘enable a court to understand the parties’ obligations,’” “and to give ‘ | 1 | 1 |
Central Petroleum Limited v. Geoscience Resource Recovery, LLCgreen1 sentence2021Petroleum, 543 S.W.3d at 921 (identifying the operative facts of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim as facts showing a misrepresentation that was false when made and made knowingly or recklessly, that the plaintiff relied on the false representation, and that the plaintiff was injured by that reliance); WaterWorks Corral Creek, LLC v. AquaTech Saltwater Disposal LLC, No. 03-16-00309-CV, 2018 WL 988907 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 21, 2018, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (quoting Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at 67 , for the proposition that “[a] forum state has specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defen | 1 | 1 |
Citrin Holdings, LLC v. Minnisgreen1 sentence2021Contra Citrin Holdings, LLC v. Minnis, 305 S.W.3d 269, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (upholding personal jurisdiction for contract claims “arising from a contract specifically designed to benefit from the skills of a Texas resident who performs contractual obligations in Texas”). | 1 | 1 |
Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Partners Vi, L.P., Reliant Splitter, L.P., and Kennedy Plaza Partners Vi, L.P.green1 sentence2021Tortious Interference Finally, Woods alleged that by threatening CQuentia with legal action if it maintains its “business relationship and/or contractual relationship with Woods, 41 As noted above, Intervenors also produced emails showing that Rapee solicited business with a contact with the VA and that the VA has some facilities in Texas, but this contact does not have a substantial connection to Woods’s claim, either. 42 Woods cites Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding, Inc. v. Nautic Management VI, L.P., 493 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Tex. 2016), to support his argument. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kramergreen1 sentence2020See In re Kramer, 9 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding) (“The trial court had a mandatory duty to transfer the case to Harris County promptly without a hearing as soon as the statutory requirements were met.”). | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.green1 sentence2016See also In re Estate of Hardesty, 449 S.W.3d 895, 909-12 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (following Priester ); Santiago v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 443 S.W.3d 462, 470-73 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (same); cf. Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, 262 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (parties agreed four-year statute of limitations applied to constitutional claims but disagreed on accrual date); cf. also Schanzle v. JPMC Specialty Mortg. | 1 | 1 |
Alice M. Wood and Daniel L. Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N, A. and Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.Cgreen1 sentence2016The only issue the Woods raised on appeal was whether their claims based on constitutional noncompliance, including their claims to quiet title and for a declaration of forfeiture, are subject to a statute of limitations. 1 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that liens securing constitutionally noncompli-ant home-equity loans are voidable and that the residual four-year statute of limitations applied to the Woods’ claims, accruing from the date of closing. 439 S.W.3d 585, 597 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Luis A. and Linda A. Santiago v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc.green1 sentence2016See also In re Estate of Hardesty, 449 S.W.3d 895, 909-12 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (following Priester ); Santiago v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 443 S.W.3d 462, 470-73 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (same); cf. Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, 262 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (parties agreed four-year statute of limitations applied to constitutional claims but disagreed on accrual date); cf. also Schanzle v. JPMC Specialty Mortg. | 1 | 1 |
in Re: The Estate of Carolyn C. Hardestygreen1 sentence2016See also In re Estate of Hardesty, 449 S.W.3d 895, 909-12 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (following Priester ); Santiago v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 443 S.W.3d 462, 470-73 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (same); cf. Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, 262 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (parties agreed four-year statute of limitations applied to constitutional claims but disagreed on accrual date); cf. also Schanzle v. JPMC Specialty Mortg. | 1 | 1 |
Flowers v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Found Guilty — sentenced to 60 days HC jail ... w/ credit for time served....” 6 “Just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there is more than one way to prove a prior conviction.” Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 7891green1 sentence2012See Osborne, 68 F.3d at 99 (“With one exception, the court allowed all existing spectators to remain in the courtroom ... [I]n the circumstances this case presents, the defendants were not denied their Sixth[-]Amendment right to a public trial.”). 3 Although the trial court permitted Ariza and Jones to watch voir dire from the jury box, we doubt the presence of a codefen-dant’s attorney and a member of Woods’s defense team effectively preserved the safeguards of a public trial. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munozgreen1 sentence2012Id. (citing State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Stategreen2 sentences1991Lucas v. State, 721 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim.App.1986); Adams v. State, 639 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). 1991Lucas v. State, 721 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Adams v. State, 639 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. Stategreen2 sentences1991Lucas v. State, 721 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim.App.1986); Adams v. State, 639 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex.Crim.App. 1982). 1991Lucas v. State, 721 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Adams v. State, 639 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Woods v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 3 | 2008–2018 |
