State argues error in Illinois

1990II The State also contends that, even if the trial court erred in failing to require State disclosure of its informant's identity, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) The State argues that when defense counsel orally moved the trial court for a continuance and for a body attachment of defendant's witness Stevenson after Stevenson's refusal to appear pursuant to his subpoena, counsel was unable to articulate what Stevenson's testimony would be.

1990Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 .) The State argues that when defense counsel orally moved the trial court for a continuance and for a body attachment of defendant’s witness Stevenson after Stevenson’s refusal to appear pursuant to his subpoena, counsel was unable to articulate what Stevenson’s testimony would be.

2016App. 3d 478, 481 (1981) (citing People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276 (1977), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).

2016App. 3d 478, 481 (1981) (citing People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276 (1977), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).

2025The State argues that defense counsel’s decisions were strategic ones and that Smart cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice. ¶ 11 We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo (People v. Bates, 2018 IL App (4th) 160255 , ¶ 46), and analyze them under the two-part test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984).

2025The State argues that defense counsel’s decisions were strategic ones and that Smart cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice. ¶ 11 We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo (People v. Bates, 2018 IL App (4th) 160255 , ¶ 46), and analyze them under the two-part test announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984).

2021Id. at 53-54 . ¶ 32 The State argues that no error occurred because Triplett’s statement was not “testimonial.” To decide whether a statement is testimonial, we must determine “whether, *** viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)).

2020Id. at 53-54 . ¶ 32 The State argues that no error occurred because Triplett’s statement was not “testimonial.” To decide whether a statement is testimonial, we must determine “whether, *** viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. ___ , ___, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)).

2012In Sutherland , this court quoted from Rice : "For an opportunity to cross-examine to be considered meaningful, and therefore adequate and effective, the motive and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial proceeding must be the same or similar to that which guides the cross-examination during the subsequent proceeding." Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 273 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (quoting Rice, 166 Ill.2d at 41 , 209 Ill.Dec. 635 , 651 N.E.2d 1083 ). ¶ 59 The State argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of Pena at the preliminary hearing partook of the same "mot

2012In Sutherland , this court quoted from Rice : "For an opportunity to cross-examine to be considered meaningful, and therefore adequate and effective, the motive and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial proceeding must be the same or similar to that which guides the cross-examination during the subsequent proceeding." Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 273 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (quoting Rice, 166 Ill.2d at 41 , 209 Ill.Dec. 635 , 651 N.E.2d 1083 ). ¶ 59 The State argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of Pena at the preliminary hearing partook of the same "mot

2012In Sutherland , this court quoted from Rice : "For an opportunity to cross-examine to be considered meaningful, and therefore adequate and effective, the motive and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial proceeding must be the same or similar to that which guides the cross-examination during the subsequent proceeding." Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 273 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (quoting Rice, 166 Ill.2d at 41 , 209 Ill.Dec. 635 , 651 N.E.2d 1083 ). ¶ 59 The State argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of Pena at the preliminary hearing partook of the same "mot

2012In Sutherland , this court quoted from Rice : "For an opportunity to cross-examine to be considered meaningful, and therefore adequate and effective, the motive and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial proceeding must be the same or similar to that which guides the cross-examination during the subsequent proceeding." Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 273 , 307 Ill.Dec. 524 , 860 N.E.2d 178 (quoting Rice, 166 Ill.2d at 41 , 209 Ill.Dec. 635 , 651 N.E.2d 1083 ). ¶ 59 The State argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of Pena at the preliminary hearing partook of the same "mot

2008The State argues the principle for which defendant cited Braggs is not good law because Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th cir. 2002), a case our supreme court relied heavily upon in Braggs, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 655 , 158 L.

2008The State argues the principle for which defendant cited Braggs is not good law because Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2002), a case our supreme court relied heavily upon in Braggs, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 655 , 158 L.

2006In In re A.G., 195 Ill.2d 313 , 253 Ill.Dec. 911 , 746 N.E.2d 732 (2001), this court had its initial encounter with the question of the applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to juvenile proceedings.

2006In In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001), this court had its initial encounter with the question of the applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act to juvenile proceedings.

2000However, as noted, the strict application of the waiver doctrine may be relaxed where required by fundamental fairness, which is analyzed in terms of “cause and prejudice.” Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d at 20 .

2000However, as noted, the strict application of the waiver doctrine may be relaxed where required by fundamental fairness, which is analyzed in terms of "cause and prejudice." Franklin, 167 Ill.2d at 20 , 212 Ill.Dec. 153 , 656 N.E.2d 750 .

1998The State argues this was error because even if we assume Garza acted improperly, the State discovered the records from an "independent source" or the records would have been "inevitably discovered." See Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 81 L.

1998The State argues this was error because even if we assume Garza acted improperly, the State discovered the records from an "independent source" or the records would have been "inevitably discovered." See Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431 , 81 L.

1998In general, a hearing on a postconviction petition is appropriate "where resolution of the issues requires an inquiry into matters outside of the common law record." Smith , 268 Ill.

1998In general, a hearing on a postconviction petition is appropriate “where resolution of the issues requires an inquiry into matters outside of the common law record.” Smith, 268 Ill.

1989It maintains that this evidence is relevant to show intent and motive: intent in the sense that the defendant’s prior acts are probative of the absence of accident (see, e.g., People v. Manzella (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 187 (evidence that the defendant had previously threatened and assaulted the victims was relevant to show criminal intent)), and motive in the sense that the prior acts tend to show that the defendant had a reason for killing the decedent (see, e.g., People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22 (evidence that the decedent had previously turned the defendant in to the police is relevant t

1988The State argues that the instruction was adequate, for this court in People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill.2d 54, 81 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 892 , 83 L.Ed.2d 205 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , and in People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 71 , cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1131 , 86 L.Ed.2d 283 , 105 S.Ct. 2666 , held that there was no error in giving this standard IPI instruction without informing the jury that natural life imprisonment was the only statutory alternative to the death penalty for a multiple murderer. *261 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in King v. Lynaugh (1987), 828 F.

1989(See People v. Gaines (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 79, 92-94 , 473 N.E.2d 868, 875-76 , cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1131 , 86 L.

1988The State argues that the instruction was adequate, for this court in People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill.2d 54, 81 , cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 892 , 83 L.Ed.2d 205 , 105 S.Ct. 268 , and in People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 71 , cert. denied (1985), 471 U.S. 1131 , 86 L.Ed.2d 283 , 105 S.Ct. 2666 , held that there was no error in giving this standard IPI instruction without informing the jury that natural life imprisonment was the only statutory alternative to the death penalty for a multiple murderer. *261 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in King v. Lynaugh (1987), 828 F.

2026People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 .