Rose v. Lundy
green
2 sentences2015The exhaustion requirement is designed to "prot.ect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent the disruption of state judicial proceedings." Ro`se v. Lund , 455 U.S. 509 ,` 518, 71 L. 2015The exhaustion requirement is designed to "prot.ect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent the disruption of state judicial proceedings." Ro`se v. Lund , 455 U.S. 509 ,` 518, 71 L. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Hess v. State
green
2 sentences2009See Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Leija , 2009 WL 331897 , at *3 (citing Hess , 224 S.W.3d at 515 ); Vargas , 271 S.W.3d at 341 . 2009See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Leija, 2009 WL 331897 , at *3 (citing Hess, 224 S.W.3d at 515 ); Vargas, 271 S.W.3d at 341 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Vargas v. State
green
2 sentences2009See Almanza , 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Leija , 2009 WL 331897 , at *3 (citing Hess , 224 S.W.3d at 515 ); Vargas , 271 S.W.3d at 341 . 2009See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 ; Leija, 2009 WL 331897 , at *3 (citing Hess, 224 S.W.3d at 515 ); Vargas, 271 S.W.3d at 341 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Sterrett v. Jacobs
green
1 sentence2022“The ‘statute of frauds requires that a memorandum of an agreement . . . must be complete within itself in every material detail and contain all of the essential elements of the agreement so that the contract can be ascertained from the writings without resorting to oral 4 Our ruling is based solely on the evidence Woods attached to his summary judgment motion and the arguments presented in the response to Woods’s motion. 10 testimony.’”5 Petrohawk Props., L.P., 455 S.W.3d at 763 (quoting Sterrett v. Jacobs, 118 S.W.3d 877 , 879–80 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Petrohawk Properties, L.P., and P-H Energy, L.L.C. v. Noel Diane Jones
green
1 sentence2022“The ‘statute of frauds requires that a memorandum of an agreement . . . must be complete within itself in every material detail and contain all of the essential elements of the agreement so that the contract can be ascertained from the writings without resorting to oral 4 Our ruling is based solely on the evidence Woods attached to his summary judgment motion and the arguments presented in the response to Woods’s motion. 10 testimony.’”5 Petrohawk Props., L.P., 455 S.W.3d at 763 (quoting Sterrett v. Jacobs, 118 S.W.3d 877 , 879–80 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
TV Azteca v. Ruiz
green
1 sentence2021But even assuming that Cadbury’s contracting with a Texas entity and earning revenue from the contract constitute contacts by Rieder and Rapee with Texas, these contacts do not have a substantial connection to Woods’s claim that Rieder and Rapee made misrepresentations to induce 55 (Utah-resident) Woods to form Cadbury with them to his detriment.38 See TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 52–53; Cent. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
First Bank v. Brumitt
green
1 sentence2021We consider these filings to argue that while Defendants did not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction over Cadbury for claims by CQuentia, or at least for any claims related to the CQ Agreement, they did dispute that any such claim had been asserted or, if it had, that the trial court had jurisdiction over Cadbury for Meeker’s first declaratory judgment claim. 34 See First Bank, 519 S.W.3d at 102 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Jason R. Searcy, as Trustee of the Exempt Assets Trust v. Parex Resources, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Petroleum, 543 S.W.3d at 921 (identifying the operative facts of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim as facts showing a misrepresentation that was false when made and made knowingly or recklessly, that the plaintiff relied on the false representation, and that the plaintiff was injured by that reliance); WaterWorks Corral Creek, LLC v. AquaTech Saltwater Disposal LLC, No. 03-16-00309-CV, 2018 WL 988907 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 21, 2018, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.) (quoting Searcy, 496 S.W.3d at 67 , for the proposition that “[a] forum state has specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defen | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017This point of error is overruled. (2) Woods Preserved No Error in the Admission of Moore’s Expert Testimony When the State presented testimony from Paris Police Captain Tommy Moore as an expert to describe narcotics investigation procedures, Woods objected that the State had failed to show Moore was properly qualified: “Your Honor, I don’t think what he’s testified [to] meets the [Daubert]2 qualifications and I’ll object.” Because Woods’ objection was not specific enough to preserve any error, we overrule this point of error. 2 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmas., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (Fe | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Gamble v. State
green
2 sentences2014Gamble, 8 S.W.3d at 454 . 2014Gamble, 8 S.W.3d at 454 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Zamorano v. State
green
1 sentence2012Id. (citing State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.